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Foreword
Value chain deVelopment is a growing approach worldwide to increase incomes of small producers and the economically active poor. Access to adequate 
and timely financial services for all actors in the chain has proven a key element 
for success. This implies that not only large producers and traders but also small 
producers need access to appropriate financial services to make optimal use of 
value addition and income generation. Such finance is, however, not always avail-
able, and chain actors working in agricultural and rural value chains frequently 
complain about a lack of access to financial services.
Traditionally, most regular banks and microfinance institutions have avoided 
rural finance since this is perceived as risky and costly, with cash flow require-
ments that are irregular and difficult to manage. Banks shy away from the high 
transaction costs and risks related to agriculture such as crop failure, diseases 
and market fluctuations. Also the lack of physical collateral is a restriction, and 
the risk of political interference that can damage the repayment behaviour of the 
rural clientele is high. Most microfinance institutions opt for high-density urban 
or peri-urban areas where they serve their clients in standardized – often group-
based – systems, usually unfit for the needs of small farmers. In answer to this 
gap in finance, there has been a tendency for companies worldwide to patronize 
a certain chain as a whole and directly finance producers or traders. While this 
may be a good short-term solution to a burning problem, one may also question 
whether this will provide enough perspective for sustainability and scaling up of 
chain interventions needed to reach out to many millions of small rural producers 
and processors worldwide. Also one can question whether such financing mecha-
nisms will contribute to the desired empowerment of small rural producers and 
processors, or rather increase their dependency on larger chain actors.
In this book the link between chain actors and financial institutions is described 
as a means to deepen financial services for value chains. Value chain finance 
aims to address perceived constraints and risks by providing innovative ways of 
delivering financial services to rural producers and agribusinesses. Value chain 
finance means linking financial institutions to the value chain, offering financial 
services to support the product flow, and building on the established relation-
ships in the chain. It means that the product flow in the value chain is used as a 
carrier to provide financial services. This way of financing can spread risk among 
the financial institutions and chain actors and provides alternatives to traditional 
collateral requirements. It provides tremendous potential for unleashing capital, 
scaling up and sustaining chain prospects, but it needs to be managed and or-
ganized well.
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Value chain finance as defined in this book needs to build on trust and strong 
relationships between chain actors and financial service providers. Parties need 
to know and understand each other, and this often requires a change of mindset, 
particularly with the banks but also with the microfinance institutions, producers 
and companies. All cases in the book underline the need for financial institutions 
to have a deep understanding of the realities in the chain and of the need for timely 
and flexible finance. Likewise, the chain actors need to understand the business 
realities and mentalities of banks and microfinance institutions looking at risk 
mitigation and cost coverage for their services. 
Innovative financial products and services are needed such as insurance, over-
drafts, factoring and leasing models, as well as investment loans, guarantees and 
venture capital. Such a variety of sizes and types of financial products can be 
offered only through a combination of financial service providers. This requires 
building vertical linkages in the financial sector. For example, microfinance in-
stitutions can link with producer organizations to provide small input loans to 
producers, while banks simultaneously provide an investment loan to a process-
ing company in the chain. The microfinance institutions and banks need to link 
up to align their services in this chain for potential overdraft facilities to small 
traders. 
Organizations such as Hivos, ICCO, Terrafina Microfinance and Triodos Bank can 
be instrumental in horizontal and vertical relationship building between produc-
ers, companies and financial service providers. These organizations are promoting 
value chain finance as part of their policies to develop rural entrepreneurship, and 
can develop a variety of support mechanisms to financial institutions and chain 
actors. Such mechanisms are indispensable for increasing the numbers of small 
rural producers and processors that make use of value chain finance. 
This book is the third in a series on value chain development by the Royal Tropical 
Institute (KIT) and the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) and 
is the logical follow up to the two other books. One is called Chain empowerment: 
Supporting African farmers to develop markets (2006) and the other is titled Trading 
up: Building cooperation between farmers and traders in Africa (2007). This book is 
the first to draw on worldwide experiences.
This publication will add to the growing literature on value chain development 
and value chain finance. We hope that the publication contributes to ongoing 
exchange and mutual learning and will increase the effectiveness of the work 
on poverty reduction of our organizations. We also hope that the book will 
stimulate bankers and government institutions to support value chain finance 
in a bid to create sustainable local and international markets. This book is a re-
sult of exchange by practitioners and academics using the particular method of 
a “writeshop” (jointly writing a book in a workshop). As a result it contains an 
easy-to-read analysis of many excellent examples from practice that convince us 
that, together, development agents can increase their relevance for many millions 
of rural poor.
Ford Foundation, hiVos, icco, terraFina microFinance, triodos Bank
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Preface
in 2006, the royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) published a best-seller on empowering African 
smallholder farmers in value chains. The book was reprinted in 2007, and in 
2008 we published a second book on building cooperation between farmers and 
traders in Africa. This book was also well received, and the first printing of 1000 
copies was sold out before the end of the year. 
The writeshop approach used by IIRR and KIT proved able to result in interesting 
reading for practitioners who recognize themselves in the real-life experiences 
documented in these books. It is a simple phenomenon: audiences appreciate a 
movie more if they can sympathize with the hero. The people who help us write 
and publish these books are all champions in their fields and share their best 
practices to the inspiration of others.
When considering what issue should feature next in our series, we came across 
what experts call the “finance gap”. Farmers can be empowered to participate 
in value chain governance. Traders can build strong relations with farmers to 
achieve value chain efficiency. But if there is no finance to make the chain work, 
business comes to an abrupt stop. Successful business needs trade finance and 
loans for making investments. No normal business venture can finance this with 
its own resources. Entrepreneurs need financial services from banks and other 
financial agents to keep operating and growing their businesses. 
In recent years the microfinance industry has mushroomed to develop into a big 
business catering for the needs of previously “unbankable” micro-entrepreneurs 
around the world. Yet small- and medium-sized enterprises still experience major 
problems in borrowing money for their operations and investments, especially 
in the countryside. This is the finance gap that constrains business development 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Business people in low-income countries encounter major obstacles for obtain-
ing loans. Banks and related financial institutions have built high walls for small 
and medium-sized businesses. Their requirements and procedures seem to be 
designed to keep business people out of the bank. Often, applying for a bank 
credit is more a matter of political networking than doing good business. 
But these enterprises employ lots of people, are able to invest in product devel-
opment, and are capable of exploring new markets. There is plenty of evidence 
that small and medium-sized enterprises are the real backbone of developing 
economies. Not providing these small engines of development with capital to 
operate is a tragedy in disguise.
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Fortunately there are heroes in this story. There are people and financial insti-
tutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America who look for solutions that cross the 
boundaries of the conventional. They understand the problem, but also the oppor-
tunities offered by small and medium enterprises. They are developing tools and 
mechanisms to provide them with capital. And they are succeeding in promoting 
good business and achieving sound returns on their investment. 
This book is about their experiences. The authors of this book are, again, practi-
tioners themselves, who tell their own stories, which we have carefully put into 
context. I am sure that you as a reader of this book will sympathize with them 
and admire their novel ways of providing financial services.
On behalf of KIT and IIRR, I would like to thank all the contributors for their 
willingness to explain how their businesses and how their financial models work. 
There are still relatively few such initiatives around the world, and it is high time 
that the pioneering approaches were copied, adapted and expanded to the benefit 
of millions of other farmers and businesses.
I would also like to thank our donors and partners who made this book possible. 
Their support is vital to KIT’s and IIRR’s efforts to promote better approaches to 
value chain development. 
Finally, my personal thanks to the team of specialists, facilitators, editors, art-
ists and other staff, within KIT and IIRR and outside, who have made this book 
possible.
 Bart de steenhuijsen piters
 Area Leader Sustainable Economic Development
 KIT – Royal Tropical Institute
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1
linking rural 
entrepreneurs to 
financial services
Conrado grows potatoes on a plot of land in the Valles region in Bolivia. He is proud of his crop: the tubers are good quality, and his uncle, a trader, pays him a 
good price for them. Although business is going quite well, Conrado has a problem: every 
day he has to walk 2 hours to get to his farm. If he had a bicycle, he could spend this time 
instead grading and packaging the potatoes, which would fetch him a higher price. His 
uncle cannot afford to lend him the money – he has to pay staff and the costs of storing 
the potatoes. Conrado went to a local bank, but they refused him a loan: Conrado does not 
own the land he works on; without collateral, the bank cannot help him.
Gonzalez, a bank employee, knows the Valles region well: his father used to grow potatoes 
there, and made just enough money to put his children through school. Gonzalez started 
working at the bank with a dream: he thought his job would let him help poor people 
improve their businesses. But even though he knew that an ambitious young man like 
Conrado would be able to pay back his loan, he could not help him. He asked his boss if 
an exception could be made. His boss said no: the bank’s rules prohibited making loans 
without collateral.
* * *
This story illustrates a mismatch between a would-be borrower and a potential 
lender. Even knowing that a loan to the farmer would generate benefits for both 
parties, the bank cannot enter this kind of business. Generally there is a problem 
in how financial services suit the demands and circumstances of rural clients. 
This book is about how rural entrepreneurs can be better linked to providers of 
financial services. 
Only 20 years ago, giving credit to poor people was seen as foolish. Since then, 
improvements have been made. Poor households increasingly have access to 
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small loans from microfinance institutions, and large agribusinesses can get credit 
through commercial banks. But many rural producers and small- and medium-
sized agribusinesses remain under-served. Their financial needs are generally too 
large for microfinance, but too small for commercial banks. This gap hampers 
growth and limits agricultural development. It is also a loss to the financial sec-
tor, which ignores millions of potential rural clients. 
Financial service providers generally regard the rural sector as too risky and as 
involving high transaction costs. They doubt the ability and willingness of rural 
entrepreneurs to repay their debts. Potential lenders may also see high risks be-
cause they lack understanding of the rural sector, and have no way to evaluate 
the risks in agricultural value chains (Quirós 2006).
In this book we explore value chain finance as a way to deliver more, and bet-
ter, financial services to farmers and rural entrepreneurs. Realizing the benefits 
of value chain finance requires a shift in thinking on the risks in financing agri-
culture, and on how to mitigate risks through new approaches to cooperation. 
Such a shift can neither be made overnight, nor by every financial institution. 
But by sharing experiences with value chain finance, this book aims to pave the 
way for financial institutions to increase the reach of their services to small-scale 
farmers and other rural entrepreneurs. We also hope that rural entrepreneurs 
and development organizations will be able to draw lessons and inspiration on 
ways to promote business and development in rural areas. 
Parts of this book
The remainder of this book is divided into seven chapters.
Chapter 2, Finance for rural entrepreneurs, focuses on the finance gap for rural 
entrepreneurs, and introduces the role of value chain finance in delivering serv-
ices to the poor.
Chapter 3, A value chain finance framework, takes a closer look at how value 
chain finance works, and presents a framework that helps us analyse the cases 
in the following chapters.
Chapter 4, Crafting new chains, presents four cases that involved establishing 
new value chains: potatoes in Peru, milk in Bolivia and India, and chilli in Kenya. 
In these cases, financial services were part of an integrated approach to building 
a value chain. 
Chapter 5, Improving chain liquidity, explores four cases where financial agents 
linked with existing chains and provided new services to build on and improve 
the chain flows. These chains cover cotton in Tanzania, sal leaf in India, tea in 
Kenya, and rice in Rwanda.
Chapter 6, Unleashing investments in the chain, focuses on how chain actors 
made medium-term investments and how financial agents played an enabling 
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role in this process. The five cases in this chapter cover honey in Kenya, soybean 
in Ethiopia, coffee in Nicaragua, quinoa in Bolivia, and fish in India. 
Chapter 7, Synthesis, looks at the cases through a wider lens. It draws lessons 
from the cases and offers some ideas on ways to use value chain finance to pro-
mote rural businesses in ways that benefit the poor.
Chapter 8, Resources, lists organizations, websites and publications that focus 
on value chain finance. It also gives the contact details of the people who con-
tributed to the book.
How this book was produced
This book is part of wider efforts to generate practical knowledge for organi-
zations that work on the development of markets, value chains and financial 
services in Africa. In 2006 KIT, IIRR and Faida MaLi jointly produced a book, 
Chain empowerment: Supporting African farmers to develop markets that reflected the 
experiences and views of many organizations assisting African farmers in value 
chain development. The book was well received as many organizations found it 
useful as a guide in their programmes and activities with the farmers.
In 2008 KIT and IIRR produced a second book focusing on the role of traders in 
value chains, Trading up: Building cooperation between farmers and traders in Africa. 
Many organizations working on value chain development are unfamiliar with 
how to deal with traders. They therefore encourage the farmers to do the mar-
keting themselves, which in many cases has yielded disappointing results. This 
book showed that cooperation with traders is indeed possible, and can bring 
benefits for all.
This third book turns the focus to the role of finance in value chains. Financial 
markets in developing countries largely fail to serve the need of small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises, particularly in rural areas (the “missing middle”). Among 
the many current innovations, value chain finance is a promising one. This book 
presents some experiences in value chain finance, assesses the preconditions, 
opportunities and limitations of this approach, and develops experience-based 
strategies and guidelines for future policy and practice. 
For this book, KIT played an overall technical coordination role, developed a 
conceptual framework and raised funds, while IIRR advised on the process, as-
sembled the technical team, facilitated the writeshop and organized the logistics. 
KIT and the editor managed the editing and layout, and KIT Publishers was 
responsible for printing. 
The production of this book was supported by ICCO, Triodos Bank, Terrafina 
Microfinance, Hivos and the Ford Foundation. Hivos staff also participated in 
the writeshop.
The bulk of this book was produced through an intensive participatory “write-
shop”, held from 18 to 27 February 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya. Prior to the writeshop, 
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potential cases were identified through an open call for cases sent to the partner 
networks of KIT, IIRR and the donor organizations. On the basis of one-page ab-
stracts, 13 cases from Africa, Latin America and Asia were selected. The authors 
were sent guidelines on how to write their case along with a sample to use as a 
model, and were invited to participate in the writeshop.
Each contributor brought to the writeshop a draft manuscript describing interven-
tions by an external financial institution providing services to chain actors. Each 
case focused on how value chain finance contributed to smoothing of the chain 
and competitiveness. They were asked to bring with them to the writeshop other 
printed materials and photographs relevant to their case.
The 37 participants included managers and staff of financial institutions, business 
development services, private companies and cooperatives, as well as farmers, 
development professionals, researchers, facilitators, artists and editors. They are 
listed on page xvi, and their contact details are given on page 246.
The writeshop process
The writeshop began with an introduction to the process to be used and the 
framework that underlies this book (described further in Chapter 3). One of the 
cases was presented as an example, making use of the framework. On the second 
day the participants worked in teams, together with a resource person (individual 
specialists in value chain finance) and an editor, and prepared a presentation of 
their case, following the first example. 
The authors then presented their cases in turn to the plenary. After each presenta-
tion, the participants had an opportunity to ask questions, make comments, and 
critique the manuscript. The author, editor and resource person allocated to that 
case took notes. With their assistance, the authors then rewrote their drafts, add-
ing details about the situation before and after the financial initiative described 
in the case. An artist drew illustrations to depict the case. Teams of participants 
also used labels, marker pens and flip-chart paper to depict the flowcharts of 
their value chains (these were later condensed into the graphics included in this 
book).
The authors then in turn presented their revised manuscripts to two sub-plenary 
groups. The other participants again commented on and critiqued each case, and 
the author, resource person and editor again took notes, then incorporated the 
corrections into a third draft. 
Also during the writeshop, participants took part in two brainstorming and dis-
cussion sessions to generate ideas for the Analysis section of the book (Chapter 
7). In the first, groups of participants discussed the themes of “crafting new value 
chains”, “expanding chain liquidity” and “unleashing investments in the chain”. 
The second session dealt with cross-cutting issues: “building and destroying 
triangles”, “opportunities, benefits and limitations”, and “institutional environ-
ment and governance”.
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One day of the writeshop consisted of a forum for stakeholders and policymak-
ers, where financial institutions and policymakers shared their experiences with 
innovative ways of financing chain actors. A second day was devoted to a field 
visit to a milk cooperative and a small milk farmer near the writeshop venue. 
After the writeshop, only minor editing was necessary to put the case manuscripts 
(which form the bulk of the book, Chapters 4–6) into their final form. The KIT 
coordinators wrote the introductory and analysis chapters (Chapter 1–3 and 7–8) 
based on the ideas developed during the brainstorming sessions. The overall edi-
tor in collaboration with KIT and IIRR was responsible for finalizing the book.
Throughout the writeshop process, the initial manuscripts were revised substan-
tially or were completely rewritten. The individual participants remain the main 
authors of their cases; their names are printed at the end of each case.
Writeshop advantages
The sequence described above is an adaptation of the writeshop approach 
pioneered by IIRR at its headquarters in the Philippines. IIRR–Africa has used 
this approach to produce extension and information materials on a wide range 
of subjects. Writeshops have several advantages over conventional methods 
of producing a publication. They speed up the production process, taking full 
advantage of the participants’ range of expertise. The process of writing, getting 
comments, revising and illustrating takes place at the same time, considerably 
shortening the often-difficult process of writing, editing and publishing. A large 
number of participants contribute to each topic, generating insights and significant 
amounts of new information. Working with the editors enables the manuscripts 
to be revised, simplified and put into a common format. In effect, the writeshop 
provides an opportunity for technical peer review by a large number of review-
ers, as well as pre-testing for understandability and field relevance by a group 
of the intended readers. 
In addition, writeshops bring together a large number of people from various 
institutions, countries and walks of life, each with different perspectives and exper-
tise. They are an excellent training and networking opportunity, with individuals 
learning about each other’s work and exchanging ideas and experiences that will 
be of value for them when they return home. It is hoped that the relationships 
and networks forged during the writeshop will continue long into the future.

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Finance for rural 
entrepreneurs 
agriculture is the BackBone of the economy in developing countries. Millions of micro-entrepreneurs – farmers, processors, traders, transporters, input 
suppliers – run their businesses in difficult circumstances. Roads are potholed, 
distances are long, market prices are often unknown, inputs may not be available, 
electricity is unreliable – these entrepreneurs need to deal with many challenges 
on a daily basis. All this points to enormous entrepreneurial potential. But most of 
these entrepreneurs are asset-poor and their management is informal, so financial 
institutions are reluctant to finance them. 
The rural finance gap
Without finance, farmers may not be able to buy good seeds, hire workers, or 
invest in equipment. For traders, a lack of finance may mean that they cannot pay 
cash when they take delivery of the crops – so the farmers may sell their crops 
elsewhere. For small-scale processors, a lack of finance may mean they cannot 
expand their operations.
Private financial institutions have tended to regard such micro-entrepreneurs as 
unbankable. Banks did not think they were creditworthy – micro-entrepreneurs 
have no credit histories or collateral to offer; many are illiterate, so cannot fill in 
the necessary paperwork. For bankers it is easier and more lucrative to provide 
a handful of large loans to well-established businesses, rather than lots of small 
loans to such micro-entrepreneurs (Yunus 2007: 47–8). 
An additional problem is that these businesses are in the countryside. Agricul-
ture is a risky business. Drought, heavy rain, pests and diseases, unreliable input 
supplies, lack of storage and cooling facilities, bumpy roads, fluctuating prices, 
seasonality of many crops: all make the financial outcome of farming unpredict-
able (Fries and Akin 2004), so most banks are reluctant to finance crops and 
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livestock. They have few staff or branches in the countryside, and distances are 
large, pushing up transaction costs. 
The bad reputation of agricultural credit does not help either. From the 1950s 
to the late 1980s, public bodies intervened extensively in rural credit markets 
in developing countries, especially in Africa. Governments and international 
donors used heavy subsidies to promote rural lending. Credit was cheap, and it 
often went to the wrong people, at the wrong time, for the wrong purpose. When 
farmers had difficulty in repaying their loans, or deliberately defaulted on their 
repayments, no measures were taken against them. Due to low repayment rates 
and bad allocation, rural credit programmes became permanently dependent on 
external resources, and were not a viable operation for private banks. 
The result is a serious and long-lasting rural finance gap (UNCTAD 2004) that 
keeps the economic potential of agriculture underused. The perception of agri-
culture as risky means a loss to the farmers and other entrepreneurs, to the local 
and national economy, and to the financial sector. It hinders agricultural devel-
opment and blocks attempts to reduce poverty. Improved financial markets in 
rural areas would stimulate agricultural and rural growth, leading to economic 
growth and less poverty (USAID 2005).
With commercial banks reluctant to lend to the rural poor, and public agricultural 
development banks closed because of bad performance, it took microfinance in-
stitutions to prove that the asset-poor are bankable. With the use of new lending 
techniques, the microfinance industry showed that lending to micro-entrepreneurs 
is not only feasible, but can even be an attractive market opportunity. 
Microfinance: The beginnings
In the 1970s and 1980s, microfinance institutions began providing small loans to 
poor people. Muhammad Yunus, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, pio-
neered microcredit. He set up a project testing the idea of lending small amounts 
of money to the poor. The project showed that the poor are very well able to pay 
back their loans. So in 1983, Yunus created a special bank for this purpose in 
Bangladesh, called Grameen Bank (which means “village bank”). 
Grameen Bank was revolutionary: it represented a shift in thinking, challenging 
the belief that loans cannot be made without collateral. The bank empowered its 
borrowers to lift themselves out of poverty by removing the institutional barriers 
that normally prevent poor people from accessing financial services. The bank 
showed that the poor are entrepreneurs: they repay their loans with interest, us-
ing money they earn through their own productive work. 
One important innovation underlying the success of Grameen Bank is the use 
of positive social pressure to create trust and loyalty. The bank provides loans 
to groups of borrowers: “No one who borrows from Grameen Bank stands 
alone” (Yunus 2007: 57). Preferably, these groups of borrowers are self-formed 
by neighbours and friends who meet regularly. These small social networks are 
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embedded in a larger group: a centre where ten to twelve groups come together 
for weekly meetings. This “community-oriented dynamic” is perceived as one 
of the cornerstones of Grameen’s success and has also been promoted among 
commercial banks. 
Other new techniques also explain the success of microfinance vis-à-vis tradi-
tional banking:
•	 Regular repayments and savings Building on techniques used by traditional 
grassroots saving groups (Box 2.1), Grameen introduced the idea of regular 
repayments and savings. Borrowers within a group have to repay their loans 
regularly; they have to repay completely before others can apply for a loan. 
That creates social pressure within the group and the centre to encourage 
borrowers to remain faithful to their commitments. This has contributed 
to the high repayment rates of Grameen Bank; in 2006 this was almost 99% 
(Yunus 2007: 51). Yunus says this success is partly because the bank looked 
at the behaviour of people it lent money to. This “people-oriented approach” 
is illustrated by the preference to give credit to women instead of men; un-
like men, women tend not to spend the money on themselves but on their 
families. 
•	 Non-financial services Finance alone cannot reduce poverty. Grameen offers 
multiple services, such as information technology, scholarships, health and 
welfare. It also promotes a strong social agenda: every borrower of the bank 
must commit to this, and is expected to take responsibility for issues such as 
family planning, education, hygiene and community development. 
Despite its success, Grameen Bank also faced difficulties and limitations. Like any 
business, it has had to adapt over time to serve its customers and their needs more 
effectively. For example, the bank had to match its services better to its clients’ 
needs. It introduced a wider variety of loan types, as well as pension funds, loan 
insurance and other financial services. It also had to increase the amount of sav-
ings deposits to improve its capital structure and create a reserve. This would 
enable the bank to become fully self-sufficient. 
Worldwide expansion of microfinance
From the pioneering work of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, microfinance started 
to conquer the world, albeit slowly. As late as 1997, microcredit reached only 
7.6 million families, 5 million of whom were in Bangladesh alone. But in the last 
decade the “microfinance revolution” has come into full swing. In 2006 as many 
as 100 million families were reached worldwide, most of them in South Asia 
(Yunus 2007).
Microfinance programmes have especially benefited women, enabling them to 
grow their businesses, empowering them and giving them a voice in decision 
making (Gonzalez and Rosenberg 2006; Fisher and Sriram 2002). Most microfi-
nance borrowers are from urban areas. They are predominantly self-employed 
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entrepreneurs: shopkeepers, street vendors, artisans, and small service-providers 
such as car mechanics. In rural areas, microfinance reaches clients that are mostly 
engaged in off-farm activities, such as food processing and trade. 
So far only few microfinance institutions successfully serve farmers, though there 
are some notable exceptions. For example, in 2007, Grameen Bank provided a 
large number of loans to farmers to invest in milk cows and paddy cultivation. 
Also in this book, there are examples of microfinance organizations working in 
the countryside, for example in Ethiopia (soybean, page 164) and Rwanda (rice, 
page 135). 
The microfinance industry offers different types of financial products (Interna-
tional Year of Microcredit 2005; De Klerk 2008): 
•	 Microcredit means making small loans to low-income entrepreneurs so they 
can develop small businesses. Microcredit has helped large numbers of poor 
people to overcome problems due to irregular and undependable income, 
and to smooth their cash flows. 
•	 Micro-savings are deposit services that allow people to save small amounts 
of money for future use, often without minimum balance requirements. The 
Box 2.1 Traditional grassroots savings and lending groups
Around the world there are many traditional forms of savings and lending groups. Here 
are two.
A common form is the rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). In these, 
community members voluntarily come together on a regular basis; each time they meet 
they contribute a fixed amount of money. These contributions (or savings) are paid out im-
mediately to one member of the group who is present at the meeting. Who gets the money 
is often decided through a lottery. The money enables this member to invest, buy equipment 
or consumer items, or pay school fees. Once a member has received a payment he or she 
will not take part in the coming lotteries. However, he or she will continue to participate in the 
meetings and pay contributions until the cycle ends. A ROSCA cycle ends once all members 
of the group have received a payment. At this point new members can enter the group, old 
members can leave, and a new cycle of contributions and payments begins. The system is 
particularly popular among women (Gonzalez and Rosenberg 2006; Klerk 2008). 
Another common system is accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs). 
These go one step further than the ROSCAs. Unlike the ROSCA system, savings collected 
during regular meetings are not paid out immediately. They are set aside until enough money 
has been accumulated to provide members with larger loans or until members need to bor-
row money. ASCAs are more difficult to manage than ROSCAs, because the money is held 
as cash and records are needed to keep track of loans and repayments. This is probably 
the reason they are less common than ROSCAs (Klerk 2008). 
One of the advantages of self-help groups is that they are self-sufficient and initiated by 
their members. Because members select co-members themselves, the group coherence 
is assured. Membership of such group also has an intrinsic value in itself as an important 
social resource. Nevertheless, these groups also have their limitations: their life-cycle is 
limited, they require good leadership (which is not always present), and their loans are 
generally small and short-term (Klerk 2008). 
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conventional way of dealing with emergencies and expenses is to sell valuable 
assets such as livestock and equipment. If farm families have access to savings 
facilities, they can put aside part of their earnings to meet future expenses, so 
avoid going into debt or having to sell their assets. 
•	 Micro-insurance includes life insurance for entrepreneurs and their employees 
and, on a smaller scale, crop insurance. It is a system by which people and 
businesses make payments to share risks. 
Initially most initiatives were financed by donor agencies. They provided guaran-
tees to support long-term commercial loans to microfinance institutions so these 
could build more capital resources and develop new financial services for small-
scale businesses. In the late 1990s, many microfinance institutions transformed 
themselves into formal financial providers operating on commercial terms. By then 
it had been proven that the poor are creditworthy, so commercial banks became 
more and more engaged, supporting microfinance institutions with capital to 
increase their outreach and efficiency. Despite the growing interest from private 
investors, 53% of the $11.7 billion that was committed to the microfinance industry 
in 2008 came at below-market rates from donor agencies and multilateral banks 
(The Economist 2009). 
Alongside the microfinance industry there are many traditional, informal types 
of savings and lending groups, which are not officially registered. Also credit 
unions and farmer cooperatives cooperatives remain important in providing 
financial services to the rural poor.
Limitations of microfinance
Microfinance has been truly revolutionary in proving that the poor are bankable, 
and also in allowing poor people to signal their creditworthiness. But microfinance 
is not a panacea. Here are some of its limitations:
•	 High costs Microfinance remains a costly service. Unlike conventional banks, 
microfinance organizations deal with very large numbers of small loans and 
savings. Handling this type of business is more expensive than dealing with 
a small number of large loans.
•	 High interest rates. At up to 36% a year, interest rates charged by microfi-
nance institutions are higher than the rates charged by commercial banks (but 
generally much lower than those charged by moneylenders). These rates are 
high because of the high costs involved in microfinance operations: they need 
to cover the cost of the money, compensate for loan defaults and transaction 
costs (Kiva 2009). 
•	 Small amounts only. Microfinance institutions lend small amounts of money. 
Experience has shown that it is better for new clients to start with small loans 
–generally between $35 and $800 (Yollin 2007). Such amounts can enable a 
borrower to make small investments in a store or to produce handicrafts, but 
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are generally not big enough to allow these businesses to grow to an efficient 
scale.
•	 Short-term loans Most microfinance programmes provide short-term loans 
only. They require their clients to repay relatively quickly – often within 3–4 
months – and in monthly instalments. This approach is well adapted to activi-
ties where an investment pays off immediately, but is less suited to activities 
where the turnover of capital is slower, as in farming.
•	 Little flexibility in loan conditions Generally financial services provided 
by microfinance institutions do not address any special needs that borrow-
ers might have, and they do not respond to changing conditions. Grameen 
Bank has responded to this problem by giving borrowers more options as to 
how and when they repay their loans – making it easier to pay back more 
during the peak business season and less during the slack time. Microfinance 
institutions have also responded by offering a wider range of products and 
services.
•	 Importance of savings underestimated Many poor people need savings 
more than credit facilities (De Klerk 2008). Savings help the poor by smoothing 
their income over time, and function as a kind of insurance. This is especially 
helpful when someone has an irregular income. Savings help people meet the 
costs of occasional events, such as funerals, and can be used for investments 
without having to rely on loans. Savings deposits also benefit microfinance 
institutions in several ways: they make them less dependent on external fi-
nance sources, help them to analyse the creditworthiness of their clients, and 
can be used as a guarantee for an outstanding loan, so reducing its risk. 
•	 Exclusion of the poorest The emphasis within the world of microfinance 
has been very much on sustainability. This means that when they select cli-
ents, microfinance institutions have to choose those who are able to repay 
their loans. Unintentionally, that means that the poorest people cannot access 
financial services, and rural outreach is limited. Many microfinance institu-
tions are trying to improve their outreach, including to rural areas, and have 
made tremendous efforts to improve their social performance. 
•	 Exclusion of others Microfinance is not for everyone. For example, individu-
als often cannot get microfinance services provided to groups. That excludes 
people such as migrants, who may be unenthusiastic about forming groups 
or may lack the social linkage to do so.
•	 Limited reserve of funds Without savings, which help to generate a reserve 
of funds, microfinance institutions are very vulnerable and cannot respond 
well to periods of economic crisis. Making money more readily available 
would help microcredit programmes get through their initial years until they 
reach the breakeven level. A problem that local banks face is that they cannot 
lend money to microfinance institutions because the latter cannot provide 
collateral.
•	 Professionalization Professional staff members are needed to assess their 
clients’ loan applications and ensure that effective loan monitoring and fi-
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nancial management systems are established (De Klerk 2008). To improve 
information on the bankability of the lenders, some microfinance institutions 
have introduced credit rating and financial information systems, thereby 
reducing the risks of non-repayment.
•	 Impact on the poor It is difficult to measure the impact of microcredit on 
poverty reduction. Because microfinance institutions are largely still financed 
by public money, this has raised questions on the effectiveness of the small 
loans. Most evaluation methods fail to control for what would have happened 
in their absence (The Economist 2009). 
In the countryside: Even more limitations
Perhaps the most critical limitation is that microfinance has reached relatively 
few people in the countryside, especially in Latin America and Africa (India is 
an exception, where microfinance institutions have been focusing more on rural 
areas). Microfinance institutions have tried to expand their services to rural areas, 
where poverty is concentrated and where most people are engaged in agriculture. 
But many barriers remain:
•	 High transaction costs Rural areas typically face high transaction costs 
compared to urban areas, where the density of people is higher, infrastruc-
ture is better developed and bank’s branches are less expensive to maintain. 
The large distances to and between (potential) clients is a big challenge for 
microfinance institutions. 
•	 Lack of information for credit assessment In rural areas information to 
assess a borrower’s ability and willingness to repay a loan is difficult and 
expensive to obtain. Although group-based systems in rural areas work well 
in assessing a client’s chracter, it is difficult to do the same for the agricultural 
risks involved. Products are often perishable, and it is hard to forecast price 
movements accurately. Key lending techniques, such as regular repayments 
and savings, are less suitable for agriculture, where cash flows are generally 
very irregular throughout the year. 
•	 High risks in agriculture Another difficulty is the high risks involved in 
agriculture, the main source of income for the majority of the rural poor. 
Plus, if a drought or disease hits, or if the sale price of the produce falls, many 
farmers will find it difficult to repay their loans, all at the same time. Finance 
specialists call this “covariant risk” (De Klerk 2008: 20). It is why microfinance 
organizations are reluctant to extend their services to marginal and risk-prone 
agricultural areas.
•	 Larger loans required Large enterprises can get loans from commercial 
banks or equity finance from venture capital funds or the stock market. Very 
small entrepreneurs can get loans from microfinance institutions. But small 
and medium-scale businesses fall somewhere in between (KIT and IIRR 2008). 
These entrepreneurs have financial needs that are generally too large for 
microfinance, but too small for commercial banks. For example, for buying 
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in bulk, storing produce, or collective processing they need more financial 
assistance than the loans offered by microfinance institutions. 
•	 Inappropriate terms for loans and repayment Most microfinance pro-
grammes provide only short-term loans. That has some benefits: problems 
with repayment can be identified early on. But it does not always work for 
borrowers in the agricultural sector, who can repay loans only after selling 
their crops or livestock (De Klerk 2008). So the terms used by microfinance 
institutions are less effective for clients with irregular cash flows, as is often 
the case in agriculture. 
•	 Distortion from government-subsidized credit programmes Government 
and donor intervention in agricultural lending is one of the greatest sources 
of risks for agricultural lenders. For example, such interventions may offer 
subsidized loans (undercutting the rates offered by microfinance institutions), 
or may be lax on demanding repayment (undermining borrowers’ willing-
ness to repay other loans too). Politicians campaign for debt forgiveness, and 
governments may force lenders to reduce their interest rates. These distortions 
have contributed to dramatically poor repayment rates, a poor allocation of 
credit, and unprofitable lending.
•	 Exclusion of the poorest Excluding the poorest people hits rural areas hard-
est as that is where poverty is concentrated. Problems with illiteracy and age 
hinder access to financial services: illiterate and older people are less likely 
to be informed about such services or be able to understand or apply for 
loans.
Many microfinance institutions have recognized these limitations and are trying to 
overcome them, within the constraints imposed on them by national regulations. 
For example, they are increasingly investing in social performance monitoring to 
measure their impact, seeking ways to address the needs of agricultural producers 
and the rural poor, adding extra financial services to their microfinance support 
activities. Several of the cases in this book reflect these promising initiatives.
Looking at value chains
Unpredictable weather, dodgy infrastructure, volatile prices, low status, little 
support: despite all these problems, millions of farmers, traders, service provid-
ers and other micro-entrepreneurs still manage to deliver fresh food every day to 
urban consumers, export produce to distant markets, and stay in business. That 
reflects their resilience, creativity and huge entrepreneurial potential.
That potential becomes fully clear if we look at the value chains that link farm 
production to rural trading and other sectors of the economy. These chains show 
that farmers do not operate in isolation, but are part of a wider system. The small-
scale businesses of asset-poor farmers at the beginning of the chain are intimately 
connected with larger businesses of traders, food processors and supermarket 
chains at the end.
Figure 2.1 A simple value chain
Product
Money
Services, information
Farmer Trader Processor ConsumerRetailer
Coffee cherries
Cash
Bulk coffee beans
Payment
Roast coffee
Payment
Roast coffee
Cash
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A value chain refers to the entire system of production, processing and marketing 
of a particular product, from inception to the finished product (Figure 2.1).
A value chain consists of a series of chain actors, linked together by flows of 
products, finance, information and services. 
Chain actors
The chain actors are the individuals or organizations that produce the product, or 
buy and sell it. In Figure 2.1, the farmer produces dried coffee cherries and sells 
them to the trader in exchange for cash. The trader bulks the dried cherries from 
several farmers, removes the pulp to produce coffee beans, and sells a lorryload 
of beans to the processor. The processor roasts the beans, seals them in packages, 
puts them in cardboard boxes, and sells them to the retailer. The retailer displays 
the packages on supermarket shelves and sells them to consumers.
Chain actors actually own the product at some stage in the chain. A processor 
who buys coffee beans and roasts them before selling them is a chain actor. A 
processor who roasts the beans for a trader in return for a fee, but who does not 
become the owner of the product, is not a chain actor, but is a service provider 
or chain supporter (see below).
At each stage of the chain the value of the product goes up, because the product 
becomes more convenient for the consumer – after all, the customer in a coffee 
shop in Amsterdam does not want to go all the way to a coffee farm in Togo to 
buy raw coffee cherries. Besides the transport costs involved, the product is not 
ready for use yet: the pulp has to be removed and the beans must be roasted be-
fore a customer can enjoy a cup of Togolese coffee in the coffee shop. The same 
is true for other crops (see also KIT, Faida MaLi and IIRR 2006). 
Besides value, costs are added at each stage in the chain. For example, a farmer 
who dries and processes the coffee after harvesting the cherries can get a higher 
price – a reward for the extra work. The trader employs workers to load and 
transport the beans. The processor incurs the costs of roasting and blending the 
beans, packaging and promoting them, and distributing them to retailers. The 
retailer bears the costs of putting them on shelves and selling them to consumers. 
Costs also arise through losses that occur along the chain.
Figure 2.1 A simple value chain
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Flows of  products, money, information and services
When a farmer sells a product to a trader, two things change hands: the product 
goes in one direction, and money goes in the other. This exchange is repeated at 
each stage in the chain, forming two parallel flows, of produce (the black arrows 
from left to right in Figure 2.1) and money (the grey arrows from right to left).
In addition, each of the actors may be prepared to invest in the chain and to sup-
port the other actors to make sure that it functions smoothly. This gives rise to 
additional flows of finance between the different actors in the chain. These flows 
may go in either direction. For example, a trader may give a loan to a farmer at 
the start of the season so the farmer can buy inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. 
Or the farmer may give the trader a loan – this is essentially what happens when 
the farmers get paid several months after they deliver the produce to the trader. 
Such financial flows may also include fees paid by a farmer to an association or 
cooperative that markets their produce. 
In addition, the farmer and trader exchange information. The trader may tell 
the farmer how much coffee he or she wants to buy, when and where to deliver 
it, and what quality it should be. The trader may train the farmer on things like 
quality standards or new varieties. The farmer may tell the trader what the yield 
is likely to be and when the harvest will be ready. The two are likely to haggle 
over the price. 
The farmer and trader also provide services to each other. The farmer may dry 
the produce, sort and grade it, put it into sacks and take it to a convenient pick-
up point. The trader may provide labour for harvesting, supply sacks to hold the 
produce, and deal with the local government’s paperwork. Similar exchanges 
also occur at each stage of the chain. 
In Figure 2.1 and other chain diagrams in this book, the information and services 
are represented by the dashed arrows. (To avoid cluttering the diagrams, we 
normally omit such arrows unless they are explicitly mentioned in the text.)
Chain supporters
Flows of finance, information and services are not limited to the actors within 
a chain. Often other individuals and institutions are involved, surrounding the 
chain actors. We call these “chain supporters” (Figure 2.2). 
Chain supporters may provide various financial services to the chain actors. 
These supporters include moneylenders, savings and credit groups, microfinance 
institutions, banks, equity funds, and so on. The financial services they provide 
include loans, pre-financing, shareholdings, factoring, leasing arrangements, 
and so on (see Box 2.2). It is not just financial institutions that provide financial 
services; for example, an input supplier may give a farmer a loan in the form of 
fertilizer, in return for repayment plus interest after harvest.
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Chain supporters may also provide a wide array of non-financial services: in-
put supplies, farm labour, transport, grading, processing, storage, packaging, 
advertising, research, training, advice, organization, and so on. These services 
may be vital for the chain actors to produce the product, turn it into something 
that someone else wants to buy, and deliver it to the consumers.
Many of these chain supporters provide services to the chain actors for a fee. Har-
vest labourers want their wages at the end of a hard day’s work. A transport firm 
will only pick up and deliver produce if the trader pays the going rate, perhaps 
with a down-payment in advance. Input suppliers may offer fertilizer on credit, 
but they want to be paid eventually. Banks expect borrowers to repay loans, and 
charge interest to cover their cost of doing business.
Other chain supporters do not have to be paid by the chain actors, at least not 
directly. They include research and extension services (paid by the government 
out of taxes), standards organizations (ditto), and non-government organizations 
(paid by donors).
Some chain supporters are paid directly by the chain actors through member-
ship fees and the like. For example, a cooperative may cover some of its costs by 
charging membership fees or requiring members to put in work for free. 
CHAIN CONTEXT
CHAIN SUPPORTERS
CHAIN ACTORS
Farmer Trader Processor ConsumerRetailerWholesaler
€/$ %
Figure 2.2 Value chain actors, supporters and context
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Chain context
The chain actors and supporters operate within a context that includes the larger 
economy, currency exchange rates, government economic policy, and governance, 
tax, regulatory and legal frameworks. This context may help the performance of 
the chain, for example by promoting a transparent, stable macroeconomic policy. 
Or it may hinder it by imposing restrictions or allowing corruption to flourish 
(Quirós 2006; Shepherd 2004; OECD 2006). The context may also include influ-
ence by advocacy movements (for example NGOs that work on environmental 
or social issues) and by social structures (for example traditional hierarchical 
structures in a community).
Finance needs in the value chain
For the value chain to work well, all the chain actors need access to finance. But 
their needs for finance differ. A value chain perspective allows us to analyse the 
needs for finance for different actors in the chain, and see opportunities to fill 
these needs. 
In general, different chain actors have the following needs:
Input suppliers These provide farmers with seeds, chemicals, fertilizer and 
equipment, plus perhaps training or in-kind credit (such as a loan of fertilizer). 
Various types of input suppliers exist: big foreign-owned firms, large national 
companies, small-scale local retailers, farmer groups, cooperatives or public 
bodies – all with different financial needs. The small-scale entrepreneurs depend 
on small, short-term loans for working capital: they need to buy the seeds and 
agrochemicals and keep them in stock for their clients. Pesticides and fungicides, 
the more expensive products, need to be readily available for farmers when they 
face a problem with their crop. Farmer groups, co-ops and public bodies may 
depend on government funding, which may be late in arriving. 
Farmers Farmers, their families and hired workers manage the crops or ani-
mals, and are involved in post-harvesting practices and marketing. Most farmers 
have too little money. During the production season, they often lack working 
capital to buy seeds and other inputs, or to hire workers to plough the land, 
sow, irrigate, weed and harvest the crop and to care for the animals. Especially 
in the months before the harvest, many farm families cannot even pay for food, 
household expenses or medicines. In addition, few farmers have investment 
capital to buy equipment such as ploughs or draught animals, or to invest in ir-
rigation, terracing or farm buildings. So the farmers’ finance needs include loans 
to pre-finance the crop, and prompt cash payment for their crops after harvest 
(or even beforehand) (KIT and IIRR 2008). They also need credit to invest in live-
stock, equipment, drying and storage facilities, and to cover the costs of labour 
(for example, for harvesting). If they cannot get such financial support, they will 
not be able to produce the quantity and quality that the buyers need, diversify 
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their output, stay competitive, or increase their share in the final value of their 
products (UNCTAD 2004). 
Farmers can turn to few options for money. They are seen as unbankable, and 
even if they do qualify for credit, the bank is a long way away, bank procedures 
are lengthy, and repayment systems are strict. High interest rates and transac-
tion costs are other reasons for not knocking on the bank’s door. Informal loans 
from business partners within the chain are often cheaper and more convenient 
– although they are short-term and provide small amounts, so are not enough to 
make investments that do not pay off immediately. Informal loans are not always 
convenient, for example moneylenders can lend money to farmers at excessive 
interest rates (perhaps 100%), putting farmers in a vicious debt-cycle.
Farmer organizations Cooperatives and farmers’ associations have been one 
way of delivering credit to farmers, with loans often tied to farm inputs and ma-
chinery. However, like other semi-formal institutions, co-ops suffer from flawed 
administrative controls, lack of independent decision-making, inflexibility and 
high administrative costs (UNCTAD 2004). Apart from such loans, co-ops face 
various other financial needs. They need to cover their administrative costs. Those 
that market their members’ produce need cash to pay their members promptly, 
which requires working capital; if farmers do not get paid quickly, they may 
sell to a private trader who pays less but who can provide fast cash. Farmer 
organizations that function as collection points need to invest in warehousing 
and transport. 
Traders The traders buy produce from the farmers or co-ops and bulk it before 
selling it on. Their business depends crucially on making their working capital 
flow as quickly as possible in buying and re-selling produce. Every transaction 
offers an opportunity to make a profit (and, of course, carries a risk of losing 
money). Small rural traders have to stop buying when they run out of cash, leav-
ing farmers stranded with their products. The traders need working capital to 
optimize their turnover and keep transaction costs down (UNCTAD 2004). They 
also need longer-term investment capital so that they can buy a vehicle, build a 
warehouse, or pay for equipment to weigh or grade a product. Because so much 
of their capital is tied up in products at any time, traders have little collateral, so 
find it difficult to get loans. Few financial services are designed specifically for 
traders.
Processors Small-scale processors may also lack the working capital they need 
to buy bulked products from a farmer group or trader. They often lack the money 
to invest in equipment, leading to losses, lowering quality, and pushing up the 
cost of processing. They typically need access to medium-term loans and the 
ability to lease equipment. Commercial banks are becoming involved in lending 
to such processors.
Wholesalers and exporters These sell the processed product to local and global 
retailers, supermarkets and corner shops, who in turn sell to consumers. Whole-
salers often manage credit relations in two directions: they provide money to 
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trusted traders so they can buy on their behalf, and they may provide products 
to retailers on credit, expecting to be paid after the retailer has sold the goods. 
In this way, wholesalers often act as a “bank” for other actors in the chain. They 
often need more capital than other traders in the value chain. To avoid bad debts, 
they need good information on the reputation and financial status of their sup-
pliers and buyers. 
Wholesalers and exporters have access to the financial services of commercial 
banks. These loans can be long term, or at least medium term. Exporters may 
have the option to provide guarantees to their suppliers (for example if they apply 
for a bank loan), based on an export contract. Exporters (or importers) can also 
participate in a joint venture, together with other chain actors. Through an equity 
investment they become (partial) owner of a corporation (KIT and IIRR 2008). 
Financing value chains
In general, there are three types of finance for the actors in the value chain:
•	 Chain liquidity Short-term loans from suppliers or buyers within the value 
chain
•	 Agricultural finance Financial services from commercial banks, microfinance 
institutions and other financial institutions
•	 Value chain finance Financial services that are based on cooperation in the 
value chain.
We will discuss each type in turn.
Chain liquidity
Osmine spreads out her freshly harvested coffee cherries on the road outside her house 
and leaves them for several days to dry in the sun. She then scoops the shrivelled, dried 
cherries into sacks, heaves the sacks on her bicycle, and takes them to a local trader. She 
was able to get the coffee harvested on time because the trader gave her a small loan to hire 
some labourers. In return, Osmine agreed to sell the bulk of her output to the trader.
* * *
Such financing within a chain is common between farmers or farmer groups and 
traders. These credit flows are generally called trade credit, or chain credit. They 
consist of short-term loans to ensure a smooth flow of products, keep the chain 
running and maintain long-term relationships between trusted business partners. 
They may be given in cash or in kind. For example, a trader may provide a farmer 
with fertilizer at planting time, then deduct the cost from the amount he pays 
when collecting the harvested crop (De Klerk 2008). 
Other actors may also be involved, and the credit flow can go in either direction, 
depending on market conditions. For example, a wholesaler may pre-finance a 
travelling trader; an input supplier may provide inputs on credit, and a farmer 
may accept a delay in payment after delivering the crop. Such types of finance 
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work because the actors in a chain are interdependent and share, at least to some 
extent, a common goal. In this book we call this type of value chain finance chain 
liquidity (Figure 2.3).
Chain liquidity has various benefits: 
•	 Low costs The lenders normally do not charge interest, and the loans are 
informal and uncomplicated. However, this is not always the case (see be-
low).
•	 Low risk The borrower and lender know and trust each other, and the lender 
knows that the borrower is likely to be able to pay the loan back. Sometimes, 
the main objective of the loan is not to make money but to maintain relation-
ships with chain partners.
•	 Tailor-made The loan terms are based on the individual business deal. The 
amount and terms of repayment can be varied depending on the needs of the 
two parties. 
•	 Improved chain efficiency This is a win–win situation. Both the borrower 
and lender have lower transaction costs and fewer risks as a result of the 
loan: the borrower can use the money to produce more and gets a guaranteed 
buyer, while the lender gets a more reliable supply. The loan may reduce the 
time and costs of transport and communication, as well as losses caused by 
an actor not being able to sell perishable stock (KIT and IIRR 2008). 
Chain liquidity is easy and convenient, and provides many benefits to buyers 
and sellers. But it does not solve all their financial needs. Some limitations of 
chain liquidity are: 
•	 Relies on trust Chain liquidity works only in long-standing relationships 
and is built on trust. 
•	 Short-term, small amounts Chain liquidity only concerns short-term loans 
and relatively small amounts. The duration of the credit is no longer than it 
takes to buy and sell the product. The loans cannot be used for investments.
•	 Danger of dependency Chain liquidity lacks transparency, may have high 
“embedded” costs, and there is a risk of dependency and exploitation. Many 
cotton farmers in India have become trapped in a vicious cycle of debt by 
buying bad seeds and costly pesticides that yielded little due to drought. 
Unable to see a way out, more than 25,000 farmers have committed suicide 
Figure 2.3 Chain liquidity
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since 1997, many by drinking the chemical that was supposed to make their 
crops grow. 
Agricultural finance
Johnson, the trader who buys Osmine’s coffee, needed working capital to buy dried coffee 
cherries from many farmers, and to hire a lorry to take the coffee to a processing plant. So 
he has arranged a loan from a microfinance institution. At the end of the harvest season, 
he will pay back the loan, plus interest.
* * *
This is an example of an outside agent (the microfinance institution) offering spe-
cialized financial services to an actor in the value chain (the trader). This is what 
we call agricultural finance or external finance. Here, microfinance institutions, 
banks and other financial agents become chain supporters in one-to-one relation-
ships with a chain actor (Figure 2.4). Commercial banks have started to use the 
techniques of microfinance institutions to lend to rural entrepreneurs. 
Agricultural finance may take various forms and target different actors in the 
chain. It includes loans, deposits and insurance. These specialized financial serv-
ices are longer-term than services falling under chain liquidity. Also, they involve 
larger amounts of money, they are more transparent, and the risks of exploitation 
are considerably less. But agricultural finance also has its limitations. The section 
on microfinance at the beginning of this chapter discussed some of the difficulties 
in providing financial services to the agricultural sector: high transaction costs, a 
lack of information on borrowers’ creditworthiness, high risks, and the bad past 
performance of rural credit organizations.
Other limitations of agricultural finance are:
•	 Lack of flexibility Rural finance is embedded in underdeveloped financial 
markets, with cumbersome procedures, strict requirements for lending, high 
interest rates, and high transaction costs. Microfinance institutions generally 
have too little capital to provide investment capital to small and medium 
enterprises. Commercial banks generally lack incentives to do so. In many 
African countries, banks are owned wholly or partly by the government or 
large business holdings, and tend to allocate credit to favoured sectors or af-
filiated companies. 
•	 Bankability of small businesses Rural businesses are often informal, lack 
written records or formal accounting, and have little capital which can be used 
as collateral. Financial institutions are reluctant to lend to them. Requirements 
for deposits, collateral or balance sheets often act as insurmountable barriers 
to small- and medium-scale farmers and traders. In Cameroon, for example, 
the minimum deposit needed to open a checking account with a commercial 
bank is over $700 (Yago et al. 2007).
•	 Inadequacy of formal finance Farmers and traders do not always want 
formal finance. They often face immediate needs for cash that are incompat-
ible with lengthy bank procedures and with strict repayment systems. High 
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interest rates and the costs of applying for the loan are other reasons for not 
walking into the bank. Informal loans from business partners are often cheaper 
and more convenient.
•	 Lack of access Rural entrepreneurs still have very limited access to this type 
of finance Banks and microfinance institutions have few branches in rural 
areas or expertise in the agricultural sector. Few offer financial services that 
are adapted to the needs of farmers and traders. 
Value chain finance 
Johnson’s business was growing, and he needed more working capital to buy more cof-
fee from Osmine and her neighbours. He went to a local bank to arrange a loan. He had 
no hard collateral to offer, so the bank agreed instead to rely on soft collateral: Johnson’s 
relationships with the farmers and with the processor. It is confident that Johnson will 
be able to repay the loan because he has bought from the same farmers for several years, 
and is a regular supplier to the processing plant. As a condition of the loan, Johnson, the 
processor and the bank sign an agreement: the processor will pay Johnson not directly, but 
through the bank. The bank deducts interest and part of the loan principal before paying 
the remainder of the money into Johnson’s account. To make sure things work smoothly, 
Johnson tells the bank how much capital he needs, and the processor tells it how much 
coffee he has delivered.
* * *
Value chain finance is when one (or more) financial institutions link into the 
value chain, offering financial services which build on the relationships in the 
chain. The seller, the buyer and the financial agent work together, using the busi-
ness relations in the value chain as a carrier to provide financial services. In the 
example above, Johnson gets working capital from the bank, which is repaid by 
the processor. This form of finance provides benefits to all parties:
Figure 2.4 Agricultural finance
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•	 Johnson has better access to capital to cover his financial needs. The fact that 
it is provided by a bank gives him more independence than if he got a loan 
from the processor.
•	 The processor does not need to engage in financial services and deal with 
the problems of disbursement and repayment. Rather, it can focus on its core 
business.
•	 The risks of the bank in financing Johnson are lower because the loan is se-
curitized by the agreement between the three parties, and the loan will be 
repaid by the processor.
Box 2.2 gives some more examples of value chain finance, and Figure 3.1 (on page 
28) shows it in diagrammatic form.
Trust is key in value chain finance. Trust is related to the duration of relationships 
and the degree of openness with which the chain partners exchange information. 
The more trust between the business partners in the value chain, the better are 
the conditions for good business performance. At the same time, when the chain 
partners share information on a frequent basis, this will also contribute to the 
bank’s understanding of how the value chain works. In-depth knowledge of the 
value chain makes risks better manageable, so the bank will be more willing to 
Box 2.2 Some examples of value chain finance
Warehouse receipts In this system, farmers take their produce to a warehouse and get 
a receipt in return. They can use this receipt as collateral if they want to apply for a loan, so 
do not have to wait for payment. This is a useful arrangement for co-ops that want to store 
their products until prices rise, or if farmers have to wait for payment from buyers.
Repo finance Repurchase agreements (“repos”) are a form of commodity finance. The 
bank actually buys the product from the seller (e.g., a co-op), and at the same time signs 
a contract to sell it back to the co-op at a certain point in the future. The contract specifies 
a price that reflects the costs that the bank incurs. 
Private equity A bank or other investor may buy shares in a company, so giving it capital 
it can use to invest. 
Leasing This is an alternative to long-term loans to buy equipment, which many financial 
institutions think are too risky. The leasing company provides the farmer (or other borrower) 
with equipment for a few years on a contract basis, and the farmer pays off the lease in 
instalments. At the end of the lease period, the leasing company either repossesses the 
equipment or offers to sell it to the farmer. Leasing is less risky than a loan because the 
equipment remains the property of the owner, who can withdraw it easily if the farmer de-
faults on payments. With a loan, by contrast, it may be difficult to take possession of the 
collateral offered to guarantee a loan because legal constraints and weak judicial systems 
(Klerk 2008; KIT and IIRR 2008).
Factoring A farmer delivers the produce to the buyer and writes an invoice for the amount 
delivered. Instead of asking the buyer to pay, the farmer sells the invoice to a third party, 
a factoring house. The factoring house pays the farmer immediately (minus a fee), then 
submits the invoice to the buyer for payment.
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engage with the value chain and take the risk of lending to asset-poor farmers, 
traders and other rural businesses. 
Value chain finance is not a goal in itself, and only seldom is it the ultimate solu-
tion for a problem in a chain. Indeed, often the most severe constraints in value 
chains are not financial: they include a lack of technical knowledge or the absence 
of an attractive market. But value chain finance can help to set up a value chain, 
smooth out bumps in it, or upscale the operations in the value chain, so increasing 
the chain’s competitiveness. It complements (rather than replaces) existing credit 
flows between actors in a chain, and it empowers the chain actors by making new 
sources and forms of finance available to them. 
In the next chapter we will look in closer detail at value chain finance, and present 
a framework for how we analyse value chain finance in this book.
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A value chain 
finance framework 
in the preVious chapter we saw that value chain finance results when financial agents link up with two or more value chain actors. Value chain finance thus 
combines two worlds – the world of value chain actors with the world of special-
ized financial service providers. The first is a world of soil management, crops, 
irrigation, harvesting, transport, trading, consumer marketing, etc. The latter is 
a world of balance sheets, risk management, credit rating, guarantees, collateral, 
and so on. The more these two worlds are connected, the more they benefit from 
each other:
•	 Smallholder farmers, traders, processors and other chain actors can improve 
their access to financial services. Previously they might be excluded from bank 
loans due to a lack of collateral, a perception of high risk, or other barriers. 
But now they can obtain external finance based on the fact that they have a 
small but viable business that forms part of a wider and more stable system 
of value creation – the value chain.
•	 Financial institutions can develop whole new markets for their services. 
Smallholder farmers, traders, processors and agribusinesses become bank-
able clients. In many developing countries, agriculture is the backbone of the 
economy. Therefore, the ability to serve this sector greatly increases the scope 
of action for financial institutions.
In this section, we take a closer look at how value chain finance works. We will 
present a framework to understand and analyse value chain finance. This frame-
work will be used in the case studies that follow in the other chapters.
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The triangle of value chain finance
In value chain finance, a financial institution engages with the actors in the chain. 
This creates a triangle of cooperation (Figure 3.1). The triangle is between the 
seller, the buyer, and the financial institution. 
Together they make an agreement which covers four essential aspects:
•	 The product that is produced and sold
•	 The finance needed to produce and deliver the product
•	 The way the parties communicate and exchange information
•	 The way risks are managed. 
Below we explain the four aspects in more detail, using another example of a 
farmer selling coffee to a processor. Keep in mind that the buyer and seller could 
also be other chain actors, like traders, wholesalers or retailers. 
Product flow Before the season starts, the farmer agrees to produce and deliver 
coffee to the processor. Preferably this is recorded in a contract. The batch of 
coffee the farmer will deliver at the end of the season is specified as precisely as 
possible to determine its market value. Also, the parties estimate the costs needed 
to produce, harvest and deliver the coffee. In this way, the parties calculate both 
the loan size that the farmer needs for working capital, as well as the collateral 
value of the coffee. Normally a loan would not be more than 70% of the market 
value of the product, in order to prevent repayment problems in case the harvest 
is disappointing.
Financial flow After the purpose and the size of the loan are determined, the par-
ties agree on other important aspects of the financial product. These include:
•	 The interest rate of the loan.
•	 The timing and form of disbursement The loan may be given at once up-
front, or in small parts during the season when the farmer needs the money. 
Figure 3.1 Value chain finance
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It may be paid directly to the farmer by the financial institution, or through 
the processor. It may be paid in cash, or in kind, or in some combination of 
the two.
•	 The timing and form of repayment The repayment can be done by the proc-
essor by deducting the loan from the value of the coffee the farmer delivers. 
Or the money may be repaid directly by the farmer;
•	 The liability for the loan The farmer may be solely responsible for repay-
ing the loan, or it may be a shared responsibility between the farmer and the 
processor.
Information flow The farmer and the processor also agree on the information 
that they will share with the financial institution to guarantee the loan is managed 
well. There are two important periods of information sharing:
•	 Before the loan is approved Before the financial institution can release the 
funds, it needs a good insight into the operations of the farmer and his or her 
business relation with the processor. This is called due diligence. Usually the 
financial agency will ask for information like: 
•	 A signed contract between the farmer and the processor
•	 Information on previous years’ production
•	 A detailed plan on how the loan will be used
•	 A membership statement of a cooperative or other types of farmer 
groups
•	 The farmer’s identity document
•	 Report of a technical audit of the farm.
•	 During the loan period After the loan is released, the financial institution 
will appreciate frequent information about how the business is going. This 
is called monitoring. Usually the financial institution will require a monthly 
report about the status of the crop, the expenditure so far, and the outlook for 
the rest of the season. Preferably the report is based on technical visits from 
the processor’s field staff.
Risk management Finally, the parties agree on how the risks of the loan are 
being managed. This is called securitization of the loan. In traditional finance, the 
bank usually requires hard collateral in the form of fixed assets (such as land and 
machinery) for a total value of up to two times the size of the loan. The purpose 
of value chain finance is to reduce hard collateral requirements so that farmers 
and other chain actors can more easily access financial services. Usually in value 
chain finance we see the following forms of collateral:
•	 The contract between buyer and seller As mentioned earlier, normally a 
loan would not exceed 70% of the value of the contract.
•	 The product itself The financial institution may put a claim on the product 
while it is being stored or shipped.
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•	 Solidarity guarantees and peer pressure The financial institution may 
require that peers, neighbours or family of the farmer become co-guarantors 
for the loan.
Hence, the triangle of value chain finance is an elaborate agreement between 
the buyer, the seller and the financial institution. Their agreement covers the 
product, the financial service, the sharing of information, and the management 
of risks. Each case study will closely examine how these details are arranged in 
the particular finance deal at stake. 
We use the icons shown in Table 3.1. 
Product and financial flows
Purpose What is the loan (or other financial product) used for?
Amount
What is the amount of the loan? Total of all loans, average 
loan per borrower, or range.
Period
What is the average period of the loan? When must it be fully 
repaid?
Disbursement How is the loan disbursed? In instalments, or all at once? To whom?
Repayment How must the loan be repaid? In instalments, or all at once? By whom?
Interest rate What is the interest rate (per year or other period)?
Transaction costs What other costs are incurred?
Risk management
Securitization How is the loan securitized? How can the lender be sure of getting the loan repaid?
Liability Who has to repay the loan?
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
What information does the lender require before the loan is 
disbursed?
Information required 
during season
What additional information does the lender require during 
the loan period?
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment
How long does it take between an application and the dis-
bursement of the loan?
Table 3.1 Icons used to depict financial products
Figure 3.2 A single financial institution finances several stages in the value chain
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The chain of value chain finance
So far, we discussed value chain finance as a triangle of cooperation between the 
financial agency, the buyer and the seller. But in practice we often see that multiple 
actors from the value chain are involved. Not only the farmer, but also the trader 
needs finance. And not only the trader, but also the processor, the wholesaler and 
the retailer. For the value chain to work well, there need to be proper financial 
services at all stages of the value chain. This we see, for example, in the case on 
sal leaf in India (beginning on page 110). The local bank provides loans to: 
•	 The women who collect the sal leaves in the forest
•	 The processors who make the leaves into plates
•	 The traders who sell the plates to the wholesalers and retailers.
This is shown in Figure 3.2. The triangle has been expanded to cover five stages 
in the value chain.
But it can get even more complex. Often we see that various financial institutions 
are involved at the same time. This is because each financial institution has a 
specialization. Credit cooperatives are specialized in working with smallholder 
farmers. Microfinance institutions are strong in working with small-scale trad-
ers. Banks are good at financing larger companies. So we often see that multiple 
financial institutions offer financial services to the value chain actors. 
Figure 3.2 A single financial institution finances several stages in the value chain
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For example in the case of honey in Kenya (beginning on page 149), there are 
two financial service providers. There is a specialized financial service associa-
tion that provides leasing and small loans to the beekeepers, hive makers, and 
honey collection centres. At the same time, a bank provides loans to the traders 
and processors (Figure 3.3). The triangles have been expanded and multiplied to 
cover five stages in the honey value chain.
When more actors are involved, the triangle grows to become a chain of value 
chain finance. This is because the various stages in the value chain needs vari-
ous forms of financial services at the same time. Each financial services requires 
specific capacities, therefore also various financial agencies might be involved at 
the same time. Figure 3.4 shows how this may work. 
In this book we will see chains of value chain finance in six case studies: milk 
India (page 68), sal leaf India (page 110), rice Rwanda (page 135), honey Kenya 
(page 149), soybean Ethiopia (page 164), and fish India (page 200). This is no 
coincidence. Apparently an integrated approach in value chain finance works 
better – you cannot strengthen the value chain unless all links work well.
Reorganization of the value chain
Value chain finance is not simply a matter of pumping money into the value 
chain. On the contrary, when financial institutions engage with the value chain, 
Figure 3.3 A complex value chain finance model with two financial providers
(from the honey Kenya case, page 154)
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they do so to make the chain more efficient and competitive. Value chain finance 
is a deliberate intervention that restructures and reorganizes the value chain. It 
triggers significant changes in the flows of money and information in the chain, 
in the services provided to the chain, and sometimes even in the product flow 
itself.
Take, for example, the case of honey in Kenya (page 149). Figure 3.5 shows how 
it was organized. Before the intervention, beekeeping was not a profitable busi-
ness. Few people who owned hives also kept bees. These beekeepers obtained 
traditional hives from artisan hive makers. In exchange for these hives they 
would give the hive makers honey or some other in-kind payment. The beekeep-
ers would sell the small quantities of low-quality honey they produced to local 
traders or directly to their neighbours. The local traders, often without cash, 
would borrow money from moneylenders against high interest rates to pay the 
beekeepers. Home brewers and herbalist would buy honey from the trader for 
further processing into alcoholic drinks and medicine. These products were sold 
in the capital of Kenya, Nairobi. 
In this chain many opportunities were underused. For example, the potential for 
honey production was much higher than in reality. The techniques used by the 
beekeepers were inadequate. More efficient organization could add enormous 
value to the whole chain and to its individual actors. But this reorganization 
required support. When the bank intervened, it stimulated the rebuilding of the 
entire value chain. The beekeepers were organized in groups and trained how to 
Figure 3.4 The chain of value chain finance
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improve the quality of their production method. Traders and hive makers were 
also trained, for example on financial management. Financial services associa-
tions (a type of village co-op) were introduced, providing a variety of financial 
products to different actors in the beginning of the chain. The bank itself provided 
financial services to actors higher up in the chain. The chain was reorganized as 
in Figure 3.3.
In conclusion, value chain finance is more than pumping money into the chain. 
Value chain finance is a deliberate intervention that reorganizes the value chain 
to make it more effective and efficient. Each case study captures this by present-
ing diagrams of the past and present situation of the value chain.
Risk management
The first part of this chapter explained that financial institutions are reluctant 
to provide loans to rural entrepreneurs because they perceive high risks in ag-
ricultural production and trading. The most important sources of risks in the 
agricultural sector are: 
Production risks A farmer’s crop may fail due to drought, excessive rain, pests, 
diseases, fire, and many other factors. A trader’s merchandise may be lost due 
to expiration, theft, leakages in the warehouse, and many more. A processor’s 
output may be worthless due to contamination, human errors, etc. All these are 
production risks.
Figure 3.5 Honey value chain before intervention
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Price risks Agricultural markets are extremely volatile. Prices go up and down, 
and may vary 100% or more during the same season. A trader may go to a re-
mote area to purchase a load of tomatoes, and arrive at the market 3 days later 
to find several other lorryloads of tomatoes have arrived on the same day, and 
that prices have fallen. That trader will lose a lot of money. This is a price risk. 
Price risks rise when there is little market information, or when markets in one 
place are not connected to the markets in other places.
Market risks Closely related to price risks are the risks of market demand. 
When supply is larger than the demand, prices will drop, and some farmers will 
not be able to sell any of their produce. 
Default risks Default is when somebody fails to honour an agreement. This 
may be a farmer who promised to deliver a product but then decides to sell it to 
a third party who offers a better price. Or it may be a trader who has received the 
product on credit but then fails to pay for it. Or it could be a processor who took 
a loan to invest in new machinery, but then goes bankrupt and fails to repay the 
debt. Obviously the risk of default is a key consideration in issuing loans.
Currency risks Farmers and processors often use inputs and technology from 
abroad. And many agricultural products are traded internationally. In such situ-
ations, currency risks may arise. When the exchange rate of the local currency 
drops against the euro or dollar (or whatever foreign currency the inputs are 
priced in), the farmer or processor may be faced with higher costs. If the local 
currency strengthens against the foreign currency, they may receive less for the 
produce they sell.
Other risks The political and legal environment is often a source of uncertainty. 
When social unrest breaks out, companies may be affected. Or governments may 
intervene in the market for political reasons. 
Value chain finance is a way to manage and mitigate these risks on the basis 
of strong collaboration in the value chain. When farmers, traders, processors, 
retailers and other chain actors work together, they can jointly reduce the risks 
that each of them faces in their businesses. When the buyer and the seller make 
a sales contract, then the market risks are almost absent. Production risks may be 
lower because the buyer may give technical assistance to the farmer. The risk that 
farmers do not pay back the loan is lower, when repayment is done immediately 
when the products are delivered to the buyer. 
So value chain finance has the benefit of reducing risks by promoting better coor-
dination between the buyer, seller and financer. In financial jargon, value chain 
finance reduces credit risks into performance risks. The risk of a farmer being 
unwilling to pay off a loan (a credit risk) is much higher than that of the farmer 
being unable to produce a certain volume of produce (a performance risk). The 
risk of a trader not paying off a loan (credit risk) is much higher than that of the 
trader stopping his trading activities (performance risk). 
As the risks are reduced, it becomes more attractive for the financial agent to 
provide loans to the actors in the value chain. Also, as the risks are lower, the 
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interest rates on the loans can be reduced, which is to the benefit of the actors in 
the value chain.
Each case study in this book presents an analysis of the main risks in the value 
chain, and how these risks are mitigated through value chain cooperation. Table 
3.2 gives an example how this is done in the case of organic cotton in Tanzania 
(see page 103).
Benefits
The premise of this book is that value chain finance provides for a triple-win 
situation:
Type of risk Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Drought  
Accurate yield forecasts, based on visits 
to farmers every 2 weeks
Contamination of 
chemicals (“drift”)
Grow hedges or leave gaps near non-
organic cotton fields
Compliance checked by inspectors
Price Price fluctuations  
Purchase guarantee from Remei with 
continuous price adjustments based on 
“open-book budgeting”: Remei looks 
at BioRe’s production costs and adds 
a small profit margin to calculate sales 
price
Market
Lack of market 
demand  
BioRe has purchase guarantee from 
Remei
BioRe commits to buying only 80% of 
actual yield of farmer
Market may not 
pay premium for 
cotton not yet 
fully certified as 
organic
BioRe will continue to buy such cotton 
and pay the input subsidy, but will stop 
paying the organic premium
Default
Side-selling to 
competing trad-
ers
Price premium
Close relationship with farmers based on 
transparency
Short storage period (weekly)
Budgeting accounts for 9% default
Non-compliance 
with organic 
regulations
Visits to farmers every 2 weeks
Internal and external inspection
Continuous training
Currency Exchange rate US$–TSh
Loan and payments are in dollars, so 
currency risk reduced to 2 months that 
cotton is in BioRe’s hands
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 3.2 Mitigating risks for organic cotton in Tanzania
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•	 Value chain actors improve their access to financial services and can therefore 
improve their businesses. 
•	 Financial institutions can develop new markets for their services.
•	 Economic development and poverty reduction are attained as small-scale 
entrepreneurs get better conditions to flourish their businesses.
To capture these benefits, the case studies analyse the benefits of value chain 
finance at various levels.
Small-scale farmers, farmer groups and traders gain better access to finance. 
Value chain finance breaks with the need to have hard guarantees. The business 
relations in the value chain replace the need for hard collateral. When a buyer 
with a reputation as a reliable purchaser is willing to vouch for its producers, 
even small producers become more attractive clients to financial institutions 
(USAID 2005). There are fewer obstacles to credit provision, the terms and services 
are better, and the loans reflect the cash flow pattern of the business activities 
(UNCTAD 2004).
Access to financial services enables farmers to invest in better equipment and 
input, hire workers, improve the quality of the product or diversify their income 
by getting involved in processing or by producing other types of products. In this 
way value chain finance can contribute to higher and more stable incomes. Besides 
loans, other types of financial services (such as micro-insurance) are being offered 
to farmers. These services help farmers in future planning of their business. 
Value chain finance may entail more than financial services; for example, it can 
also involve training and the organization of farmers into groups. Training often 
contributes to the production of better quality items, greater efficiency and higher 
volumes of the product, resulting in higher prices and incomes for farmers. The 
organization of farmers into groups can serve different goals. It can contribute 
to better negotiation positions, help reach price agreements, and create access to 
group loans. Farmers may also benefit in less tangible ways, for example through 
increased levels of trust and dignity. 
Small traders share some of the benefits that go to the farmers. Higher quality, 
higher volumes and better continuity in supply enable traders to expand their 
business. Direct funding to traders can support them to pay their suppliers at 
the moment of delivery. For many farmers immediate payment is crucial and 
an important reason to sell to a specific trader. It thus cements loyalty between 
farmers and traders. 
For processors and other buyers the main benefits of value chain finance are to 
secure a supply of better-quality raw materials. Value chain finance enables the 
processor to invest in its suppliers and to gain their loyalty. Providing financial 
services directly to the processor enables it to invest in processing equipment. 
Consumers benefit by gaining access to higher-quality products, a more regular 
supply and a greater choice of products. 
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For the value chain as a whole, financial services help to streamline and smooth 
relations in the chain. Trust among different actors can help revive the chain. The 
chain itself can upgrade because it carries a greater volume or a higher-quality 
product, which fetches a higher price, which will be to the benefit for all chain 
actors. 
Because specialized financial institutions are involved, actors in the chain may 
have access to larger loan sums and a greater range of services, including savings, 
leasing, investment loans and insurance (USAID 2005).
For the financial institution, benefits include an increase in the number of cli-
ents and the size of a loan portfolio, a gain in the trustworthiness of clients, and 
improvements in the quality of financial services the institution can offer. Value 
chain finance mitigates risks for financial institutions and reduces their transaction 
costs. For example, the costs of credit screening, monitoring and enforcement are 
lower because the chain actors do much of this work themselves. That cuts the 
financial institution’s costs and lets it provide loans at lower interest rates.
The product flow in the value chain is used as a carrier to provide financial 
services. Market risks (the risk that no buyer will be found) are almost absent, 
because the buyer is involved in the deal. Default risks (the risk that farmers do 
not pay back the loan) are lower, because repayment is done right at delivery of 
the farm products. Production risks (the risk that the farmer fails to produce the 
product) remain, but may be lower because the buyer may give technical assist-
ance to the farmer.
Wrapping up
This chapter has presented the framework that will be used to analyse the experi-
ences in the case studies. So much for the theory: let us now look at the experiences 
of people who have made value chain finance work in the real world.
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Crafting new 
chains
this chapter Focuses on the use of value chain finance in building new value chains from scratch. It contains four cases:
•	 Turning potatoes into crisps in Peru shows how an NGO has helped a group 
of potato growers negotiate a deal to supply potatoes to a large maker of snack 
foods, and helped them obtain value chain financing for their production. 
The NGO has guided the farmers through the first few years of this business 
relationship, and now the farmers are able to manage nearly all aspects of the 
business themselves.
•	 Milk helps revive a microfinance institution in Bolivia tells how an NGO 
seeking to help milk producers in the Altiplano linked them with Sartawi 
Foundation, a struggling microfinance institution, to supply dairy companies 
with raw milk. The collaboration has worked: the milk producers have upped 
their production and now earn ten times more than before; Sartawi is now a 
vibrant business; and the dairy companies have reliable suppliers of milk.
•	 Creating a new dairy value chain in India is also about milk. It shows how 
Reliance, one of India’s biggest companies, along with BASIX, a private 
company which promotes livelihoods for the rural poor, have set up a value 
chain that buys tiny amounts of milk from smallholder farmers. This case is 
remarkable because the decision to buy from such small-scale producers was 
a hard-headed commercial one, not based on humanitarian considerations.
•	 Fighting elephants by growing chilli in Kenya describes the efforts of small-
scale farmers to grow crops in an area prone to wildlife incursions. The answer 
was chillies, along with marketing agreements with buyers, which in turn 
acted as soft collateral for loans from a local bank.
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Turning potatoes into crisps in 
peru
pick up a packet of potato crisps in a Peruvian supermarket, and chances are that it will have a “Lays” logo on it. “Lays” is a brand of Snacks America Latina 
Perú SRL, part of Pepsico, a big American multinational. Snacks is the market 
leader: it supplies 85% of the Peruvian market for crisps.
To make its crisps, Snacks uses two particular varieties of potato, “Capiro” and 
“Canchan.” These varieties are pale yellow and high in dry matter: good for mak-
ing crisps. They are normally grown high in the Andes, where the production 
season lasts from March to July. Potatoes are in short supply during the rest of 
the year. Canchan must be processed immediately, but Capiro can be kept for 
up to 4 months before they are sliced into crisps. Despite this, Snacks still found 
it hard to keep supermarkets stocked with crisps all year round. 
So the firm needed an alternative source of potatoes: one that bridged the sea-
sonal gap. This alternative was the coastal lowlands. It almost never rains here, 
but with irrigation it is possible to grow 
two or three crops a year. 
Snacks may be a big firm, but it can’t 
do everything. It is good at slicing and 
frying potatoes, not at training and 
organizing farmers to grow the crop. It 
was willing to pay extra for a reliable 
supply, and to agree on prices before-
hand. But it would be too cumbersome 
to sign contracts with lots of individual 
farmers. The answer was to team up 
with Fovida, an NGO that promotes 
the development of small-scale farmers. 
Snacks had bought produce from Fovi-
da-supported farmers in the mountains, 
so knew how the NGO worked. Fovida 
agreed to help develop production of 
Capiro potatoes in the coastal lowlands 
to help fill the seasonal gap. 
Figure 4.1 Location of the River Chillón 
in Peru
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Developing a value chain: 2001–7 
Fovida suggested working with farmers in the valley of the Chillón river, near 
Lima, the country’s capital (Figure 4.1). The farmers were poor, unorganized, 
small-scale producers who were growing vegetables for sale in the local market. 
They also grew potatoes, though not the varieties required by Snacks. But Fovida 
was confident that it could help them develop a production system that would 
fulfil Snacks’ stringent quality and quantity requirements. 
Fovida helped the farmers organize into a producers’ group, called the Asociación 
de Productores de la Zona Media del Río Chillón (Producers’ Association of the 
Middle Chillón River). This organization has 34 members, each with between 2 
and 13 ha of land, or an average of 5 ha. 
At first, Snacks did not want to sign an agreement directly with the Asociación: 
it would be too difficult for the firm to manage such an arrangement with an 
unproven group of suppliers. It preferred to sign a contract with Fovida instead, 
making the NGO responsible for supplying the potatoes to the Snacks factory. 
This contract specified quantities, prices, delivery times, and so on. Fovida also 
was obliged to provide post-harvest services such as selection, loading and trans-
port of the potatoes, and handle all the documentation. It also had to ensure that 
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the farmers did not sell the potatoes to other buyers. If the quality was below 
specification, the company would not accept delivery. This contract gave Fovida 
a lot of responsibility and a lot of risk: it became a major actor in the value chain 
( in Figure 4.2).
Snacks advised Fovida on what varieties it required and the production technology 
to use, quality requirements, and so on. The Fovida technicians considered these 
recommendations, adapted them as appropriate, and informed the Asociación.
Fovida and the Asociación calculated the production costs per hectare, and esti-
mated the yields. They took this information to Snacks, and with Fovida’s help, 
the farmers negotiated a price directly with Snacks that gave them an estimated 
profit margin of 15%. When agreement had been reached, Fovida signed the 
delivery contract on behalf of the farmers. 
As a result of these arrangements, the farmers started growing potatoes for 
Snacks. Now, from December and April each year, 85% of each farmer’s land is 
planted with Capiro or Canchan potatoes. During the rest of the year the farmers 
continue to grow vegetables such as tomatoes, lettuce and carrots, as they had 
been doing before. 
From field to supermarket shelf
The potato value chain was organized like this: 
1 Fovida coordinated the supply of seed potatoes (from producers in the Andes) 
and other inputs to the farmers in time for planting.
2 Each member of the Asociación planted seed potatoes at different times, fol-
lowing a planting schedule designed by two Fovida agronomists working on 
the project full-time. The Asociación coordinated the planting and harvesting 
by the farmers to ensure a regular supply of potatoes ready for processing. 
3 Throughout the growing season, the two agronomists made regular visits 
to advise farmers on production issues and help them solve problems. The 
average yield was 22–24 tons per hectare.
4 During the harvest season, the farmer whose turn it was to harvest that week 
hired workers to lift, sort and grade the potatoes. The agronomists were on 
hand to supervise this process.
5 The farmer hired a lorry to take the potatoes to the Snacks factory, which is 
located in an industrial zone in Lima, about 40 km away. The Asociación had 
an arrangement with a group of truckers to provide transport services, so each 
farmer did not have to negotiate prices individually.
6 At the factory, a Fovida staff member supervised the unloading and weigh-
ing of the potatoes. A new lorryload of potatoes arrived at the factory three 
times a day during the harvest season. One farmer could deliver an average 
of 24 tons of potatoes – two lorryloads – at a time. 
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Figure 4.3 It is vital to grade the potatoes after harvest so they conform to the buyer’s 
requirements
Figure 4.4 Production of Capiro potatoes, 2002–8
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7 The Fovida staff sent the delivery data to the president of the Asociación. That 
meant the Asociación could monitor production, yields and deliveries, and 
was alerted to any problems that occurred.
8 Within 10 days of each delivery, Snacks paid Fovida for the amount supplied, 
and Fovida paid the farmers. Fovida deducted a portion of the credit (includ-
ing interest) the farmer had received (see below), and a 2.6% fee. 
9 Snacks processed the potatoes into crisps, packaged them and delivered the 
finished product to supermarkets, distributors and wholesalers.
This arrangement has worked well. Production grew from 629 tons in 2002, to 
2,713 tons in 2008 (Figure 4.4). 
Arranging credit
The farmers needed money to pay for seed and other inputs, as well as to cover 
other expenses while they waited for the payment at the end of the season. Fovida 
explored various potential credit providers, but found either closed doors or 
unattractive conditions. For example, they turned to Agrobanco, a state bank 
that finances agricultural chains at low interest rates. This bank was willing to 
provide loans to individual farmers, but it wanted the Asociación to provide 
hard collateral, which it did not have. The farmers also heard that Agrobanco’s 
procedures were lengthy and bureaucratic, and its loans payments were often 
too late to be useful. So the Asociación and Fovida decided it was not practical 
to pursue this option.
What was the alternative? Without credit, the chain could not function. Peruvian 
banks and microfinance institutions could not offer the loans as required by the 
farmers, so Fovida had no other option than to look for a solution inside its own 
organization. Fovida runs a credit programme called Credivida (Box 4.1), which 
provides loans to urban entrepreneurs and had only limited experience in rural 
credit. Fovida was reluctant to involve Credivida because of the potential com-
plications and conflict of interest (with the same organization providing credit 
Box 4.1 Credivida
Credivida is a Fovida programme that has several years of experience providing credit to 
small urban entrepreneurs. Although it is part of Fovida, it is managed as a supervised entity, 
has its own accounting system, accumulates reserve funds as required by the Peruvian 
banking authorities, pays taxes on interest, and has achieved full economic sustainability.
Credivida’s financial products include working and investment capital and short and long-
term loans. It has a team of 8 professionals and operates in two of Peru’s 25 regions. In 
June 2009 it had a loan portfolio of 3.8 million soles (about US$ 1.2 million).
More information: www.copeme.org.pe and www.mixmarket.org (search for Fovida) 
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as well as technical assistance). But there was no other option. Credivida agreed 
to tailor-make a financial product to suit the needs of the potato growers. It was 
willing to do this because in Snacks, the farmers had a firm buyer with a guar-
anteed price, and because Fovida was managing the chain, provided technical 
support to the farmers and handled all the payments. 
With its long experience in urban credit, Credivida knew that if small entrepre-
neurs invested their money well, they would be able to honour their debts. It 
Crop loan ( in Figure 4.2) Investment loan ( in Figure 
4.2)
Product and financial flows
Purpose Financing of potato growing for sale to processing industry
Finance for investments in farm 
equipment
Amount
US$ 2,000 per hectare Average $6,000 for each pro-
ducer
Period
6 months
No penalty for early repayment
Up to 3 years with repayments 
every 4 or 6 months
No penalty for early repayment
Disbursement Direct to the farmer in 2 or more instalments All at once
Repayment
Lump sum, including interest, 
after delivery of product to 
buyer
Every 4–6 months depending 
borrower’s income flows
Interest rate 2.8–3.2% per month in local currency 1.2–2% per month in US dollars
Transaction costs None None
Risk management
Securitization Borrower must own the land, but land not used as collateral
Hard collateral (such as house), 
particularly for higher amounts
Liability The borrower The borrower
Information flows
Information required 
to apply
Personal documents
Characteristics of the family: 
number of members, ages, 
activities
Number of hectares owned
Area planted to potato
Items in previous column, plus:
Plan on how to use the money 
Budget for item to be purchased
Information required 
during season
A field credit officer visits the 
farmer once a month to check 
on progress
A field credit officer verifies that 
the investment has been made
Time lag between 
application and pay-
ment
2–3 days 1 week on average
Table 4.1 Credivida’s loan terms for Asociación potato growers in Peru
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believed that the same would be true for farmers in a value chain like that sup-
plying potatoes to Snacks.
Crop loans Credivida designed a standard credit line, personalized for each 
farmer ( in Figure 4.2, first column in Table 4.1). Standard items include the 
period of financing (6 months), the maximum amount of loan per hectare ($2,000), 
the interest rate (2.8–3.2%, depending on the amount borrowed) and the items 
to finance (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, transport). This standard package could 
be adjusted according to the amount borrowed, the number of hectares, the pos-
sibility and amounts of partial payments, and the guarantors for the loan. The 
only collateral required was that the farmer had to own the land, or could get the 
owner sign in his or her stead (the land itself was not used as collateral). Credivida 
provided 100% of the loan directly in cash. The credit was made available when 
the farmers needed it to buy inputs. 
Repayment terms Potatoes can be harvested all at once (or two or three times if 
the farmer grows enough to make multiple deliveries). So lump-sum repayments, 
including the accumulated interest, were scheduled after the expected harvest 
dates. Snacks paid Fovida, which deducted the amount of the loan and paid it to 
Credivida, before forwarding the balance to the farmer.
Interest rates Credivida has to cover its own costs. Its interest rates are an aver-
age of those charged by other microfinance institutions. The more a farmer bor-
rows, the lower the interest rate it charges. Credivida accepts early repayments 
without applying any penalty. 
Investment loans Credivida also designed an investment loan package to en-
able farmers to purchase equipment or other items. These loans were for up to 3 
years, with repayment every 4–6 months. Hard collateral was required for these 
loans – typically the borrower’s house, depending of the amount of the loan ( 
in Figure 4.2, second column in Table 4.1).
The credit scheme worked well because Credivida had a triangular relationship 
with the farmers and Fovida (). Though the farmers had no hard collateral, as 
required by the local banks, Credivida considered the farmers to be attractive 
clients, thanks to their integration into the potato chain. Credivida knew that 
the farmers would generate sufficient cash flow to repay the loans by supplying 
potatoes to Snacks. The risks were relatively low because the farmers were closely 
supported by Fovida. The solid relations in the value chain replaced the need for 
hard collateral, thereby making it a viable operation for Credivida.
Making the chain sustainable
The potato chain was working well and benefited all the stakeholders. But the 
system was not yet sustainable: it depended on the support from Fovida. Over 
time, as production and trade kept growing, the value chain evolved towards 
more business-like relations. As this happened, new triangles were built between 
Fovida, the farmers, Snacks and Credivida. 
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Fovida–farmers 
By 2001, Fovida had become a major actor in the chain: it was organizing inputs, 
production and post-harvest activities; and it was guaranteeing the supply and 
quality of the produce. It was providing these services for free, using funds from 
Novib, a Dutch donor agency.
It was necessary for Fovida to take on these roles in order to get the value chain 
started, but this role was not sustainable for an NGO in the long term. Fovida 
believes that farmers should learn how to operate in the real market, so should 
pay the full cost of the services they receive. So Fovida needed a strategy to hand 
over responsibility. 
In 2004, the Novib project came to an end, and a government-funded develop-
ment project covered some of the extra costs. But not all: Fovida made it clear to 
the farmers that they would have to pay part of the costs. It started deducting a 
service fee of 1.31% from the payments to the farmers. 
The government funding ended in 2007, so Fovida had to charge more. After long 
and sometimes difficult discussions, the Asociación and Fovida agreed that the 
service fee would be 0.028 sole cents per kilogram weight sold (approximately 
3.78% of total sales). Reaching this agreement was possible only because Fovida 
was transparent about its costs: the agronomists’ salaries, transport, administra-
tion and overhead. The producers realized that they would have to take on more 
tasks in the chain in order to keep Fovida’s commission low. 
In 2008, Fovida’s fee covered 85% of the costs of its services; the NGO paid the 
remaining 15% out of other funds.
Because they are now paying more for the service, the farmers have become more 
demanding: they want more frequent visits from the Fovida field agents and 
want the process of billing and payment to be speeded up. This puts pressure 
on Fovida to improve the services it offers.
Input suppliers–farmers
When it first established the chain, Fovida arranged for suppliers to provide inputs 
to the farmers’ group, rather than to individual farmers. This made sense at that 
time: the inputs would be cheaper when bought in bulk. But the farmers have 
decided to start buying from their input suppliers as individuals rather than as 
a group. There are three reasons for this: 
•	 Staggered planting The farmers plant and harvest potatoes at different 
times in order to comply with Snacks’ delivery schedule. Some farmers did 
not need the inputs right at the beginning of the season, but would have to 
take out a loan to pay for them then. That meant they would have to pay all 
the accumulated interest even though they had not used the inputs. 
•	 Operational problems Some farmers complained that the group did not 
store seed and other inputs properly, or that they had not been provided the 
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correct amounts. Others did not pick up their supplies on time, leading to 
storage and management problems for the group.
•	 Disagreements about suppliers The farmers did not always agree where to 
source the inputs. Some complained that the suppliers chosen by the group’s 
management provided inferior inputs.
These changes are shown as  in Figure 4.5: the input suppliers now link with 
individual farmers, rather than with the Asociación.
Credivida–farmers 
Throughout the years, the farmers built up a good credit history; only very few 
defaulted on their loans – usually if the potatoes did not attain the quality required. 
As Credivida became familiar with their production system and financial status, 
it expanded its loan services to other produce, including crops where Fovida has 
no involvement. It also started offering credit for investment and home improve-
ments, with repayments scheduled for when the farmers tend to have cash. These 
loan products have performed very well: the farmers do not want to risk their 
potato loans by defaulting on one of the other loans.
Fovida’s technical services and Credivida’s credit facilities are run by different 
people and are operated independently of each other – though the farmers know 
they are really part of the same organization. That means that farmers may receive 
technical services even if, for whatever reason, they do not qualify for credit; or 
they may get credit although they do not use the technical services. 
Credivida registers its loans with one of the most important central credit-refer-
ence bureaus in Peru, which other financial institutions can consult. In this way 
the farmers are building up a credit history and can apply for loans from other 
banks. 
New triangles
In 2008, 6 years after the first contract between Snacks and Fovida, the company 
agreed to include the farmers’ group as a formal partner in the agreement. In-
stead of a supply contract between Fovida and Snacks, there is now a tripartite 
contract between the company, the NGO and the farmers’ group. In the new 
agreement, Fovida has stopped being a direct actor in the chain. The farmers 
have taken over full responsibility for producing and delivering the potatoes 
to Snacks in accord with the quality standards as agreed upon. Fovida is now 
responsible only for providing technical and business support to the farmers, in 
return for its service fee.
Fovida continues to manage the financial flows in the value chain. Fovida receives 
the payment for the product from Snacks, deducts its own service fee, repays the 
loan from Credivida, and then transfers the remainder to the farmers as a net 
payment for their produce. 
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These changes mean that there are now two triangles in the potato chain:
1 A triangular relationship between Snacks, Fovida and the farmers ( in Fig-
ure 4.5) in which the farmers produce and deliver potatoes, Snacks buys and 
pays for the produce, and Fovida provides technical, financial and business 
support services
2 A triangular relationship between Credivida, Fovida and the farmers ( in 
Figure 4.5) in which Credivida provides loans to the farmers, the farmers 
invest the loans to produce potatoes, and Fovida collects the payment from 
Snacks to repay the loan and pay the farmers.
Costs and risks
The potato chain involves several risks. The risks are mitigated because the chain 
actors work closely together in their triangular relationships (Table 4.2). To ensure 
they get good-quality seed, the producers make advance contracts with certified 
seed growers. Rising input prices and low yields are another problem; farmers 
overcome this with the support of Credivida’s technical experts. Together, they 
monitor the crop and adjust the farming system if needed. Defaults on repay-
ments are prevented by giving Fovida control over the financial flows in the 
value chain. 
Figure 4.5 The potato chain in 2008: two triangles
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Fovida steps out of the chain
In 2009, the agreement with the buyer was revised again: the Asociación contract 
eddirectly with Snacks, without Fovida being involved. The tripartite arrange-
ment has been replaced by a bilateral contract between the farmers and Snacks. 
The farmers may choose to contract separately with Fovida to supply technical 
and business support services (they have to pay the full cost of these). Or they 
are free to make arrangements with other service providers if they wish. 
This means that Fovida has moved from being a major chain supporter with 
triangular relationships with Snacks and Credivida, to a mere supplier to the 
chain. This is shown as  in Figure 4.6.
Building and destroying triangles
Back in 2001, it was necessary for Fovida to become a chain actor, taking respon-
sibility for delivering potatoes to the buyer. Also, to get the necessary production 
loans, Fovida had to build a triangle that involved the producers’ group (the Aso-
ciación), a financial institution (Credivida), and itself ( in Figure 4.2). Without 
this triangle, the value chain could not have been established: alternative sources 
of finance were not available.
But this role was not sustainable for an NGO: Fovida needed to move away from 
being a chain actor. It did this first by creating a new triangle involving Snacks, 
ensuring that the farmers negotiated directly with the buyer, with Fovida in a 
supporting role ( in Figure 4.5). 
Now that the chain is functioning, Fovida can reduce its involvement further. 
From 2009 onwards, Fovida has become a mere supplier of services. The farmers 
have got used to the idea of paying for these services, and are rightly demand-
ing value for money. The farmers may decide to go elsewhere for these services, 
rather than hire Fovida. 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Poor seed quality  
Advance contracts with certificated seed 
growers
Input prices  
Modify farming system to use less chemi-
cal inputs
Low yields  Technical assistance from Fovida
Price
Price fluctuations 
in the potato 
market
 
Agreement on prices before season be-
gins, allowing the farmers to make sound 
profits (15%)
Default Non-repayment of loan  
Fovida handles payments from buyer and 
deducts loan and interest
Borrowers know about central credit 
reference bureau
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 4.2 Risk analysis of the potato chain in Peru
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As Fovida is no longer responsible for handling payments and deducting credit, 
there is no triangular relationship with Credivida either. The farmers have now 
built up their own credit histories and can get financing on their own. They may 
decide they no longer need Credivida’s services: they can go to another financial 
institution if it offers a more attractive deal. Both triangles have disappeared 
(Figure 4.6).
Empowering farmers 
These changes are entirely in accord with Fovida’s and Credivida’s mission. As 
an NGO, Fovida aims to empower the people it serves. That means building up a 
value chain until it can run independently, and Fovida can withdraw. The same 
is true for Credivida: while it is run on commercial lines, it is part of Fovida, so 
shares its overall goals of graduating its clients to mainstream commercial service 
providers. 
Fovida empowered the farmers in various ways. It trained them in production 
techniques, business management, negotiation with the buyer (and with Fovida 
itself), and financial management. The farmers had to assume the costs, so they 
quickly learned to get value for money: they began to demand tailor-made finan-
cial services to suit their individual needs. To reduce their costs, they decided 
to contract their own part-time coordinator, and take on more responsibility for 
organizing the chain, planning production, and arranging for seed supplies, 
skilled harvesting workers and transport.
Figure 4.6 The value chain in 2009: farmers’ group is responsible
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Impacts
The players have benefited in various ways from the potato value chain. 
The producers have moved from being an unorganized set of individual grow-
ers who sold low-value products in an unsystematic way, to a skilled, organized 
group that supplies a high-value product, at a fixed price, to a sophisticated value 
chain. They have a strong relationship with the buyer, with prospects for the 
future. They have increased the area planted from zero 36 ha in 2002 to 170 ha in 
2008, and total output from 630 tons to 2700 tons in the same period. Improved 
production technology has boosted their yields from 15 tons/ha to 23 tons/ha. 
They have an assured income, spread throughout the harvest season because of 
the staggered planting schedule. 
The Asociación and its members are now familiar with financial institutions and 
contractual rights and obligations. They have developed their business skills: for 
example, they have learned of the need to analyse costs before negotiating a deal. 
The farmers have developed their skills for dialogue and negotiation, so are now 
more able to play an active role in the market. They have learned the importance 
of working together in businesses that require large-scale production.
The farmers now have a credit line from Credivida that covers not only potatoes 
but also other needs. One-third have taken out Credivida loans for equipment, 
vehicles or house improvements. They have developed their own credit histories, 
so are more likely to find open doors when they approach banks for loans. Their 
incomes grew significantly in the first years because of the high price Snacks paid; 
the farmers want to continue the arrangement so they can keep this price advan-
tage. Many have started renting more land so they can produce more potatoes. 
(This also has a negative effect, as the cost of renting land has risen.)
Service providers Service providers such as truckers, field workers and harvest-
ing teams have more employment and have learned how to work with organized 
producers.
Credivida has learned how to evaluate credit for agricultural purposes and is 
pleased with the loan model it has developed. It now has two professionals work-
ing exclusively on agricultural credit, and the service is financially sustainable. 
It has already expanded this model to three other value chains. Not only that: it 
has also started serving farmers who are not part of a particular target chain, but 
who grow other crops or raise livestock. 
Credivida now has a growing portfolio of around 170 active farmer clients in the 
coastal area. It has moved from being an almost exclusively urban institution to 
one that also serves rural areas. Urban micro-enterprise credit is a highly com-
petitive field, so this new rural credit line spreads Credivida’s risks and gives it 
a more balanced and efficient portfolio. In 2008, about $1 million, almost half of 
its disbursements, went to the farming sector. 
Fovida is on the point of relinquishing its coordinating role in the chain. It has 
transferred the major responsibilities to the farmers’ association, and has fulfilled 
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its mission of building strong, sustainable farmers’ groups who can generate 
wealth and buy in the services they need. It has avoided the common trap facing 
NGOs that work with value chains: with a clear exit strategy, it has made itself 
unnecessary for the sustainability of the chain. And it has a model for building 
value chains with poor producers that it can replicate in other areas and with 
other commodities.
Snacks The buyer gets a constant, reliable supply of potatoes of uniform qual-
ity. In the producers’ association it has a strong business partner that has shown 
that it can deliver the produce regularly without problems. Because Snacks is 
now assured of a regular supply of potatoes, it can use its production facilities 
more efficiently and can keep crisps on the supermarket shelves throughout the 
year. Customers are less likely to switch to other brands or products if they do 
not find the particular type of crisps they are looking for.
In 2008, Snacks started marketing a new product: crisps made from a multicol-
oured native potato variety, grown by smallholders in the Andes. The value chain 
works in a similar way to that in the coastal area, though is not yet self-sustaining. 
Snacks is interested in developing new products following a similar model.
Consumers Peru’s many middle-class consumers can now find their favourite 
crisps on the supermarket shelves all year round. 
The chain as a whole The value chain is now more efficient. Production facili-
ties are idle for less time, and there is a constant flow of products in one direc-
tion and money in the other. The total amount of Capiro and Canchan potatoes 
grown and traded has increased from zero before the initiative, to over 2,700 tons 
in 2008. Information flows are transparent. The chain is governed by clear rules 
in which all chain actors have a say. It is sustainable: as long as Peruvians want 
to eat crisps, and as long as the actors in the chain remain competitive, there will 
be a demand for the potatoes produced in the Chillón valley.
Challenges
Monopoly buyer It is risky for the farmers to be so dependent on a single prod-
uct and a single buyer. Fovida recognizes this, and has tried to link the farmers to 
other buyers. But the farmers prefer to maintain their relationship with Snacks. 
New tasks Until now, Fovida has been handling the payments and documenta-
tion that are required. The Asociación is new to this function. It needs to ensure 
that it can handle these tasks in a timely, efficient manner.
Tensions within the Asociación As illustrated above with the input suppliers, 
the interests of the group members are not always the same. The Asociacíón will 
have to find suitable people to take over the administrative tasks from Fovida, 
fix their salaries, pay the expenses, and absorb potential losses. Larger-scale 
members may wish to contract directly with the buyer instead of going through 
the Asociación.
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lessons
Market-driven approach The potential for agricultural development is greater 
if it is guided by the market. In the Chillón valley, Fovida first identified a market 
(Snacks) and product (potatoes). It then identified a group of farmers who could 
supply this market, trained and organized them to do so, negotiated contracts 
and made the financial arrangements. This is an unusual approach for an NGO, 
which often start with a group of farmers, help them produce more or a particular 
commodity, then start looking for a market.
Initial investment Such projects require an initial investment, especially when 
working with a poor population. It was necessary for Fovida to help get the farm-
ers organized, build their capacity and provide technical advice at first. After an 
initial period when the services were free, Fovida had to start charging fees and get 
the farmers to realize they would have to pay the full cost after a certain period. 
For financial services, the farmers had to pay the full cost right from the start. 
Transparency Even if a donor is supporting the intervention, it is important 
that the NGO makes the full costs clear to beneficiaries (in this case, the farmers). 
That will force the NGO team to build low-cost models that the beneficiaries can 
take over when the NGO phases out. The buyer also had to be transparent in its 
operations, for example in controlling quality and avoiding hidden costs.
Covering transaction costs Managing the chain has its own costs: coordination, 
training, supervision, handling documentation and payments, and so on. The 
chain must be profitable enough to generate enough money to cover these costs. 
Also, the chain must have enough scale to cover for these costs. Otherwise there 
will be no way to manage the chain in the future when the NGO withdraws.
Integral interventions Fovida (technical, organizational and business support) 
and Credivida (credit) worked closely together to ensure that the chain operated 
smoothly. Without such cooperation, the chain may not have been as success-
ful.
Empowerment For Fovida and Credivida, empowering the producers was an 
important goal. They kept this goal in mind throughout, even though Fovida had 
to take on more responsibilities in the chain than is normal for an NGO. Because 
it had a realistic exit strategy, it has been able to hand over this responsibility to 
the producers themselves.
More information
Luisa Santur Alberca, Fovida, luisa@fovida.org.pe 
www.fovida.org.pe
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Milk helps revive a 
microfinance institution in 
Bolivia
this is a story of how a technically bankrupt microfinance institution managed to get back in business by restructuring its portfolio towards value chain 
finance.
Sartawi Foundation is a Bolivian microfinance institution focusing on small-scale 
farmers and rural micro-entrepreneurs. Established in 1990, by 2002 Sartawi had 
developed a portfolio of $5 million, of which 60% was for rural clients. Its main 
service was providing short-term loans for small farmers. But many borrowers 
defaulted – an average of 30%, and in 2003 half of them failed to repay. From 2002 
onwards, Sartawi had a negative balance sheet (it had more debts than assets), 
and in 2005 it was on the verge of bankruptcy.
But by 2008 Sartawi was back in business. Its defaults were down to just 3% on 
a portfolio of $2.2 million. How did it achieve this? Did it abandon rural lending 
and focus instead on more profitable urban clients?
No – in fact, just the opposite occurred. Sartawi’s portfolio became more rural, 
and its average loan size decreased. So rather than abandoning small farmers, 
Sartawi increased its work with them, while at the same time improving its own 
operations. What was the secret?
Sartawi developed a new financing model: one based on strategic cooperation in 
the value chain. This new model was pioneered together with Save the Children, 
an international NGO, in the milk value chain.
The traditional milk value chain
Although 60% of the population of Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, 
live below the poverty line, the economy has grown strongly in recent years (6.5% 
in 2008). The growing urban middle class has rising purchasing power. They like 
to shop in modern stores and are willing to pay higher prices for good quality. 
That goes for milk, too. Urban consumers look for fresh, safe milk in supermarkets 
rather than buying from street vendors. 
This demand is supplied by Bolivian milk processors as well as imports. The two 
biggest firms that supply milk and other dairy products to the capital, La Paz, 
are Pil Andina and Delizia. These two firms had a total capacity of 60,000 litres 
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of milk a day, but fell 24,000 litres short: they could not source enough milk from 
the farmers in the surrounding highlands, the Altiplano. 
Why not? Let us look at the situation of the dairy farmers.
Typical dairy farmers on the Altiplano have just three cows that produce only 9 
litres of milk a day, depending on the season (6 litres in the low season, 15 litres 
in the high season). Many of these farmers also raise sheep as well as cattle, and 
grow potatoes, barley, alfalfa and quinoa for home consumption. The farmers 
graze the cows on their own land, and forage is scarce in the dry season, leading 
to lower milk production. The farmers can get veterinary services but cannot 
afford to buy additional feed. They have no information about how the milk 
market works.
The farmers keep 10% of their milk for home use, and make cheese from the re-
maining 90%. They sell this direct to consumers at weekly rural markets nearby 
(Figure 4.7). 
There are three main reasons the farmers do not increase their milk output and 
the market demand remains unsatisfied. 
•	 Farmers’ revenues are so low that they have no way to upgrade and expand 
their production. Farmers make on average $2 a day by selling cheese, and 
another $3 from selling other foodstuffs. That equals $1 a day per person for 
a family of five – a case of extreme poverty. The farmers have no savings to 
invest and no incentive to increase production because the demand for cheese 
in the rural markets is limited, and prices are low. 
•	 Dairy processors have no system to collect the milk from the producers. 
The roads are bad and there is no cool chain (milk collection centres, cooled 
tankers, etc.). The farmers would have to go themselves to the dairy plant to 
deliver small amounts of milk – but the dairy is a 3 or 4 hour bus ride away. 
The farmers are not organized, and it would be unprofitable for the dairy to 
collect milk from many individual smallholders.
Figure 4.7 Previous value chain for milk
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•	 To produce more, the farmers 
would have to buy higher-yielding 
cows and feed them with purchased 
feeds. They cannot afford to do 
either. No financial institutions are 
willing to lend money to individual 
farmers without collateral or a firm 
market. It is a vicious circle, a pov-
erty trap.
Intervening in the 
market
In an analysis of the Bolivian milk mar-
ket, Save the Children found that the 
country produces 287 million litres per 
year, but consumes 460 million litres 
(the deficit is imported from Argentina 
and Chile). It saw that dairy farmers 
had an opportunity to increase their incomes if a way could be found to boost 
their production and build an efficient system to bring the milk from the highlands 
to the dairy plants. Small dairy farmers had a competitive advantage because 
the cold temperatures in the Altiplano mean their milk has a high fat content – a 
characteristic highly appreciated by dairy processors.
Convinced that the farmers could satisfy the demand, Save the Children met with 
the executives of several dairy companies to see if they were really willing to buy 
from small-scale producers. Its strategy was based on the following elements: 
Finding a buyer The market analysis showed that the Bolivian milk market is 
dominated by three companies. The two biggest, Pil Andina (which has an 80% 
market share) and Delizia, showed strong interest in Save the Children’s initia-
tive. They were aware that the initial volume would be low, but they could see 
the potential of the value chain approach. Save the Children agreed to start a 
pilot with both firms.
Organizing the milk producers In 2006, Save the Children helped a group of 
60 farmers from 12 communities in Sica Sica, some 115 km from La Paz, form the 
“Association of Milk Producers from the Carmen Altiplano” (Aplec). In nearby 
Patacamaya there already was a group of 30 farmers from 4 communities which 
was also incorporated into the project (Figure 4.8). Some of the farmers agreed 
to supply Pil Andina; others agreed to deliver milk to Delizia. 
Technical assistance The technicians of Save the Children initiated “farmer field 
schools” to teach the farmers about animal hygiene, health, nutrition, breeds, herd 
management, milk collection and delivery, and business management. Save the 
Figure 4.8 Location of Sica Sica and 
Patacamaya, Bolivia
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Children is not responsible for verifying the quality of the milk the farmers deliver; 
this is done by the dairy, which reports any problems to Save the Children.
Increasing production In the beginning the farmers in the two groups were pro-
ducing a combined total of just 80 litres of milk for sale a day. That is less than 1 
litre per producer: they were risk-adverse, looking how the project would develop, 
and in the meantime they continued producing cheese. This was, of course, far 
below the volume that the companies needed. The producers still needed better 
animals and feed to increase the volume of milk they produced. So buying new 
animals and feed was crucial to make the value chain work. 
Pil Andina, the larger company, was able to provide its farmers with feed. But 
Delizia is a smaller firm and could not afford to do so. So Save the Children needed 
to involve a partner that could provide financial resources to the farmers who 
supply Delizia. Otherwise there was no way to increase production and keep the 
company interested in working with the small farmers.
Searching for a financial partner
Finding a financial institution to finance the milk producers was far from easy:
•	 Banks required hard collateral to securitize loans: proof of income and an 
inventory of assets. Few farmers could fulfil these requirements. Moreover, 
the banks had no branches in the countryside to serve the farmers.
•	 Microfinance institutions offered loans but at very high interest rates (25% a 
year) and most worked only in urban areas, so their financial products were 
not tailored to the farmers’ needs. 
•	 Development finance institutions (a type of NGO that provides financial 
services on a non-regulated basis) were approached, but most did not respond 
positively. Some worked exclusively with urban women. Others worked 
with farmers, but were not prepared to put in their own funds; they would 
administer the portfolio for Save the Children but charge high rates.
Sartawi Foundation: The ideal partner
But one development finance institution, Sartawi, seemed a good partner: it had 
a rural focus and a specific mission to serve small farmers and rural micro-en-
trepreneurs. Sartawi’s managers saw that the dairy farmers were enterprising, 
were receiving technical assistance, and were producing high-quality milk. At the 
same time, there was a large market demand for milk. Sartawi was also encour-
aged by the fact that the producers’ clients, Pil Andina and Delizia, were leading 
dairy companies in Bolivia, with a consolidated market. The milk farmers had 
contracts with both companies, guaranteeing the dairies would buy milk at an 
agreed price as long as it met the quality standards. This contract could act as 
“soft collateral” to reduce Sartawi’s risk.
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Figure 4.9 Farmers use their profits to buy food and pay for their children’s education
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Save the Children’s proposal was fully in line with a new business strategy that 
Sartawi had developed to restructure its operations. Sartawi had had a couple 
of tough years and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Though it focused on the 
countryside, it had had little knowledge of the value chains it financed or the ac-
tors in those chains. Rural communities were far from its head office in La Paz, 
complicating the process of assessing loans and collecting payments, and raising 
operating costs and increasing its risks. As a result, Sartawi’s loan appraisal was 
inadequate, resulting in a very high-risk agricultural loan portfolio and a 30% 
default rate. Plus, producers’ collateral, such as farm equipment, was of no use 
to Sartawi, so in cases of default it had no value. 
Sartawi needed a new strategy for agricultural loans, one which would improve 
credit risks and lower costs. It needed “legs” in the rural marketplace – a part-
ner with experience and knowledge of the communities – to reach the farmers. 
Sartawi realized that Save the Children could be this partner, and agreed to join 
the pilot project. For Sartawi this would consolidate a new form of working that 
it had been exploring since 2005. The new model aimed to reduce risks through 
the following elements:
•	 Preferred supply relations between the producers and a purchaser.
•	 The purchaser is a lead firm in its sector.
•	 The producers supply a large amount of the raw materials required by the 
purchaser.
Figure 4.10 The new milk value chain
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•	 In the overall market for the raw materials that the farmers produce, supply 
is lower than demand, so the purchaser is likely to buy from the producer.
•	 When paying the farmers for their produce, the purchaser retains part of 
the produce value to pay back the loan, which reduces risks and transaction 
costs.
•	 The loans are combined with micro-insurance in order to mitigate risks by 
transferring these to the insurance company. This reduces the interest rates 
on the loan.
•	 The model of cooperation must be attractive for producers, purchaser and 
financier so that it can be scaled up or replicated.
The new dairy value chain 
The resulting value chain includes two strategic alliances, one for technical as-
sistance, and another for financing:
•	 Save the Children + Sartawi + farmers Save the Children provides training 
and technical assistance to the producers ( in Figure 4.10), and gives Sartawi 
the information it needs about the production system to provide financial 
services to the farmers. Save the Children pays for its services with donor 
funds.
•	 Sartawi + Delizia + farmers Sartawi provides individual loans and micro-
insurance to the farmers so they can purchase improved animals and feed, 
among other things ( in Figure 4.10). The farmers produce milk under con-
tract for Delizia, which pays them every 2 weeks, retaining a share to repay 
their loans from Sartawi (). To manage this scheme, Sartawi and Delizia share 
the account information for each farmer, including the repayment schedules, 
monitoring sheets, payment receipts and bank transfers.
The farmers’ groups are important supporters of this new chain. They organize 
their members, help them prioritize their needs, negotiate prices with the dairy, 
support their members’ loan requests, and ensure that loans are repaid (). They 
are not directly involved in their members’ commercial and financial relations, 
which remain responsibilities of the individual.
Sartawi’s financial services for the milk farmers 
In 2006 Sartawi began providing loans to the dairy farmers of the Altiplano. The 
average loan was less than $1,000. The farmers used the loans to improve their 
stables, buy high-quality feed for the cows, and to buy more productive animals. 
Table 4.3 gives details of these loans.
Sartawi follows these steps when appraising a loan application:
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Product and financial flows
Purpose To finance dairy farmers’ operations and investment capital needs
Amount
$100–3,000
Average per farmer less than $1,000
Total loan portfolio (pilot programme) of $100,000 in milk 
value chain
Period
6 months–2 years, depending on farmer’s payment capacity 
and purpose of loan
Disbursement Disbursed directly to dairy farmers by Sartawi in La Paz
Repayment Payments by bank transfer by Delizia
Interest rate Up to 16% per year in US dollars
Transaction costs 1% administration fee (one time, payable at time of disburse-ment)
Risk management
Securitization
Up to $2,000 without hard collateral
Securitization is based principally on sales contract between 
dairy farmers and Delizia
Collateral can also be provided in the form of livestock, 
equipment or a guarantor
Liability Individual farmer
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
Identity card
Status in central registry of financial system
Copy of sales contract with Delizia and other necessary 
guarantees
Registration of membership of the Dairy Farmers Association
Basic plan on how loan will be used: purpose, cash flow pro-
jections, repayment, etc. (prepared with Sartawi’s assistance)
Inspection of farm by Sartawi staff
Information about previous season and other references
Information required 
during season
Sartawi makes inspection visit to farmer at least once every 
2 months 
Save the Children and Delizia have constant local presence 
and inform Sartawi about problems that could put repayment 
at risk
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment
After requirements fulfilled, maximum 5 days to approve and 
disburse loan
Table 4.3 Details of Sartawi’s loans to dairy farmers in Bolivia
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1 Application and evaluation The milk producer applies for financing from 
Sartawi. Sartawi evaluates the application according to its guidelines and 
procedures to determine the borrower’s capacity to repay.
2 Validation and risk management Sartawi checks with Delizia on the amount 
of milk the farmer has sold. This helps assure Sartawi that the farmer will be 
able to repay the loan. Additionally, Save the Children provides qualitative 
information about the client (family, actual capacity, risk, behaviour, etc.).
3 Disbursement Once Sartawi approves the application, it disburses the funds 
to the farmer. 
4 Repayment Delizia has an agreement with the farmer and Sartawi to retain 
a portion of the amount it owes the farmer for his or her milk. It transfers this 
amount to Sartawi to repay the farmer’s credit. This greatly reduces Sartawi’s 
overhead and operational costs since it does not have to collect money from 
each individual borrower. As a consequence, Sartawi can lower its costs, 
becomes more competitive, and can offer more attractive interest rates to 
farmers. 
The loans for the dairy farmers bear an interest rate of between 13 and 16% a 
year (preferred clients pay lower rates). Sartawi obtains loans at 3% interest 
from the PROFIN Foundation, a microfinance institution supported by Swiss 
and Danish development agencies. Sartawi adds 7% to cover its operating costs, 
3% provision for defaults, and between 0 and 3% profit, making 13–16% inter-
est in all. Sartawi’s normal rural operating costs are 14%, but are only 7% in this 
case because Delizia and Save the Children take over parts of the due diligence, 
monitoring and enforcement. Sartawi’s profit margin is intended to let it raise 
its own capital for operations.
mitigating risk
Many of Sartawi’s risks are mitigated because of the farmers’ relationships with 
Save the Children and Delizia. These two organizations are aware of the bor-
rowers’ needs and production capacity, making it easier for Sartawi to assess 
the purpose of the loan and the borrower’s ability to repay it. Save the Children 
and Delizia field staff monitor the farmers and can detect problems quickly. 
They share information about individual farmers’ accounts. The directors of the 
NGO, the dairy firm and the microfinance institution meet regularly to discuss 
their cooperation.
Table 4.4 summarizes the risks to the loans and Sartawi’s strategy to mitigate 
them.
Sartawi mitigates the risks of accident and death of the borrower and damage to 
property by offering micro-insurance to borrowers. It charges a small fee for this 
coverage on top of the interest costs of the loan. This service is managed through 
an agreement with an insurance company based in Bolivia:
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•	 Insurance in case of borrower’s death This protects family members against 
inheriting the debt. The family also receives $200 to cover funeral expenses. 
This scheme also covers borrowers against total or permanent handicap. The 
fee is 0.09% per month of the outstanding debt.
•	 Life insurance Family members receive $2,000 if the borrower dies naturally, 
and $4,000 in case of accidental death. The annual fee is $18.
•	 Multi-risk insurance against material damage that might affect the farm 
enterprise. Coverage includes damage to property (except land), machinery, 
and mobile equipment (except cars). The annual fee is $12 for coverage worth 
$1,500 and $18 for $10,000.
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Drought Save the Children provides additional feed
Livestock dis-
ease
Save the Children and Delizia provide 
information and technical assistance on 
disease
Quality and 
quantity
Save the Children and Delizia provide 
technical assistance on inputs, productiv-
ity, etc.
Price Price fluctuations Purchase guarantee at fixed price from Delizia
Market Lack of market demand
If Delizia cannot buy milk, Pil Andina will 
do so
Default
Side-selling
Farmer signs contract with Delizia
Save the Children, Delizia and farmers’ 
association supervise deliveries
Non-repayment 
of loan
New loans will be frozen for Association 
members
Currency
Exchange rate Sartawi debts and farmers’ loans are in US dollars
Inflation
 
long term
 
short term
Assessment of farmer’s payment capac-
ity is conservative to allow for inflation
Other
Transport block-
ades, political 
unrest
Delizia to extend its network of cooled 
tanks in the are to hold milk for a while
Accident or 
death of bor-
rower, damage 
to property
Micro-insurance
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 4.4 Risk analysis of the milk value chain in Bolivia
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Benefits
Farmers The farmers have a new source of revenue (milk rather than cheese) 
which diversifies their risks. Their numbers have grown: the programme began 
in 2006 with 90 farmers producing just 80 litres of milk a day. By 2009, 340 farm-
ers were producing 3,000 litres a day. The average daily income per farmer has 
increased from $0.30 to $3 a day. This tenfold increase results from a 60% rise in 
productivity (due to balanced feed) and an increase in average herd size from 
three to five. Farmers are producing less cheese: they still consume 10% of their 
milk at home, and sell 80% to the dairy, leaving only 10% to make cheese. Their 
income from cheese has fallen accordingly. 
The farmers in Sica Sica have registered their organization, Aplec, with the 
government and affiliated it to the association of milk producers of the Depart-
ment of La Paz. This gives the farmers greater negotiating power with the diary 
companies.
Their relationship with the dairy company has given the farmers soft collateral 
that makes them eligible for credit from financial institutions. Micro-insurance 
is teaching the farmers how to care for the future of their enterprises and their 
families.
The farmers have learned about milk production and financial management, gain-
ing knowledge and skills that lead to higher yields and competitiveness. With 
these skills, they will ultimately be able to carry on without Save the Children’s 
support (the technicians of Delizia will take over), while maintaining the progress 
they have achieved – access to loans, higher incomes, greater food security and 
strengthened relationships with other chain actors.
In essence, the farmers escaped from the poverty trap: they have become skilled 
actors in an integrated value chain with long-term business relations; this in-
creases their access to financial services, which in turn enables them to further 
invest and grow.
Dairy company Delizia has diversified its milk suppliers and can rely on a 
regular, growing supply of high-quality milk from a reliable set of suppliers. 
The chain as a whole Consumers can buy more milk. The supply of cheese 
has gone down, but demand for this was low anyway. The farmers have higher 
incomes, so can spend more, boosting the local economy. 
Finance institution Sartawi has reduced its transaction costs (and thereby its 
interest rates) because Delizia and Save the Children have taken over part of the 
credit appraisal, monitoring and payment enforcement. The low-interest loan 
from PROFIN enables Sartawi to provide loans to farmers at attractive rates.
The value chain finance model has allowed Sartawi to better manage and clean 
up its loan portfolio. The average loan amount disbursed fell from $2,072 in 2005 
to only $869 in 2008, and the average size of loans in its portfolio decreased from 
$1,980 in 2003 to $977 in 2008. That shows that Sartawi is succeeding in serving 
smaller, poorer clients, deepening the fulfilment of his mission. From 2005 to 
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2008, the number of clients rose slightly from 2,125 to 2,277. The total portfolio 
size has shrunk accordingly, from $5 million in 2002 to $2.2 million in 2008. Milk 
loans account for 20% of this. 
The quality of Sartawi’s loan portfolio has increased dramatically. The default 
rate has fallen from 17% in 2005 to 3.5% in 2008. Sartawi has introduced this way 
of operating into value chains for peaches and apples, and now 94% of its loan 
portfolio is based on chains where relations are a key element. Not counting bad 
debts from the past, the default rate is now only 1.95%. 
In line with its mission, Sartawi has increased its operations on the countryside. 
Its loan portfolio has become more rural, from 60% in 2002 to 75% in 2008. It has 
developed in-house expertise, partnership networks, and a line of tailored finan-
cial products, making it a leading player in the field of rural finance in Bolivia. 
Challenges
Continuity Save the Children will finish its intervention in the milk value chain 
at the end of 2009. Seeing the project’s profitability, Delizia has already engaged 
the services of a dairy specialist, who now works together with Save the Children 
and who will continue with the technical assistance to the farmers when the NGO 
withdraws. There is so much competition among dairies for the milk that they 
need to provide technical assistance in order to keep their producers loyal.
New insurance In order to reduce risk for farmer and financers alike, it will be 
important to develop micro-insurance for livestock deaths, as well as for crops.
Replicating the model in other sectors Based on its positive experience in the 
milk chain, Sartawi wants to further develop and replicate the model to other 
value chains, such as soybeans, potatoes and vegetables. The model clearly re-
duces the credit risk for the financer. It is hoped that other financial agents will 
also apply this model.
lessons
Win–win cooperation Strategic collaboration can create a win–win situation for 
all parties involved. The dairy farmers increased their incomes, Delizia satisfied 
its unmet demand for milk, the financial institute increased its agricultural loan 
portfolio and decreased the credit risk, and Save the Children was able to work 
towards its goal of decreasing chronic malnutrition among Bolivian children, 
through better incomes for farming families. These achievements were possible 
because strong, trust-based relationships were developed (“soft collateral”) be-
tween all four parties, enabling clients without hard collateral to gain access to 
credit, and creating sustainable relationships among the parties.
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More information 
Navil Agramont Akiyama, Save the Children Bolivia, nagramont@savechildren.org.
bo, nagramont@hotmail.com, tinyurl.com/yj6qycr 
Marcio Oblitas Fernández, Sartawi Foundation, marcio.oblitas@sartawi.org, marcio_
oblitas@hotmail.com, www.sartawi.org 
Delizia Compañía de Alimentos S.A., www.delizia.com.bo
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Creating a new dairy 
value chain in India: 
Reliance and BASIX 
eVery morning, a queue forms in the dusty street outside the village house. Men, women, small children and young people all wait patiently for their 
turn. Some chat with their friends; others are impatient to get away to school or 
household chores.
A doctor’s surgery? No: the queue is moving too quickly for that. And everyone 
is carrying a jar or bottle of milk. One man has a big metal bucket, carefully cov-
ered to prevent the dust from getting in and the contents from spilling. A child 
is clutching a bottle that cannot contain more than half a litre.
Looking past the queue as it snakes in though the door, it’s possible to see what is 
happening inside. Each person steps up to a desk, where there is some electronic 
equipment run from a car battery on the floor. The man behind the desk uses the 
Figure 4.11 The collection centre accepts even tiny amounts of milk Figure 4.12 An inefficient milk value chain
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equipment to test some of the white liquid in each container. Each person then 
tips the milk into a gleaming steel churn standing on a set of scales. A readout 
shows how much milk has been poured in, and the man hands the person a 
printed chit of paper showing how much milk he or she has delivered, and how 
many rupees he or she is owed.
The same people will be back in the evening, and the following morning, and 
the evening after that, each bringing half a litre, one litre, three litres of milk. For 
this is one of the most remarkable dairy operations in the world: one that buys 
milk from thousands of individual small-scale buffalo owners and sells it through 
supermarkets in India’s booming cities.
Dairying in Mahabubnagar
Mahabubnagar is one of the poorest districts of Andhra Pradesh, a state in south-
ern India – so poor that every year, several thousand residents migrate to other 
parts of the country in search of a better life. Dairying is important here: 40% of 
rural families depend on their buffaloes for milk to drink and to sell. An average 
family earns US$ 100 a month, with milk accounting for some 50–60%. A fam-
ily might have one or two animals, which they milk once a day. Most buffaloes 
are indigenous breeds; they yield only 2–2.5 litres of milk a day. Buffaloes are 
traditionally the major livestock in the area: they provide 90% of the milk in the 
district; cows produce the rest.
Figure 4.12 An inefficient milk value chain
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The government has built a lot of infra-
structure to support the dairy industry 
in the district. It has supported the farm-
ers to work together in groups, and it 
established dairies that buy buffalo milk 
from the farmer groups to produce pas-
teurized milk, yoghurt and other dairy 
products (Figure 4.12). 
Unfortunately this government-run 
system is inefficient and underused: it 
handles only 20% of the surplus milk 
produced ( in Figure 4.12), and the 
dairies run at only 30% capacity. This is 
because the chain is not well organized: 
the farmers are paid only once a month, 
there are inadequate controls to prevent 
adulteration of the milk, and the dairies 
are subject to political patronage and 
interference. Several government development schemes provide subsidized loans 
to the farmers, but they often fail to reach the poorer farmer groups like minori-
ties and lower caste individuals. As a consequence, many farmers are chronically 
short of money and heavily depend on informal money lenders.
For these reasons most farmers sell their milk to private traders ( in Figure 
4.12). The traders offer better prices and pay every 15 days, sometimes even in 
advance. Because of this, the traders buy 80% of the surplus milk. They visit the 
producers each day on a moped to pick up the morning’s milk. Some sell their 
milk to the government-run dairies; others sell milk to tea stalls and other local 
retailers, while others sell raw milk direct to consumers.
But this privately run system has its own problems. The milk is often diluted or 
adulterated, and there are no checks for health or quality. This is a great concern 
for many Indian consumers. As India’s middle class is booming, the demand 
for fresh, high-quality milk products is increasing rapidly. Rather than buying 
unlabelled milk from a tea stall in the open air, these Indian consumers want to 
find a wide range of dairy products, nicely packaged and presented, in coolers in 
their supermarket. They are willing to pay a higher price for the milk in exchange 
for being assured of its quality and safety.
Spotting a business opportunity
Reliance Fresh is a modern supermarket chain operating in this new market seg-
ment of urban consumers with higher purchasing power. The company is part of 
the Reliance Group, India’s largest industrial holding. To secure a steady supply 
of fresh milk for its retail outlets, the Reliance Group established a specialized 
Figure 4.13 Location of Mahabubnagar in 
India
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dairy firm in 2006: Reliance Dairy Foods Ltd. It supplies dairy products to the 
Reliance Fresh chain of supermarkets, as well as to other urban retailers. 
When setting up its supply chain, Reliance chose not to source milk from the 
government-run dairies. The firm was not confident that these dairies could as-
sure the quality and quantity required, and it was concerned about the payment 
terms and the danger of political interference. The company also decided not to 
use the existing private traders: it wanted to extend opportunities to others.
So Reliance decided to build its own milk chain. It designed a supply chain con-
sisting of three tiers: 
1 Village pooling points, where the farmers can bring their milk on a daily 
basis, even in very small portions ( in Figure 4.14)
2 Bulk milk cooling centres, where the milk from various village pooling points 
is collected and cooled ( in Figure 4.14)
3 Dairies, where the milk from various cooling centres is processed, packaged, 
and distributed to the market outlets ().
Reliance figured that, rather than controlling the full supply chain by itself, the 
best way was to train selected local villagers and provide them with the necessary 
infrastructure and technical support, so they could operate the pooling points 
and cooling centres as independent business people. This is a so-called franchise 
model (see Box 4.2).
Building an alliance
Reliance started pilot operations in two areas: in Mahabubnagar, and in Punjab in 
the north of the country. But Reliance realized that it could not do the job alone. 
The company was new and it had no experience in organizing rural villagers 
and training them to become part of a supply chain. It needed a strong partner 
to ensure that the village end of the chain functioned well. 
Box 4.2 Franchising
All three tiers of the collection system – village pooling points, cooling centres and dairies 
– are run on a franchise system. The owner must provide the building and staff; Reliance 
provides equipment to the pooling points and cooling centres, and trains the franchisees 
and staff how to use them. A network of Reliance field staff supervises and supports the 
three tiers.
This model reduces Reliance’s capital and running costs, since Reliance does not have to 
build all its own infrastructure and employ lots of staff. It also spreads the risk, since each 
franchisee is responsible for delivering the product to the next stage in the chain, and bears 
the risk if something goes wrong.

Value Chain Finance 
In January 2008 it signed an agreement with KBS Bank, a subsidiary of BASIX 
(Box 4.3), to organize and support milk producers in Mahabubnagar and to build 
up the Reliance value chain. Reliance pays BASIX a service fee  of Rs 0.40 for each 
litre of milk procured from its customers.
The Reliance/KBS Bank team surveyed villages in the district to discover their 
milk production potential. They appointed local people to run the village pool-
ing points and cooling centres. They set up the infrastructure in each location, 
and trained these people how to manage the equipment and run the service as a 
franchisee. They supported the farmers to elect one person in each village to act 
as a joint account holder to receive and manage the milk payments on behalf of 
all the farmers. 
Establishing this infrastructure and training the villagers to run it took 6 months. 
By then the new milk value chain was reality (Figure 4.14).
Box 4.3 The BASIX group
The BASIX group is a private company which promotes livelihoods for the rural poor. The 
group includes both for-profit and non-profit units that provide financial services, technical 
assistance and consulting services. It currently works with 1.1 million households in 20,000 
villages across 17 states in India. Among other things, it provides microfinance to dairy farm-
ers. It has been working in Mahabubnagar District since 1997. Reliance was interested in 
building on this experience, and BASIX wished to replicate its successes.
In 1999–2001, BASIX worked with a milk-chilling centre belonging to the government-run 
Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Cooperative Federation at Wanaparthy, a town in Ma-
habubnagar District. This chilling centre has a capacity of 10,000 litres/day, but was handling 
only 1,250 litres. BASIX offered technical assistance and support services to improve the 
producers’ management and productivity. It loaned a total of Rs 6 million ($120,000) to 500 
producers to buy 600 milking animals. The repayments were routed through the dairy co-op 
federation, saving the need to collect payments from individual producers. Milk production 
rose significantly, and within a year, the chilling centre was procuring over 10,000 litres a 
day. The net income of a typical producer household rose by Rs 5,700 ($115) a year.
In 2001, responsibility for BASIX’s financial and technical assistance operations in Maha-
bubnagar District was handed over to Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank (KBS 
Bank), a BASIX subsidiary. This is a private, profit-oriented local bank, incorporated in 
1999, and granted a license in 2001. It offers savings and other financial services to the 
rural poor in Mahabubnagar district Pradesh and two districts in neighbouring Karnataka. It 
currently has 12 static and two mobile branches in the three districts, serving 1,585 villages 
with over 110,000 customers
More information: www.basixindia.com 

4 Crafting new chains
Collecting milk: The Reliance chain
Village-level pooling points
This is where farmers bring their milk each morning and evening ( in Figure 
4.14). Each lot of milk is tested and weighed before the farmer pours it into the 
waiting steel churn. The average farmer delivers 3 litres of milk per day to the 
village point. Some deliver tiny amounts – as little as half a litre. Some 2,040 pro-
ducers currently supply Reliance with milk at 40 village pooling points.
To be sustainable, each village pooling point must have at least 50 milk producers 
who supply a minimum of 150 litres of milk a day. The pooling point is run by 
a “village service provider”, selected at a meeting of the villagers. This person is 
a franchisee (Box 4.2): he or she must provide a room where the producers can 
bring their milk. The franchisee is paid a commission of 3.75% of the value of the 
milk delivered each month. 
Reliance provides each village pooling point with testing equipment, a machine 
to remove air bubbles from the milk, an electronic scale, steel milk cans, and a 
data processing unit with dedicated software. The average investment per village 
pooling point is $1,480. 
Figure 4.14 The Reliance/BASIX value chain
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When the producer pours the milk into the churn, he or she is given a printed 
receipt showing the weight, fat content, non-fat solids (which shows whether the 
milk has been diluted) and acidity (which reflects the number of bacteria), as well 
as the price. These data are recorded electronically. Every 10 days, Reliance pays 
the money into a joint bank account for each village. The village service provider 
and the joint account holder, appointed by the villagers, pick up cash from the 
bank and disburse it to the producers. 
Reliance fixes the price the producers get. This is currently in the range Rs 20–26 
($0.40–0.52) per litre, compared to Rs 16–18 ($0.32–0.36) in the traditional value 
chain. This price difference has forced other buyers to raise the price they pay for 
milk by Rs 2 ($0.02) per litre, so all producers in the area benefit.
The price paid by Reliance depends on the fat and non-fat solid content of the 
milk each farmer delivers: the better the quality, the higher the price. Reliance 
pays extra for good-quality milk, so its prices are always higher than what the 
government dairies pay. That gives the farmers an incentive to deliver a quality 
product.
Bulk milk cooling centre
The cooling centre ( in Figure 4.14) is situated in the main village in a cluster 
of settlements. It serves 10–12 village pooling points within an average radius 
of 10–12 km. Reliance pays for the milk to be brought to the cooling centre by a 
three-wheeled auto-rickshaw. 
Reliance has set up four cooling centres in the region served by BASIX, plus 
several more in other areas. They also operate on a franchise basis: the owner 
gets a commission from Reliance of Rs 0.30 ($0.60) per litre of milk delivered 
(1.3% of the value). Reliance provides all cooling equipment: a compressor, a 
bulk cooling unit, a solar water system, testing equipment, standard milk cans, 
chemicals, and a computer. Reliance has invested around $14,300 in equipment 
for each cooling centre. 
Each cooling centre can handle 2,000 litres a day. To be profitable, it has to operate 
at a minimum of 60% of its capacity. The current capacity is 83%.
Dairies
Reliance has negotiated with defunct or underused private dairies to give prior-
ity to processing its milk ( in Figure 4.14). It pays to transport the cooled milk 
to these dairies, which also operate on a franchise model: Reliance pays them an 
annual lease that depends on their capacity and location.
The dairies pasteurize and package the milk. The finished product is sent to 
wholesalers, supermarkets and retailers, from where it reaches consumers. Up 
to 25% currently goes to Reliance Fresh. Reliance organizes the flow of products 
in this chain.
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Management information system
The entire milk supply chain is managed by a state-of-the-art management infor-
mation system with easy-to-use equipment, a foolproof backup and uninterrupt-
ible power supply. This measures milk quality and amounts, calculates payments, 
and prints payment receipts and calculates the amount of milk procured from 
each producer, village and cooling centre. 
BASIX’s services 
BASIX works in 40 villages (with the same number of pooling points) that sup-
ply four cooling centres. It promotes farmer producer groups in each village, 
provides agribusiness development services, and extends microfinance to the 
producer groups. KBS Bank provides loans, while BASIX provides agricultural 
and buisiness development services for KBS Bank customers.
Producers’ groups
BASIX helps producers in each village form groups to improve their productivity 
and management abilities ( in Figure 4.14). Members of the producer groups 
are farmers who wished to expand and improve their dairying activities. The 
average group has 15 members. BASIX plans to form groups in all 40 villages; 
by January 2009, it had formed 17 of them. 
These groups are the focus of the various services provided by BASIX.
Agribusiness development services
BASIX offers various business development services to members of the producer 
groups: 
•	 Improving productivity Selecting stronger and more productive animals, 
advising on feed and fodder management, and buying inputs in bulk.
•	 Disease prevention Vaccinations against foot-and-mouth disease, regular 
deworming, and periodic visits by veterinarians to check on the animals’ 
health.
•	 Market linkages Forming producer groups and providing institutional 
development services to help farmers supply milk to the Reliance pooling 
points.
•	 Capacity building Training on bookkeeping, accounting, management and 
help with formalizing the group.
These services are provided by BASIX field staff who visit the producer group 
members once a fortnight.
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Financial services
Once a producer group is formed, it opens a joint account with KBS Bank and 
starts saving regularly (usually $1–2 per member each month). If it performs 
satisfactorily for at least 3 months, the bank will consider providing investment 
loans to the individual members ( in Figure 4.14, Table 4.5). Hard collateral is 
not required, but group members must all guarantee repayment of the loan. The 
bank can disburse the loan within 15 days of the application. The average loan 
is for the equivalent of $440 – enough to buy a buffalo. 
Borrowers are responsible for repaying their loans on a regular basis. If the mem-
ber falls behind with repayments, the group as a whole must pay up, so peer 
pressure is an important and effective way of ensuring repayment. 
KBS Bank also provides savings services and livestock insurance coverage to the 
members of producer groups.
Risk analysis
By January 2009, KBS Bank had provided a total of $47,000 in credit to seven 
producer groups to buy new milking animals. These loans are equivalent to only 
1% of the bank’s total disbursements to the agricultural sector; they are not yet a 
major part of the bank’s portfolio, but have great potential for expansion.
Normally, providing investment loans to farmers is very risky, because of the 
long repayment period and the uncertainty whether the investment will gener-
ate enough cash inflows to repay the loan. Therefore many financial institutes 
refrain from providing such loans in the agricultural sector. But the triangles of 
cooperation between KBS/BASIX, Reliance and the farmer groups (Figure 4.14) 
have helped to reduce many risks in the milk value chain. The key elements for 
risk reduction are (Table 4.6):
•	 The technical and business development assistance provided to the farmers 
by BASIX’s fieldworkers.
•	 The commitment from Reliance to buy the milk and to pay premium prices 
for quality milk.
•	 The fact that the farmers operate in groups through which they support and 
control each other and build assets through regular savings.
•	 The sophisticated management information system put in place in the milk 
chain which allows for close monitoring of the cash flows and repayment of 
the loans.
The triangles of value chain cooperation have turned the investment loan into a 
financial service that is attractive to the farmers and at the same time viable for 
KBS Bank. The interest rate is 18%. This is 3% less than what KBS Bank charges 
for equivalent loans to other borrowers in the agricultural sector. It can charge 
less because the risks are smaller and the transaction costs are lower (because the 
bank is dealing with a group, not lots of individuals).
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Product and financial flows
Purpose Financing purchase of milking animals (e.g., graded Murrah buffaloes and crossbred cows) to increase milk production
Amount
Individual loans are $440 per farmer
Estimated loan portfolio for 40 villages = Rs 12 million 
($240,000)
Period 18 months
Disbursement To individual borrower in producer group
Repayment Cash-flow-based repayment up to 36 months by producer groups
Interest rate 18%, reduced gradually as principal is repaid
Transaction costs 2% loan processing fee
Risk management
Securitization
No hard collateral
Group responsible to repay loan if individual member de-
faults. Peer pressure if a member delays repayment 
80–85% of asset value is financed by bank
Liability Each group member is liable for other members’ payments
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
Details of producer group formation and members
Current status and dairy experience of each member
Bank account details of group’s savings
Minutes of monthly meetings 
Record of group’s financial transactions
Repayment history of group members
Resolution by group to apply for loan
Estimated loan amount required for each individual and 
group as a whole
Feedback from Reliance village service provider 
Counterparty check by bank customer service representative
Information required 
during season
Monthly savings of group
Reports of monthly meetings and resolutions
Milk quantity delivered to Reliance each month by each 
group member 
Payments made by Reliance each month to group members 
Livelihood service provider feedback on animal health
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment 15 days from date of application by bank staff
continued...
Table 4.5 Investment loan terms for Reliance milk producers 
( in Figure 4.14)
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When analysing the loan risk, KBS Bank uses the following sources of informa-
tion:
•	 Producer group status The bank analyses the track record of the producer 
group and its members’ creditworthiness. The group must be functioning 
smoothly, have records of its formation and subsequent activities, and its 
members must have been saving with the bank for at least 3 months. The 
borrowers must be approved by the group as a whole, and they must already 
own at least one milking animal. 
•	 Information from the supply chain KBS Bank field staff and Reliance staff 
are in frequent contact with the franchisees and the farmer group members. 
They share the information from the management information system and 
they keep each other informed of problems encountered in the field. 
Benefits
The value chain intervention has brought several benefits to the three key stake-
holders: milk producers, KBS Bank/BASIX and Reliance, as well as to the chain 
as a whole. 
Milk producers Over 2,000 farmers now sell milk to Reliance: an average of 50 
farmers at each village pooling point. As a result of the BASIX technical support 
and KBS Bank’s financial services, they have increased their sales from an aver-
age of 2 litres to 3 litres a day. They get around one-third more per litre than if 
they were to sell to other buyers. This means that they have more than doubled 
their daily income from milk.
Producer group members now have easier access to credit at affordable rates. They 
can get credit 3 months after they form a group, and only 15 days after applying 
for a loan. Some 105 producers from the seven producer groups have obtained 
credit. All have taken out livestock insurance, so their livelihoods are protected 
in case of death or accidents.
The farmers can also get regular technical advisory services for a modest fee to 
help them improve their production.
Other financial products
Livestock insurance
Loan customers have livestock insurance to cover their newly 
purchased milking animals
Premium = 3.9% of amount insured + Rs 100 ($2) service 
charge + Rs 13 ($0.25) service tax
Savings products
Group members can put monthly savings in KBS Bank ac-
counts. This helps them manage the surplus from dairying 
and other activities. The level of savings may influence the 
future credit support. 
Table 4.5 (continued) Investment loan terms for Reliance milk producers

4 Crafting new chains
KBS Bank and BASIX Of the 2,000 farmers selling milk to Reliance, 500 are 
now KBS Bank customers. 
Seventeen producer groups with 400 members use agribusiness development 
services from BASIX on behalf of KBS Bank. They pay the full cost of these services 
($9 per member per year). As of January 2009, the 17 producer groups had saved 
a total of $4,000, and were saving an average of around $500 per month.
The central government apex bank, NABARD, has approached KBS Bank to 
promote more such producer groups in the district.
Reliance Reliance procures about 7,500 litres of milk a day. This is 83% of its 
capacity – well above its 60% break-even. The milk is good quality: the fat content 
is 7.1% and the non-fat solids are 9.4%.
A viable business model has been worked out for the village service provider 
cooling point franchisees. The transportation costs are reasonable.
Reliance has scaled up this approach beyond KBS Bank’s operating area. It is now 
procuring milk from 350 villages via 29 cooling centres and a higher-capacity 
milk-chilling centre in Andhra Pradesh.
A new high-capacity chilling centre, handling 15,000 litres/day, has been proposed 
in the KBS Bank operating area.
Chain as a whole The chain as a whole benefits: more milk, of better quality, is 
available to consumers. The chain is more efficient, and produces a higher value 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Survival of high-
bred buffaloes  
Advise on breeds suited to local condi-
tions
Livestock insurance coverage
Diseases  
Vaccination, deworming, health checks, 
visits by field staff, government support
Low fat content 
of milk  
Promote azolla feed as supplement and 
better feed and fodder management
Price
Temporary price 
rises by local 
vendors
 
Strengthen relationship with milk produc-
ers through groups and training
Market Adulteration of milk  
Transparent quality parameters, price 
incentives to produce good quality, edu-
cation on consequences of poor quality
Default
Farmer does not 
use loan to buy 
milking animal
 
Peer pressure by group members; follow-
up by field and bank staff
Sale of animal  Regular monitoring by bank and field staff
Animal death  
Livestock insurance coverage and claim 
settlement
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 4.6 Risk analysis of the dairy milk chain in India
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product than before. The example and competition of this chain motivates other 
players in the market (including the government) to improve their operations.
Challenges
Availability of grassroots-level staff It is difficult to find suitably qualified field 
staff such as extension workers who can provide the types of services needed.
Competition from subsidized credit The government sponsors credit pro-
grammes that offer low interest rates, 3–9 % a year. Farmers hear of these, so are 
reluctant to accept loans at commercial rates. In fact, the subsidized programmes 
are rarely available, so farmers are left without any loans. 
Loan cancellations A recent government decision to forgive loans may discour-
age farmers from keeping up their loan repayments in future.
Effect on other milk traders In the villages where it operates, Reliance handles 
50% of the milk sold. Total milk production has gone up, so more milk is being 
marketed. Many farmers continue to sell milk door-to-door in nearby towns, 
as well as to traders other than Reliance. The traders often have good political 
connections, so Reliance is eager to avoid creating local political problems by 
diverting too much milk away from alternative market chains. 
Replication Reliance and BASIX have developed a viable approach to buying 
milk from very small-scale producers. BASIX plans to us this partnership as a 
model for dairying elsewhere in India, for example by reviving defunct chilling 
centres or procuring milk in new locations. 
lessons
Big business benefits the poor Reliance is a big, profit-oriented company. Its 
mission is to implement business models that work – not to help the poor. In-
deed, angry shopkeepers fearful of losing their livelihoods have burned down 
Reliance supermarkets in some cities in India. Such incidents have forced some 
state governments to ban Reliance Retail (the parent company of Reliance Fresh). 
But the success of Reliance’s involvement in the dairy industry in Mahabubnagar 
shows that profit orientation is not incompatible with the interests of the poor. The 
producers get higher prices than before. Reliance’s milk procurement system is 
very efficient, and it produces a high-value product: good-quality dairy products, 
conveniently packaged, sold through supermarkets. To ensure a reliable supply 
of raw material, it is prepared to pay the producers a premium.
Paid services for farmers The farmers get low-interest loans, advice on business 
development, livestock insurance, and technical advisory services. These services 
enable the farmers to improve their management, raise their productivity, improve 
livestock health, and produce better quality milk. The farmers pay for some of 
these services directly; the rest is covered by a fee paid by Reliance. 
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This shows that the poor are able and willing to pay for services that support 
their major livelihood, where they get support from the rest of the value chain, 
and where the transactions are transparent.
Regular savings Small-scale farmers often have a problem saving on a regular 
basis. The system provides a mechanism for them to do so and inculcates a sav-
ings habit. This is in fact the basis for the whole chain intervention.
Commitment to the whole chain If large companies wish to develop the dairy 
sector, they need to go beyond merely seeking business opportunities. They must 
be committed to the whole value chain: they need to invest in the whole chain 
for it to function, and to collaborate with other actors in the chain.
More information
Mendu Srinivasulu, KBS Bank, sreenivasulu.m@basixindia.com, mendusreenivas@
gmail.com 
Beeranna Palyam, Reliance Dairy Foods Limited, beeranna_palyam@rediffmail.com 
BASIX, www.basixindia.com
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Fighting elephants by 
growing chilli in Kenya
“is there anything we can grow that the elephants will not eat?” 
The farmers in Laikipia West district were fed up with wild animals eating 
their maize and beans. Invasions by elephants have increased over the years in 
the district, destroying property and trampling farmers to death. The Kenyan 
Wildlife Service does not compensate farmers for their losses, and wildlife is 
protected by law, so the farmers cannot kill the elephants that have made their 
lives unbearable. 
Figure 4.15 Chillies are profitable – and act as an elephant repellent
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Laikipia West is a semi-arid district in Kenya’s Rift Valley, about 250 km north 
of Nairobi, with an average rainfall of 600 mm. Life here is tough even without 
elephants as neighbours. Various things make cropping and livestock-raising 
risky: recurrent droughts, infertile soils, cattle rustling, and disputes over graz-
ing between livestock owners and farmers. Inputs are costly, and farmers find it 
difficult to get credit to buy them. Farmers in the area typically own 1–5 acres of 
land. Declining production leaves most farmers short of food, and people in the 
area have long depended on church and government relief. 
In 2005, the Nakuru Region Inter-diocesan Christian Community Services (CCS) 
started a project in partnership with the Inter-church Organization for Develop-
ment Cooperation (ICCO) to improve the income and livelihoods of people in 
the district. The team conducted a study to analyse local people’s problems and 
come up with solutions.
CCS was already working with the farmers on other development initiatives, and 
had built up a good relationship with them. The farmers belong to producers’ 
organizations of about 10–20 members each. 
New members are free to join the group by paying a fee and monthly contribu-
tions. By registering with the authorities, the groups qualify for government grants 
as well as training on leadership, chilli production, business skills and financial 
management. CCS organized a series of meetings with these groups to discuss 
the findings of the study.
Growing chillies
The farmers chose a solution that had 
been suggested by the Kenya Wildlife 
Service – to plant hot chilli peppers. 
Elephants do not like the smell of the 
chillies, so leave the plants alone. Grow-
ing chillies around fields also protects 
the crops grown there. Chilli plants 
are resilient and easy to manage. They 
grow well in Laikipia West: they can 
withstand mild drought, need few in-
puts, and suffer from fewer pests and 
diseases than other horticultural crops. 
The average production per acre (0.4 ha) 
is 3,000 kg of fresh chilli. A high-value 
crop in demand throughout the year in 
local and export markets, it can be sold 
fresh or dried: a kilogram of fresh chilli 
fetches KSh 40 ($0.50), while a kilo of 
dried chilli is worth KSh 70 ($1) (chillies Figure 4.16 Location of Laikipia West 
district, Kenya
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lose about half their weight on drying). This is more income per acre than any 
crop the farmers had planted before.
Seed and other inputs Some 150 farmers bought seed at a good price (KSh 200 
for 25 g of seed, enough to plant a quarter of an acre), but the first crop in 2006 did 
not yield well because of very poor germination and drought. Tests by a govern-
ment laboratory confirmed the seeds were of poor quality, but despite admitting 
that it was at fault, the seed supplier refused to compensate the farmers. 
Production The farmers sow two crops of chillies a year. They sow seed in a 
nursery bed in February, transplant to the fields 6–8 weeks later, and harvest in 
July and August. The second planting is ready for harvest during the short rains 
of November and December. After harvest, the farmers sort the produce and 
pack it into containers, ready for collection. The farmers prefer to sell fresh chil-
lies rather than drying them: they lack storage facilities, and drying is difficult 
during the rainy season. 
Marketing CCS identified various firms that buy chillies for processing or re-
sale. Two of these are the main buyers of chilli in the area: Njoro Canning Factory 
(Kenya) Ltd. deals with dried chilli, while Frigoken buys fresh produce for export. 
CCS and the farmers discussed with these potential buyers issues such as varie-
ties, likely quantities, sale conditions, modes of delivery and payment. The firms 
signed contracts with the farmer groups to grow the chillies. The firms fetch the 
produce from the farms, then check the quality before processing or packing.
Table 4.7 Cost and income from growing chilli in Laikipia West
Activity/inputs KSh per 0.25 acre (0.1 ha) 
Seedbed preparation, nursery care, watering 1,000
Seeds (25 g) 200
Hiring land 1,000
Cultivation 2,000
Planting, manure 1,200
Pesticides, insecticides 550
Fungicides 400
Labour, chemical applications 1,200
Cultivation 750
Weedings (twice) 1,200
Harvesting (750 kg x KSh 5/kg) 3,750
Total costs 13,250
Gross income (750 kg x KSh40/kg) 30,000
Gross margin 16,750
Figure 4.17 The chilli value chain in Laikipia West, Kenya
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Financing the chain
In order to grow chillies, the farmers need loans to pay for seeds and agrochemi-
cals (Table 4.7). They suggested Equity Bank as a potential source of credit. This 
bank, which provides financial services to the under-served, began as a rural 
microfinance organization in 1984 with only 10 farmers. It now offers banking 
services with a deposit base nearly KSh 12 billion ($150 million) and over 700,000 
customers. Its typical rural client is a farmer who engages in some form of com-
mercial farming. In general, farmers must have a savings account. Opening an 
account with Equity Bank is easy – it requires only KSh 400 (though account 
holders must have saved for at least 6 months before they can qualify for a loan). 
The minimum balance is small, and the bank is customer-friendly.
The bank was initially sceptical about lending to farmer groups: it doubted that 
chilli was a viable crop, and did not think the farmers were creditworthy or able 
to meet the bank’s requirements. The farmers, for their part, were fearful of tak-
ing on a loan. To overcome these doubts, CCS guaranteed the initial loan ( in 
Figure 4.17) with a deposit of KSh 1 million ($12,500) (). The loan covered about 
40% of the production costs; it was divided amongst the farmers in proportion 
to the area of chilli that each would grow. The farmers covered the remaining 
60% of the costs.
Under an agreement between CCS, Equity Bank, the processor and the farmers’ 
groups, the farmers start repaying their loans to the bank immediately, in instal-
ments of KSh 350 ($4.38) a month ( in Figure 4.17). Within 3 weeks of receiving 
Figure 4.17 The chilli value chain in Laikipia West, Kenya
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the chillies from the farmers, the processor pays the money into the group account 
at the bank, rather than to the individual farmers directly (). The bank deducts 
the remainder of the loan and interest, and pays the balance to the individual farm-
ers () (the group advises the bank how much each farmer has produced). 
The failure of the first crop in 2006 put a major strain on this new relationship. The 
farmers were unable to repay their loans on schedule, and in desperation began 
to sell their chickens and cattle in order to do so. The bank’s fears had become a 
reality, and CCS had to cover a shortfall of about KSh 200,000 that the farmers 
could not repay. Some farmers started to side-sell to brokers () in order to pre-
vent the bank from deducting money from their payment from the processor. 
Everyone was discouraged by this setback. Many of the farmers gave up growing 
chillies. The producers’ organizations lost credibility and suffered from internal 
conflicts when some members refused to repay their loans, insisting that the seed 
company compensate them for loss of earnings. The processors were disappointed 
by yields that were a far cry from what they had been promised. And despite the 
CCS guarantee, Equity Bank was disappointed by the failure of the enterprise.
Despite the disappointment, some of the farmers were still enthusiastic about 
growing chillies, and were confident enough in CCS to give it another go. The 
bank also realized that if the teething problems could be overcome, chilli grow-
ing would be viable because it was less subject to drought or wildlife damage 
than alternative crops.
A new seed supplier
In the next season, CCS linked 500 farmers to a different seed supplier, Amiran 
Kenya Ltd., and helped them negotiate a deal to buy seed in bulk and have it 
stocked at the local shops. This firm’s seed costs much less than that supplied by 
Frigoken but is certified and is excellent quality: germination rates approach 90%. 
Amiran also supplies other inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides, 
and trains farmers how to grow chillies and apply chemicals.
CCS arranged with Amiran and farmers who did not wish to get loans to buy 
inputs such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides and fungicides directly from Amiran 
stockists. The bank, on the other hand, gives farmers individual loans directly 
so they can buy inputs.
The partners overcame the initial problems and the value chain is now working 
smoothly. Everyone is clearer on their roles. The farmers now have a group ac-
count as well as individual accounts with Equity Bank. The individual accounts 
help them develop a savings habit, while the group account is used to buy in 
bulk and to distribute payments from the processor. In case a member defaults 
on a loan, the bank will deduct the amount from the group account. 
The farmers are keen on keeping up with their repayments, and there are fewer 
defaulters – although still around 20%. To discourage the farmers from side-selling 
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to brokers or other processors which are not part of the chain, the farmer organi-
zations have signed a memorandum of understanding with the Njoro Canning 
Factory and Frigoken covering how much should be produced. 
Table 4.8 summarizes the terms of Equity Bank’s loans to the farmers.
Beginning with 150 farmers in 2006, the initial problems led to a halving in the 
number of farmers involved in the project. But encouraging returns in 2007 at-
tracted 500 farmers to take part in 2008, and even more in 2009 (Table 4.9).
The chilli growers still have a long way to meet the market demand for the pro-
duce. The Njoro factory has capacity to handle at least 100 tons of dry chilli a 
year, while Frigoken require 30 tons of fresh chilli a week. 
Product and financial flows
Purpose Financing production of chilli in Laikipia West District
Amount
Total loans to farmers in pilot project phase: KSh 600,000 
($7,500)
Initial number of farmers (2006): 150 
Current number of farmers (2009): 500+
Period 6 months
Disbursement
During March, through input suppliers
Equity Bank also gives loans to individual farmers
Repayment
Farmers repay in monthly instalments of KSh 350 ($4.38)
Buyer pays bank for produce 3 weeks after harvest; bank de-
ducts outstanding amount and interest before paying farmers
Interest rate 10% per year
Risk management
Securitization
Initial guarantee by CCS by depositing KSh 1,000,000 
($12,500) with Equity Bank
Producer organization members now guarantee each other 
directly: in case of a default, the bank deducts the amount 
automatically from the group account
Liability Farmer group guarantees loan repayments
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
Group registration certificate
Letter from Ministry of Gender, Culture and Social Services
Farmer group must have a bank account
Information required 
during season
Occasional field visits to farmers by project staff and producer 
groups during the growing season
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment 3–4 weeks
Table 4.8 Equity Bank’s loans to chilli farmers in Kenya
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Other actors
The brokers are informal traders who buy chillies from the farmers and pay on 
the spot, but at a much lower price (an average of KSh 25/kg for fresh chillies and 
KSh 40 for the dry product – just over half of the price paid by the processors). 
They in turn sell the chillies to processors or directly to consumers. These brokers 
have emerged as the value chain has developed. So far, only a few farmers have 
side-sold a small proportion of their chilli crop in this way, and this does not affect 
the loan recovery rates. So long as the value chain remains functional, with proc-
essors who pay good prices and financial arrangements which ensure reasonably 
fast payment to the farmers, side selling should not be a major problem. But the 
threat is always there to motivate all the actors to play their roles efficiently. 
Business development service providers include the Department of Social Serv-
ices, which trains the farmer groups in group dynamics, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which provides extension services. 
mitigating risk
Back in 2006, the chilli chain was built from scratch. The crop was new to the 
farmers and there were no established business relations. Because of the high 
risk of such venture, Equity Bank initially insisted on a loan guarantee from CCS, 
backed by a deposit of KSh 1 million ($12,500). This prudence was justified, as 
the crop failed due to drought and bad seed.
Over the years, the chilli chain developed and improved its performance. Seed 
supplies and yields have improved, the farmer groups have solidified through 
overcoming the initial problems, and the business relations in the chain have 
proven to work well. Now the bank no longer requires a guarantee. It relies 
instead on the mutual guarantee provided by the farmer groups, the savings 
in their individual and group bank accounts, as well as the fact that the farm-
ers have contracts with buyers that pay much more than the private traders. In 
Table 4.9 Chilli production in Laikipia West, 2006–9
Year No. of farmers Total output (tons) Processor Issues
2006 150 4 Njoro Bad seed
Drought
2007 80 <4 Broker Farmers needed imme-
diate cash
2008 500 15–20 Frigoken, 
Njoro
Good season 
Some disruption due to 
political unrest 
2009 >500 >500 Projected
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other words, the performance in the value chain serves as soft collateral and has 
substituted the initial requirements for hard collateral.
Table 4.10 summarizes the risks in the chilli value chain.
Lessons
•	 Farmers are willing to trust institutions they have worked with for long pe-
riods, particularly if there is a faith-based element to the relationship. This 
trust can survive even serious setbacks. 
•	 Regular reviews of performance by the different actors build trust, a joint sense 
of purpose and commitment. It helps if the actors have signed contracts and 
agreements to ensure responsible business practices (Box 4.4).
•	 Farmers and their groups manage loans better when they are trained in credit 
management. 
Challenges and solutions
•	 Side-selling Farmers are tempted to side-sell their produce even though 
they have contracts to deliver to a certain buyer. But as the farmers build a 
more solid financial base, they are less in need of the instant payments that 
brokers provide.
•	 Over-reliance on cash crops Farmers (especially men) tend to increase their 
chilli production at the expense of crops the family can eat. As they improve 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Drought Harvest rainwater or runoff for supple-mental irrigation
Conflict Initiatives for peace between crop farm-ers and livestock raisers
Seed quality Buy certified seeds from reputable com-pany
Price
Chilli demand 
and supply
Organic production of chilli to expand 
market further
Diversify (dairy goats, chickens, bees, 
etc)
Side selling
Encourage farmer groups to sell entire 
crop to the agreed processors.
Timely payments by processors
Default Failure to repay loan
Group guarantee 
Processor pays bank, which deducts out-
standing amounts before paying farmer
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 4.10 Risk analysis for chilli in Kenya
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their farming practices and gain experience, they get higher yields, allowing 
them to continue planting food crops so that they stay food-secure.
•	 Danger of drought Drought may force vulnerable families who borrow 
money into a worse financial situation than before, since they may have to 
sell valuable items in order to service their loans. Working with a bank intro-
duces a culture of saving, which cushions such farmers and enables them to 
diversify their enterprises.
•	 Scaling up The large number of farmers wanting to start growing chilli 
strains CCS’s ability to build their capacity and facilitate their entry into the 
value chain. Existing farmer groups should be used to introduce new entrants 
Box 4.4 Access to loans makes a difference 
Joseph Njoroge woke up one morning to find his fence destroyed and his entire field of 
maize flattened by elephants. 
“I was so disheartened”, he says. “The maize and beans yields had really gone down 
anyway because of the recurring drought. Before, if I was really lucky, I could harvest 20 
sacks of maize from the acre of land I leased. I could sell 10 sacks at KSh 700 each. My 
family and I would eat the rest. I would also plant beans between the maize for a yield of 
2–3 bags. I could sell two at KSh 1,800 each and keep one for myself. The KSh 10,600 I 
would earn once a year was not enough to cover the cost of inputs and labour, let alone 
meet my needs.
“I looked for someone or a bank to help me with a small loan so I could buy fertilizers and 
implements. When CCS came to our area in 2005, my neighbours and I were eager to share 
our problems as well as listen to their ideas. They were willing to start projects on honey 
and chilli. Chilli is a hardy crop, requiring minimal inputs, has high yields and can be used 
to chase away the elephants. We got to learn later that if we mixed elephant dung with the 
chilli and lit the mixture, the smoke would irritate the animals and keep them away from the 
farms, protecting our other crops. 
I was very sceptical about planting the chilli because I did not believe I could make any 
money from it. And anyway, I could not feed my family on chilli if I failed to sell the crop. 
CCS told us that they were willing to guarantee loans for us from Equity Bank. This was an 
answer to our prayers. We had our suspicions about financial institutions because we had 
heard frightening stories of people losing their property for failing to repay their loans. I had 
already tried to get loans and I knew that bank processes were tedious and out of reach 
for me. But CCS encouraged us and said they would support us through the process. They 
also advised us to use our self-help groups to ensure accountability. 
“The agreement with the bank was that I would repay KSh 350 each month for 6 months 
to offset the loan of KSh 7,500 (plus 10% interest) and pay the balance on selling the chilli. 
The advantage of chilli is that I can harvest it at least twice a year. I was able to harvest 450 
kg from my half acre of land. I sold 365 kg of fresh chilli at KSh 40 per kg, and 85 kg at KSh 
70 per kg to Njoro Canning Factory. I made about KSh 20,550 in 4 months. In between, I 
would sell small amounts to brokers for my daily financial needs. From the other half acre, I 
still had some maize and beans to feed my family. I now had the confidence to borrow more 
money. The following year, I borrowed KSh 20,000 directly from the bank. They trusted 
that I would be able to repay the amount on schedule, which I did. I have now applied for 
a loan of KSh 33,000, which is yet to be approved.” 
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to the production and marketing skills needed. The farmers should be encour-
aged to set up similar value chains for other farm produce.
More information
Joseph M Ndegwa, Nakuru RegionInter- Diocesan Christian Community Services, 
acknkrccs@africaonline.co.ke; jmundegwa@yahoo.com; fdevelopment7@gmail.com
Joseph Njoroge Ndirang’u, farmer, Laikipia West
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5
Improving chain 
liquidity
this chapter turns to instances where financial agents have linked with an existing chain to provide new services that build on and improve the chain 
flows. It includes four cases:
• “White gold” from Tanzania looks at a value chain for organic cotton set up 
by Remei AG, a Swiss company, and BioRe, its Tanzanian partner. It shows 
how Remei and BioRe obtained support from Triodos, a leading socially 
responsible bank, to provide the financing needed to expand the chain and 
purchase cotton from growers in northwestern Tanzania.
• Reducing poverty by strengthening the sal leaf chain in India describes ef-
forts by UNIDO, a United Nations agency, to organize federations of workers 
who collect the leaves of certain trees and turn them into disposable plates. 
Organizing these workers and working with traders was key to their getting 
loans from local banks that were tailored to their needs, rather than inappro-
priate and poorly managed forms of microfinance.
• Micro-factoring: Instant payment on delivery of tea in Kenya shows how 
Biashara Factors Limited provides an innovative financing arrangement 
known as “invoice factoring” to small-scale tea producers. By bridging the gap 
between delivery and payment, Biashara provides farmers with much-needed 
capital and overcomes a bottleneck in the chain. This case also illustrates the 
use of mobile phones for payments – a service pioneered in Kenya that will 
surely be of huge importance worldwide.
• Financing rice farming in Rwanda relates how CAF Isonga, a microfinance 
institution, works with a growers’ cooperative to provide a variety of finan-
cial services for rice farmers. The collaboration with the co-op and a payment 
system that allows it to deduct repayments automatically give CAF Isonga 
the assurance it needs that borrowers will not default on their loans.
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“White gold” from Tanzania: 
BioRe organic cotton
“pamba!”
“Dhahabu nyeupe!”
“Again, all together! Pamba!”
“Dhahabu nyeupe!” This time everyone punches their fists in the air in unison.
A political rally? No – this is the start of another session at BioRe Tanzania Ltd.’s 
farmer training facility in Meatu district, northwestern Tanzania, the country’s 
main cotton-growing region. Pamba means “cotton” in Swahili, and dhahabu nye-
upe means “white gold”.
There are 45 farmers in the hall. Today they will learn about quality control – an 
important topic for organic cotton growers. There will be a short session in the 
training hall, then the group will go outside to see BioRe’s demonstration fields, 
where the buds on the cotton plants are nearly fully open, revealing the brilliant 
white fibre inside. The farmers will learn how to stop the seed cotton from get-
ting contaminated at harvest.
The farmers of Meatu district were not always so enthusiastic about cotton. It is 
the main cash crop in the area, but when 
the sector was liberalized in 1993, the 
previous marketing system collapsed, 
leaving farmers with piles of unsold 
cotton. Many farmers still keep receipts 
from that time in the forlorn hope that 
maybe one day they will get paid for 
the bales of cotton they delivered to the 
warehouse just before it closed.
Establishing a new 
chain
Things are different now, at least for 
2,000 cotton growers in Meatu district. 
These growers cultivate 11,000 ha of Figure 5.1 Location of Meatu, Tanzania
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cotton, producing around 8,000 tons of seed cotton a year for BioRe, Africa’s 
leading exporter of organically certified cotton lint. That has a farm gate value 
of $3.5 million, or a free-on-board export value of $5 million. 
This chain is coordinated by Remei AG, a Swiss firm that produces and markets 
organically grown textiles. The garments are sold in supermarkets and fashion 
outlets in Switzerland, France, Germany and other western European countries. 
Remei had set up BioRe to secure its supply of certified organic cotton lint. Starting 
as a project, BioRe is now a separate company. Remei AG buys lint from BioRe, 
and has a similar relationship and history with another firm in India. 
Why Remei did chose to reach out and work directly with farmers, rather than 
relying on the cotton trading system? Cotton is one of the world’s most important 
agricultural commodities, involving millions of farmers (Box 5.1). But the crop is 
associated with various problems: intensive use of pesticides, soil degradation, 
depletion of water resources, child labour and rural poverty. Remei wanted to do 
business in a different way and established a sustainable business model based 
on organic farming, fair treatment of farmers and textile workers, responsible 
entrepreneurship and genuine partnering among all actors in the cotton chain. 
It wanted to produce textiles that satisfy demanding consumers, preserve the 
environment, and enable a better quality of life for small farmers. 
Box 5.1 From field to wardrobe
A long and complex chain transforms the armfuls of white fluff produced by farmers into 
shirts and trousers. In general, these are the main steps:
1 Farming Farmers grow cotton, producing a raw material called “seed cotton”. This 
contains both cotton seeds (67% of the weight) and fibre (33%).
2 Seed cotton trading Traders and purchase agents buy the seed cotton from farmers 
for bulking and transport to the ginneries.
3 Ginning In the ginning process the seeds are removed from the fibre (known as “cot-
ton lint”), and the lint is pressed into bales weighing about 200 kg. Some of the seeds 
are retained for farmers to plant in the next season. The rest is sold to oil mills, where 
they are crushed into oil (used for cooking) and seedcake (used as animal feed).
4 Cotton lint trading The cotton bales are traded on the world market, often through 
forward contracts. 
5 Spinning The cotton bales are sent to a spinning mill, where the cotton lint is processed 
into yarn. One kilogram of cotton lint produces approximately 650 grams of yarn.
6 Yarn trading Yarn is bought and sold by specialized yarn traders.
7 Textile manufacturing The yarn is dyed, woven, knitted, cut, stitched and printed to 
produce clothing and other products.
8 Retailing Retailers sell the resulting end-product to consumers.

Value Chain Finance 
Remei AG set up BioRe in Tanzania as a project in 1994 with just 45 farmers. The 
business has grown steadily; BioRe now works with over 2,000 farmers, and has a 
staff of 66. It was converted from a project into a subsidiary of Remei AG in 2002, 
and in 2006 into an independent firm. BioRe retains very close links with Remei: 
the Swiss firm buys all of its output, provides financial services, and coordinates 
the value chain. Remei AG and BioRe want to make BioRe fully independent, 
establishing a truly Africa-based company with local management and, ultimately, 
the farmers as shareholders.
BioRe works in 15 villages within a 30 km radius of the company’s head office 
in Mwamishali, in Meatu district. In each village BioRe has a local office with a 
supervisor and several extension workers, who each serve 50 farmers.
Growing the white gold: The farmers
Ninety-four percent of Meatu’s households depend on rainfed agriculture for 
their livelihood. Each family has about 80 acres (32 ha) of land. On 10–12 acres 
(4–5 ha) they grow cotton, yielding $1,250/year, which is 80% of their income. On 
another 6–8 acres (2.4–3.2 ha) they grow sorghum, maize and legumes, mainly for 
home consumption. The rest of the land is left fellow for grazing. Sixty percent 
Figure 5.2 Cotton is a major source of income for people in Meatu
Figure 5.3 Initial BioRe/Remei cotton value chain
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of Meatu’s population live in poverty, and one-third of the children suffer from 
malnutrition.
The cotton season starts in September with the registration and contracting of 
farmers who want to grow cotton for BioRe. The contract obliges the farmer to 
use only organic production methods, follow the advice of BioRe’s staff, and 
deliver the entire output to BioRe. The company, in turn, undertakes to purchase 
the entire crop, provide seeds and bio-pesticides, and offer training and techni-
cal assistance. The contract is for 5 years, but the farmer can terminate it earlier 
if he or she wishes. BioRe can annul the contract only if the farmer violates the 
contract, for example by spraying chemical pesticides.
The farmers sow cotton in the rainy reason, from November to February. They 
normally sow a little at a time, at intervals of a few weeks, to spread the risk 
of drought. BioRe’s extension officers visit the farm twice a month to provide 
technical advice, check that the organic regulations are being followed, and es-
timate the expected yield. The organic certification agency also makes random 
inspections. 
BioRe encourages farmers to work together. The company sets up farmer field 
schools in each location, where farmers learn about cultivation techniques, pest 
control, and other matters. One farmer is appointed as location leader. He or she is 
regularly trained on BioRe’s demonstration farm, and is expected to transfer this 
knowledge on to the other farmers in his location. The company also supplies im-
plements such as ox-drawn weeders for the farmer groups to use collectively.
Figure 5.3 Initial BioRe/Remei cotton value chain
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Harvesting, ginning and export: BioRe
The harvest season is from May to July. The farmer stores the seed cotton at home 
waiting for the right price to sell. He or she then gathers the cotton in a cloth, usu-
ally 60–100 kg, and takes the cotton to the BioRe village office, where it is sieved 
to remove sand and other foreign material, inspected for dryness and quality 
defects, and weighed. The farmer is then paid in cash and goes back home. 
Each BioRe village office can store up to 60 tons of seed cotton. A lorry takes the 
cotton to Bibiti Ginnery in the nearby town of Mwanhuzi. This ginnery separates 
the seeds from the lint, presses the lint into bales, and transports them to the port 
of Dar-es-Salaam. Part of the seed is kept for sowing the next season; BioRe sells 
the rest to mills that process it into oil and cake.
BioRe has a partnership agreement with Bibiti to provide all post-harvest services, 
including ginning, transport and shipping. For these services, Bibiti receives a 
fixed fee per ton of cotton. Bibiti works exclusively for BioRe: a convenient arrange-
ment for BioRe as it handles no other cotton, so there is no risk of contamination, 
and the integrity of BioRe’s organic cotton chain is guaranteed.
From spinning to clothes: Remei AG
Remei AG buys the cotton free-on-board at Dar-es-Salaam, paying BioRe by 
bank transfer. The cotton is shipped to spinning mills in Europe, Asia and Africa, 
where Remei AG contracts with specialist firms to spin it into yarn, weave it into 
cloth, and produce garments that Remei AG co-designs with large retailers and 
fashion brands in Europe.
Chain liquidity
The actors in the cotton chain rely heavily on BioRe to finance their business 
operations. The farmers have very little capital. Cotton is their only cash crop, 
so by the time it is harvested they urgently need money. If BioRe did not pay in 
cash, the farmers might sell their crop to other buyers – even at a lower price. In 
2008, BioRe needed $3.5 million in cash to pay its contract farmers. 
Prefinancing the crop BioRe has an arrangement to pre-finance the crop. For 
each kilogram of seed cotton a farmer delivers, BioRe pays an input subsidy into 
a special bank account. The farmer receives a passbook showing how much is 
in this account. The next season, the farmer can use this passbook to buy seeds 
and bio-pesticides from the company ( in Figure 5.3). Such a passbook scheme 
used to be common throughout the cotton sector in Tanzania, but it fell out of 
use; since 2008 BioRe has been the only company still offering it.
For new farmers who do not yet have a passbook, BioRe is willing to pre-finance 
the crop through a loan at zero interest rate. But this is risky for BioRe: the farmers 
have no experience in organic farming, and it is hard to assess how trustworthy 
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they are. So many drop out of BioRe’s scheme. In 2007, 23% of new farmers did 
not deliver their cotton to the company, even though they had received the loans 
– a loss of $7,000 to BioRe. Despite these losses BioRe continues to pre-finance 
farmers who are converting to organic production, otherwise it would be nearly 
impossible to attract new farmers.
Paying farmers Distributing so much cash to thousands of scattered farm house-
holds is major operation. Every day in the buying season, BioRe withdraws the 
equivalent of $50,000 in cash from the National Microfinance Bank, the only bank 
in the district. As BioRe needs small bills, these are two large bags of notes. The 
money is brought under police escort to BioRe’s office, where it is divided among 
the 15 village supervisors. The supervisors take the cash on their motorbikes to 
their villages to buy the cotton from the farmers. At night they come back to the 
office to hand in the purchase slips certifying the payment to the farmers. At the 
same time they tell the office how much money they will need the next day. Each 
day the same operation is repeated ( in Figure 5.3). 
The costs of handling the money are high, and the risks of robbery are significant. 
Also, there is the risk that supervisors and farmers collude in signing payment 
slips which are not backed by an actual delivery of seed cotton. In the cotton 
industry normally around 1% of the cotton gets “lost” in this way. But BioRe 
has no alternative ways to pay the farmers. There are no financial agencies in 
the villages where the farmers live, so they have no accounts to which money 
can be transferred.
Working capital for the ginnery Like the farmers, the ginnery is also short of 
cash. Every year BioRe lends it money to buy spare parts and maintain the fac-
tory. In February Bibiti presents a shopping list of spare parts, which BioRe pre-
finances to a maximum of $60,000. Then in the ginning season BioRe continues to 
make down-payments, twice per month. The down-payment is disbursed after 
the ginnery reports how much cotton lint it has produced – so BioRe can avoid 
overpaying for the services the ginnery has provided. The ginnery submits the 
invoice for its services only at the very end of the season to keep as much cash as 
possible in the value chain when it is needed ( in Figure 5.3).
Capital investment for the ginnery Some years ago, Remei gave the ginnery 
an investment loan of $400,000 to buy and install new equipment, to be paid 
back over 4 years (). Part of the deal was that the ginnery would give BioRe 
preferential treatment in processing its seed cotton. In fact, the ginnery stopped 
serving other clients, so now processes only BioRe’s cotton. 
Working capital Remei provided all the working capital that BioRe, the ginnery 
and the farmers needed. Every week Remei transferred a significant amount of 
money to BioRe’s bank account (), so that BioRe could pay its staff and bills, 
and pre-finance the farmers and the ginnery.
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A new source of finance
This arrangement was far from ideal. For Remei AG it was a heavy financial 
burden, even though the company is financially solid and has a respectable 
turnover. Remei AG financed its own operations, all cotton and textiles in stock 
in the chain, and the operations of BioRe as well as Remei AG’s Indian supplier. 
The more Remei AG grew, the more difficult it was to get enough credit from 
banks to finance these worldwide operations. In addition, Remei AG’s vision is 
for the BioRe companies to become fully independent. They should not depend 
on Remei AG for financing. So Remei AG has been looking for new sources of 
finance for the BioRe operations in Tanzania.
In 2004 Remei AG asked the Triodos Sustainable Trade Fund, part of Triodos 
Bank in the Netherlands, to pre-finance the cotton operations in Tanzania. Trio-
dos Bank is one of Europe’s leading socially responsible banks. Its mission is to 
finance companies and projects that benefit people and the environment. The 
Triodos fund assists certified organic and fair trade producers in pre-financing 
their export contracts with buyers in Europe and the United States.
Triodos shared Remei AG’s vision that BioRe should have the opportunity to 
become independent, so it decided to help the Tanzanian firm build direct rela-
tions with financers. The relationship went through a series of stages.
Figure 5.4 The current BioRe/Remei cotton value chain
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Product and financial flows
Purpose Pre-finance of export contract between BioRe and Remei AG; any other use is considered a default
Amount $2,325,000
Period 10 months
Disbursement Disbursed directly to BioRe Tanzania in three instalments on 15 Jul (22%), 1 Aug (43%) and 1 Sep (35%)
Repayment Repaid by Remei AG in four instalments on 15 Nov (4%), 15 Jan (19%), 16 Feb (39%) and before 1 Apr (38%)
Interest rate 8% annual
Transaction costs 1% administration fee
Risk management
Securitization
No hard collateral
Securitization based on sales contract between BioRe and 
Remei AG
Loan is maximum 60% of the free-on-board value of produce
Liability BioRe Tanzania and Remei AG are jointly and severally liable
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
Most recent audited financial statements 
Most recent interim financial statements
Cash flow prognosis for new season and projected profit and 
loss account
Copy of the export contract and certificate of organic quality
Review of previous season: realized versus expected yield, 
number of contract farmers and hectares; problems and 
claims regarding produce quality; development of market 
prices; competition in sourcing the produce; realized invest-
ments; financing from others; changes in ownership and 
management; experiences in transport and shipping
Outlook for coming season (same issues as above)
Information required 
during season
Monthly project monitoring report specifying seed cotton and 
lint cotton in stock, seed cotton readily available for sourcing, 
and cotton lint shipped abroad
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment 1 month
Table 5.1 Details of Triodos loan to BioRe/Remei AG
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•	 2005 Triodos provided Remei AG with a loan of €800,000 (about $1 million). 
Remei AG transferred the money to BioRe, and after 7 months Remei AG 
repaid the loan to Triodos. 
•	 2006 Drought severely affected the crop, so BioRe and Remei AG decided 
not to apply for a loan. 
•	 2007 Triodos provided a new loan, this time for €900,000 (about $1.2 million), 
again indirectly to BioRe through Remei AG. 
•	 2008 The partners had built trust and decided to go a further step. The loan 
was converted into US dollars, and $2,325,000 was disbursed directly to BioRe 
( in Figure 5.4). Both BioRe and Remei AG are jointly liable for the loan, 
and Remei AG will repay it. The loan period has been extended to 10 months, 
and the dates of disbursement and repayment have been adapted to better 
accommodate the trading season. Table 5.1 shows details of this loan.
Meanwhile, Remei AG has also continued to finance BioRe (Figure 5.5). The ad-
ditional finance from Triodos has made it possible for BioRe to expand its opera-
tions in Tanzania and increase the number of farmers it buys cotton from. Overall 
loans rose from $2 million in 2005 to $4.5 million in 2008, with half coming from 
Triodos in both years.
The partnership with Triodos has transformed the financial flows in the cotton 
chain from chain liquidity to a value chain finance triangle (Figure 5.4). Triodos’s 
willingness to finance the chain is based on the strong relationship between Re-
mei AG and BioRe, which is in turn based on proven relationships further up the 
chain (between BioRe, Bibiti and the farmers of Meatu district) and down (the 
links between Remei AG, the firms that spin the yarn and turn it into clothes, 
and the retailers). These relationships, plus strong market demand for organic 
Figure 5.5 Trade finance loans to BioRe Tanzania
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cotton, mean that Triodos can be confident that the value chain will continue to 
generate revenue.
Mitigating risks of financing cotton
Exporting cotton from Tanzania is a risky business in the eyes of many banks. 
They see various factors that may affect an exporter’s capacity to repay a bank 
loan (Table 5.2):
•	 Climate. Cotton farming in Meatu district is rainfed, and yields depend heav-
ily on the rainfall. Every few seasons there is a serious drought. When yields 
are low, the exporter may not have sufficient revenue to repay the loan.
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Drought Accurate yield forecasts, based on visits to farmers every 2 weeks
Contamination of 
chemicals (“drift”)
Grow hedges or leave gaps near non-
organic cotton fields
Compliance checked by inspectors
Price Price fluctuations
Purchase guarantee from Remei AG with 
continuous price adjustments based on 
“open-book budgeting”: Remei AG looks 
at BioRe’s production costs and adds 
a small profit margin to calculate sales 
price
Market
Lack of market 
demand
BioRe has purchase guarantee from 
Remei AG
BioRe commits to buying only 80% of 
actual yield of farmer
Market may not 
pay premium for 
cotton not yet 
fully certified as 
organic
 
BioRe will continue to buy such cotton 
and pay the input subsidy, but will stop 
paying the organic premium
Default
Side-selling to 
competing trad-
ers
 
Offer premium price to farmers
Close relationship with farmers based on 
transparency
Short storage period (weekly)
Budgeting accounts for 9% default
Non-compliance 
with organic 
regulations
 
Visits to farmers every 2 weeks
Internal and external inspection
Continuous training
Currency Exchange rate US$–TSh
Loan and payments are in dollars, so 
currency risk reduced to 2 months that 
cotton is in BioRe’s hands
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 5.2 Risk analysis for the organic cotton chain in Tanzania
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•	 Price fluctuations The price of cotton is set by the world market. In previous 
years prices had risen steadily, but in 2008 they suddenly dropped. If BioRe 
has a lot of unsold lint in stock when the price falls, this implies a huge loss.
•	 Default Farmers may sell their cotton to competing traders, even if they 
have signed a contract. They may not meet organic requirements or quality 
standards. Default by farmers may lead to a shortage of cotton and revenues 
for the exporter.
•	 Currency risks BioRe buys seed cotton in Tanzanian shillings and sells lint 
in US dollars, so is at risk of currency fluctuations. 
These factors meant that many banks are reluctant to provide loans to cotton 
exporters such as BioRe. BioRe requested loans from several Tanzanian banks, 
but they required mounds of documents, safeguards such as the firm’s office and 
training centre as hard collateral, as well as personal guarantees from BioRe’s 
and Remei AG’s managers.
Triodos does not demand such assurances. Its loan to BioRe is not secured by hard 
collateral or by personal or corporate guarantees. The only document underpin-
ning the loan is the sales contract between BioRe and Remei AG, specifying the 
amount and price of lint to be sold. Triodos’ decision to extend the loan is not 
based on securities, but on the trust that the cotton lint will be produced and sold, 
and will generate sufficient profit to repay the loan. In financial jargon, the loan 
is based on cash flow projections, rather than securities from assets.
There are three key strengths in the BioRe/Remei AG chain:
•	 BioRe’s management capacity Over the years BioRe has shown it can deal 
effectively with the problems and risks of cotton production and export. Field 
officers pay monthly visits to the farms, so the company has realistic forecasts 
of expected yields. BioRe has close relationships with the farmers, offering 
5-year contracts, inputs, training, and technical assistance. And BioRe builds 
in an assumed default rate of 12% into its yearly plans in case of possible 
setbacks. 
•	 Partnership between BioRe and Remei AG The companies have a sales 
contract with fixed prices and volumes. So the risk of market fluctuations is 
eliminated for BioRe and the farmers. Beyond the contract, there is strong 
commitment and interdependence between the two companies. Any issue 
will be resolved in close partnership. Remei AG is a financially solid company 
with a strong balance sheet. 
•	 The integrated textile chain All companies in the BioRe chain are partners 
who have been working together for many years. They are committed to each 
other and cooperate smoothly to solve problems. As chain manager, Remei 
AG ensures compliance with quality standards, open communication and 
efficient coordination in the chain. 
These strengths of the BioRe cotton chain effectively mitigate the risks of cotton 
trading. Many banks fail to recognize this. But Triodos specializes in financing cer-
tified export chains. Its staff can recognize the strengths of the BioRe cotton chain, 
0
5 Improving chain liquidity
and weigh these against the risks. That is why Triodos is willing to pre-finance 
the cotton chain without demanding hard securities, as local banks would do.
Setting prices
In Tanzania, the farm gate price for seed cotton is set in the following way. Before 
the harvest starts, the floor price of the season is determined by the cotton traders 
in a meeting of the Tanzania Cotton Board. The floor price depends on various 
factors: the world market price for cotton, the costs of oil and other inputs, and 
the exchange rate of the Tanzania shilling against the US dollar. Once the floor 
price is set, the free market is left to do its work. The traders compete with each 
other in buying the cotton from the farmers, so the prices normally go up during 
the season. For that reason, farmers only sell little by little, enough to have suf-
ficient cash money to pay their urgent bills, while waiting for the highest price 
possible.
BioRe’s purchase price is an average of the prices offered by competing traders 
in the villages where the company operates. Seed-cotton traders are obliged by 
law to publicly announce their buying price on a billboard outside their office. 
BioRe gathers this price information every day to calculate its own purchase price. 
On top of this, the company offers a fixed price premium of 15% on the average 
market prices of the last 5 years. The average traders’ purchase prices have risen 
from around TSh 160 per kilogram in 2000, to about TSh 480 in 2008. BioRe’s 
prices have risen from TSh 180 to about TSh 550 in the same period. 
BioRe’s and Remei AG’s strategy is to pay the farmers as much as possible, at the 
lowest cost possible. The organic premium and the input subsidy for the farmers 
Figure 5.6 Average income of BioRe’s farmers
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are not paid for by BioRe, but by Remei AG from its annual profits. So the extra 
payments to BioRe’s farmers are not added to the cost price of the cotton. Why is 
this smart? Because usually chain actors automatically add a percentage mark-up 
to the value of the product, and taxes are also calculated on the product’s value 
at each stage. By “lifting out” these costs and paying them at the end, Remei AG 
avoids inflating the price of the product at each stage in the chain. That keeps the 
price of the final product low, making consumers more willing to buy it.
Benefits
Farmers BioRe’s farmers not only receive a price premium; as organic produc-
ers they also avoid the costs of chemicals, while their yields are similar to those 
of conventional cotton farmers. That gives them an income 40% higher than 
conventional farmers (Table 5.3). In addition, thanks to the training and advice 
from BioRe, farmers have learned to produce more efficiently, and they are now 
able to produce larger areas of cotton. As a result, their income has boomed 
(Figure 5.6). 
Table 5.3 Income and expenses of organic and conventional cotton farmers
US$ per hectare
Organic (BioRe) farmer Conventional farmer
Income
Sales of seed cotton 258.12 258.12 
Organic premium 32.40 –
Total income 290.52 258.12 
Expenses
Seeds 5.00 5.00 
Land preparation 25.00 25.00 
Weeding 75.00 75.00 
Harvesting 32.40 32.40 
Inputs 3.13 8.00 
Total cost 140.53 145.40 
Input subsidy 8.10 - 
Net expenses 132.43 145.40 
Net earnings 158.10 112.72 
Figure 5.8 The future of the BioRe/Remei AG cotton value chain
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Figure 5.8 The future of the BioRe/Remei AG cotton value chain
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Figure 5.7 Annual turnover of BioRe
0
Value Chain Finance 
BioRe’s farmers also report other benefits. They obtain higher yields in other 
crops. Their soil is in a better condition since they started rotating cotton with 
other crops. The soil has more organic matter, which increases the soil capacity 
to retain humidity. So a period without rainfall is not as fatal for them as it is for 
other farmers in the district. Finally the farmers save a lot of time for their family, 
as they learned to use oxen for ploughing and weeding.
Other local people BioRe now employs 66 staff, most from local villages. It 
is the only employer in Meatu district which provides such attractive salaries 
and education opportunities. BioRe’s training centre is developing as a regional 
centre of competence. In times of need the company supports the local commu-
nity. During the drought of 2006 the company provided daily lunches to 7,000 
schoolchildren for 3 months. 
BioRe BioRe has enjoyed a spectacular increase in turnover (Figure 5.7). It is a 
key part of a chain that maintains high social, environmental and quality stand-
ards. The chain has grown markedly, outperforming conventional cotton chains, 
and generates profits for all actors. 
Bibiti The Bibiti ginnery’s contract with BioRe, along with the prefinancing 
and loans it receives, enables it to run efficiently and profitably. Without this 
relationship, its ginnery would most likely stand idle. 
Remei AG Remei AG and its downstream partners enjoy significant growth 
and sound profit margins. In the last decade Remei AG has switched fully to 
organic cotton. Its turnover has remained more or less stable at $25 million, but 
its profitability has more than tripled.
Consumers Consumers are able to buy high-quality garments that fulfil highest 
standards of sustainability at a price which is not so much higher than conven-
tional clothing. 
Triodos Bank Triodos has a good client in BioRe. There is a smooth working 
relationship; so far there have been no problems in reporting, communication or 
repayment, so the bank does not need to spend much time or effort in managing 
the loan. Most important, the loan is fully aligned with the bank’s mission – it 
is a financial product that directly benefits people and environment, in a region 
of great need.
The future
BioRe and Remei AG jointly determine the export price of BioRe’s lint by “open 
book” calculation: the partners look at BioRe’s costs of production, then add a 
small profit margin. In 2008 BioRe’s free-on-board export price was $1.73/kg of 
lint. This was significantly higher than the average Tanzanian export price of 
$1.58. In other words BioRe is not yet competitive: it would not survive if Remei 
AG were not willing to pay a higher price. The main reason of BioRe’s higher 
costs is its investment in training and technical assistance to the farmers. BioRe 
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needs to find a way to reduce its costs and produce cotton at a fully competitive 
price. To accomplish this, BioRe is pursuing a strategy with the following ele-
ments (Figure 5.8).
Involve local banks more closely The loan from Triodos is very attractive. But 
it would still be good to develop a stronger relationship with local banks. One 
important thing for BioRe is to get an overdraft account at a local bank, where 
BioRe can draw small amounts of short-term credit, for example, when a client 
pays late ( in Figure 5.8). Another issue is to find a better way to pay the farm-
ers. Rather than paying in cash, BioRe would prefer to transfer money to farmers’ 
accounts.
Establish farmer associations BioRe wants to organize the farmers into groups 
that can help to distribute seeds and inputs, collect and inspect the cotton, and 
jointly deliver to BioRe. The groups can also take care of training activities. In the 
long term, the groups can become shareholder in BioRe. In Remei AG’s Indian 
partner, this is already happening ( in Figure 5.8).
Establish savings and credit cooperatives By establishing savings and credit 
co-ops, the farmers could provide some of their own financial services. For 
example, they could save a small amount each week, then loan this money to 
members. The farmers could invest their loans in cotton production, or use it for 
other purposes ( in Figure 5.8). 
BioRe has learnt that it takes time to build a healthy enterprise. After 14 years the 
company is still not in a stable situation. To achieve high standards, the company 
has invested heavily in training of farmers and staff and built an internal inspection 
system. This created a heavy overhead. The overhead now needs to be reduced 
by empowering the farmers and ensuring they take on more responsibilities.
Further information
Niranjan Pattni, Managing Director, BioRe Tanzania Ltd., niranjan.pattni@biore-
tanzania.com
www.remei.ch
www.coop.ch/naturaline
www.triodos.com
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Reducing poverty by 
strengthening the sal leaf 
chain in India
weddings in india tend to be massive undertakings. Hundreds of well-wishers come to present gifts to the bride and groom. Naturally, all the guests must 
be fed. Behind the scenes, a small army of cooks prepares platter upon platter 
of food. But how to serve it? Few households or hotels have enough crockery to 
serve so many people at one time.
The answer is to use disposable plates and cups. Unlike their plastic or coated 
paper equivalents in the West, in India these are often made of leaves. They are 
cheap, disposable and biodegradable. Apart from weddings, they are also used 
in festivals and ceremonies, and to make offerings to Hindu gods. 
These cups and plates are made from the leaves of the sal tree (Shorea robusta) – a 
tall timber tree common in eastern and central India. The oval leaves are 10–25 cm 
long and 5–15 cm wide – too small to hold more than a morsel of food, so they must 
be sewn together and then pressed into shape to make a rigid plate or cup.
Used by some of India’s wealthiest people, these items are made by some of its 
poorest: tribal women in the states of Orissa, West Bengal and Jarkhand (Figure 
5.9). Collecting leaves and making 
plates and cups is a major source of 
income for thousands of people who 
live in this region’s forests, as well as 
for hundreds of traders. Many tribal 
families depend on collecting and sell-
ing sal leaves for over half their income. 
There are few figures on how many 
leaves they collect and sell each year. 
At a rough estimate, the total whole-
sale value of sal leaf plates and cups in 
Orissa alone is about $200 million. 
In the district of Mayurbhanj, many sal 
leaf collectors, processors and traders 
cluster in and around the district capital 
of Baripada. In 2006, UNIDO, a branch 
of the United Nations that works on 
industrial development, began working 
Figure 5.9 Location of the sal leaf industry 
in India
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in this district as part of its Cluster Development Programme. The aim of this 
programme was to reduce poverty by strengthening the sal leaf value chain. The 
programme reached around 10,000 households living in 25 villages in a forest 
area of 10,000 hectares. 
The sal leaf value chain
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the main stages and actors in the sal leaf chain.
Collectors Most of these are tribal women. They collect sal leaves in the forest 
for about 8 months of the year, dry them and stitch them together into dwipatris 
(twin leaves) or khalis (raw plates). These stitched leaves become the raw mate-
rial for making sal leaf plates and cups. They bundle them and sell them to local 
agents, earning about $0.24 to $0.30 per day. This is barely enough to survive 
on, and even this income is seasonal. During the low season from September to 
January when leaves are scarce, life gets even tougher. The collectors have no 
savings, so they look for farm work, collect edible tubers from the forest, or look 
for other sources of income. 
Figure 5.10 Stages in sal leaf production
Collecting sal 
leaves in the 
forest
Finished sal 
leaf plates
Loading bundles of 
finished plates
Stitching leaves 
together
Leaf pressing 
equipment
Self-help group
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Local agents Agents, also called “cycle wallahs”, are men who go door-to-door 
buying the stitched leaves from collectors, paying them in cash. They sell bundles 
of leaves on the local market or directly to processors who convert them into cups 
and plates. The agents are not tribal people, and most live in nearby towns. They 
are better off than the collectors, earning US$90–100 per month. They trade in 
leaves part-time; many also run small businesses such as grocery shops as ad-
ditional sources of income.
Processors Processors are women who work at home to make cups and plates 
from the leaves. Sometimes their teenage daughters stay home to help out. They 
operate one or two electric pressing machines. They buy stitched leaves from 
the local agents or local markets, press them and sell them to traders. They have 
minimal working capital: just enough to buy raw leaves. They earn $20–30 a 
month if they use family labour. For most, this is their main source of income. 
Most live around the market town of Betnoti, one of India’s biggest centres for 
the trade in sal cups and plates. 
Traders Traders are men who buy the cups and plates from the processors. 
Some also process leaves themselves. They hold a license to operate as a sal 
trader and a transit permit to transport the finished product to wholesalers and 
retailers. Larger traders have direct access to outside markets and own offices 
and warehouses to store the finished product. The average annual turnover of a 
processor–trader is $20,000 to $30,000. 
Moneylender
Local agent
Primary 
collector Household 
processor
Leaves
Cash
Leaves (60%)
Cash
Loan
R
epaym
ent
Product
Money
Services, information
Local bank
Trader Wholesaler, 
Retailer
Consumer
Leaves (40%)
Cash
Plates, cups
Cash
Loan
R
epaym
ent
Figure 5.11 Traditional sal leaf chain
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Problems in the chain
Collectors
Inappropriate credit Pushed to fulfil government credit-disbursement targets, 
local banks often offer loans that are too large for borrowers to manage. This sys-
tem leads to fraud and massive defaults, especially in areas such as Mayurbhanj, 
where the indigenous tribal people have little education and are pressed to take 
on loans of $1,000 or more. Sometimes they are not even aware that they have 
become borrowers: they regard the loan as a gift.
In the 1990s, village health workers encouraged women to form groups of up to 20 
members and to start saving regularly. The women opened group accounts with 
a local bank and lent small amounts from their group’s savings to one another. 
After a group has done this successfully for about 6 months, the banks may offer 
it a loan, giving it a bigger pool of money to lend out to its members. By 2009, 
there were about 3 million such groups in India, with around 45 million women 
members; many groups had accumulated funds of several thousand dollars. But 
unfortunately this programme has also become target-driven. The banks have 
pushed credit loans onto the self-help groups to meet their loan targets, leading 
borrowers into a debt trap. 
Inappropriate use of loans The collectors often use their loans poorly. These 
loans are meant for investing in sal leaves, sabai grass (used to make rope), poultry, 
livestock rearing or other enterprises, but borrowers lack the skills or materials 
to do this successfully. Instead of investing it in production, many spend it on 
consumption, sometimes using large amounts for food and clothing during tra-
ditional celebrations, or on alcohol. 
Lack of business skills In addition, the collectors lack skills such as book-keep-
ing, accounting and business planning. Unlike some financial institutes which 
provide “hand-holding” services with a loan, these government-funded loan 
schemes give lenders no extra services. As a result, most collectors default. 
The collectors often do not grasp what a default is, nor do they feel the conse-
quences. They have no assets that could be repossessed. For their part, the bankers 
merely erase the defaults from their books by giving the collectors a new, larger 
loan to pay off the first debts and give them a little extra money. 
Reduced availability of sal leaves. In most villages, collectors cannot collect 
enough leaves because of illegal tree felling and unsustainable harvesting prac-
tices.
Lack of market information. Collectors lack access to markets or market infor-
mation. Local agents take advantage of this by paying them below-market rates 
and not telling them about market conditions.
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Processors
No access to credit Processors have the opposite problem to collectors: getting 
enough working capital to build their businesses. Banks are not interested in 
financing them because they have no land, no collateral and no documentation 
such as financial statements on which to base a loan. They are not considered a 
target group in government policies, so they do not have access to credits from 
the government banks.
Low productivity due to outdated technology Without working capital, proc-
essors must continue using old pressing machines. The machines are dangerous: 
processors complain of chronic leg pain and electric shocks. They are also energy-
inefficient: they waste a lot of heat. Changes in voltage and temperature affect 
the quality of the pressed cups and plates. The machines frequently break down, 
causing days of lost work as processors wait for them to be fixed.
Reduced income in the low season Prices for raw materials (stitched sal leaves) 
fluctuate widely. During the low season when sal leaf is scarce, the price of 
stitched leaves may rise by 30–35%, even as the quality deteriorates. For proces-
sors, this is a difficult time. They may operate at a loss – just covering the cost 
of raw materials but not their labour – in order to remain connected to traders. 
Sometimes they are even forced to stop production. Big traders with large stores 
hoard stitched leaves during the high season for use at other times of the year. 
With some working capital, smaller-scale processors would be able to do the 
same, keeping their profit margins more stable.
Traders
No access to credit Like the processors, traders also lack access to bank loans. 
They tend to rely heavily on informal credit, such as loans from larger traders 
and moneylenders, which charge high rates of interest. Without working capital 
they cannot expand or improve their businesses, which has impacts all the way 
down the chain.
Competition from substitute products. Traders have failed to innovate: they do 
not look for ways to improve their products or build their businesses. Their earn-
ings are starting to suffer as leaf plates face growing competition from cheaper 
plastic and paper plates. At the same time, a growing market for eco-friendly 
products presents new opportunities for products made from biodegradable 
leaves. 
Innovating to improve the chain
Beginning in January 2006, the UNIDO programme worked with around 9,000 
collectors, 200 processors and 30 traders. The programme did not deal with the 
local agents, who had incomes from other sources which made them less vul-
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nerable. The programme introduced various financial, social and environmental 
innovations at the different stages in the value chain.
Financial innovations
Primary collectors 
Training on credit and business management UNIDO counselled the self-help 
groups on good financial practices, including savings, internal lending (where 
members lend to each other through the group) and financial management (Box 
5.2).
UNIDO also trained its own field staff (who are responsible for developing clusters 
of micro-enterprises) and the village health workers to coach the self-help groups: 
providing support services such as training and capacity building on bookkeep-
ing, accounting and preparing business plans to ensure they would invest their 
savings and credit in business activities rather than consumption. Such hand-
holding continued for one year, after which the self-help groups started regular 
saving and internal lending activities.
The programme organized a drama called Das Kati, where actors demonstrated to 
the villagers the consequences of taking too much credit and defaulting on loans. 
Three hundred collectors were taken to visit and learn from successful self-help 
groups outside the district.
Box 5.2 How the Dumapada self-help group took its unused 
loan back to the bank
In 2007, a self-help group from the village of Dumapada applied for a new bank loan. In 
November that year it received $600 from the regional rural bank Baitarni Grameen and 
distributed the money equally among its members. UNIDO organized a meeting with the 
group to see how they would use the loan. When UNIDO asked the borrowers what the 
purpose of the loan was, most did not know. Some replied that since they had no business 
plan, they would keep it in their savings account. 
That is when UNIDO decided to provide financial counselling to help the members develop 
a business plan and direct the loan towards production. A half-day training on business 
plans and financial management was organized in which member learned to calculate their 
loan needs, the best use of the loan and a repayment plan. After the training, the members 
realized that the loan they had received from the bank was more than they needed, and 
more than they could use. They decided to divide $400 among the members and return 
the rest to the bank. 
All the members invested their loan money in their sal leaf businesses and have decided 
on a repayment schedule of 10 months. Five months later, they were repaying their instal-
ments regularly and earning more from their businesses.
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Federation loans The Ahari Federation, composed of six self-help groups, was 
formed to improve the management of loans among the collectors. Individual 
self-help groups contributed about $40 to a common fund, demonstrating their 
commitment to joint action. The Federation used the resulting total of $240 to get 
a matching grant from UNIDO ( in Figure 5.12). 
The Federation uses this capital to give small, short-term loans to individual self-
help groups ( in Figure 5.12) to enable collectors to stockpile leaves and wait 
for market prices to rise before selling them. Before, they had no choice but to sell 
leaves to cover their daily expenses, even though prices were low. Now the women 
can increase their profits and slowly build up their income and savings.
The groups receive credit based on the business plans they developed through 
UNIDO’s training. The loans meet the actual credit needs – which are low – and 
the time period needed – which is short. The Federation charges its members 
2% interest on loans for up to 7 days, 3% for 8–15 days; and 5% for 16–30 days. 
Beyond 30 days, the Federation imposes a fine. Although these interest rates are 
high, they are set by the groups themselves, and the profits go to the Federation 
rather than to a bank. The groups assist in this loan scheme by supporting their 
members’ loan requests and pressuring members to repay on time. See Table 5.4 
for details of this loan scheme.
Figure 5.12 The sal leaf value chain after UNIDO’s intervention
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From the start this loan scheme has worked well. Monthly repayments to the 
Federation were made on schedule, and the scheme showed the banks that it is 
possible to lend to the collectors at a reasonable level of risk. 
Bank loans UNIDO sensitized the banks about collectors’ credit needs and 
how the chain works. Within a year of the start of the UNIDO programme, and 
after seeing the success of the Federation loans, the banks realized that collec-
tors need small amounts of credit for short periods – around $10–20 for up to 
6 months. Based on these results, the banks started financing the collectors via 
the self-help groups (). These were production loans, intended for collectors to 
develop their sal businesses and to develop an alternative livelihood during the 
low season for sal leaf. Sabai, a type of grass used to make rope, is another forest 
product found in the region which could serve this purpose. However, collec-
tors needed capital to invest in processing sabai. As with the Ahari Federation’s 
loans, the credit amounts and repayment schedule were designed according to 
the self-help groups’ business plans. 
Access to market information The collectors used to rely entirely on the lo-
cal agents to sell their products to processors. They had no access to market or 
to information, so the agents could get away with paying below-market rates. 
UNIDO took collectors to markets to learn how they work and how to gather 
information on a regular basis, such as the current prices for sal leaf. The Ahari 
Federation also started an information and communication centre at its offices 
where collectors can get such information. They can also call traders and proces-
sors directly to organize the sale of their product. 
Integrating the value chain The self-help groups applied for a licence to trade 
in sal leaves. Licensing is required by the government because of over-exploita-
tion of the forest. The collectors bring their leaves to the Ahari Federation, which 
sells them to a federation of processors, which in turn sells them to the processors 
(). This cuts out the local agents, so increasing the profit margins of collectors 
and processors. 
The collectors used to earn about Rs 12 ($0.24) per bundle (the amount a collector 
could produce in a day) by selling it to an agent, who would sell the same bundle 
to a processor for Rs 23–25. Under the new system, the federation of processors 
pays the collectors’ federation Rs 19 for a bundle; the collectors’ federation keeps 
Rs 2 profit and gives the collectors group Rs 17; the collectors’ group keeps an-
other Rs 2 and gives Rs 15 to the collectors. The federations now act as friendly 
intermediaries; they reinvest this in the federation. The processors pay Rs 3–5 
less per bundle, but the collectors earn Rs 3 more.
Emergency loans The Ahari Federation started offering emergency loans to 
cover sudden expenses such as illness. The Federation keeps cash at its offices 
so it can provide such loans immediately. The borrower has 10 days to repay the 
loan interest-free; after that period, interest is charged. The interest rate is the 
same as that for other loans from the Federation to its members.
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Processors
To tackle the different problems of the processors, a federation of self-help groups 
of household processors was established near Betnoti. The Betnoti Federation 
members started saving money on a monthly basis and internal lending, much 
like the Ahari Federation of collectors. 
Financing production facilities Using their savings and with support from a 
local organization called Gram Swaraj, the Betnoti Federation built a storage room 
for sal leaves, a meeting room and a common work area for processing the leaves. 
The total investment was $3,000, of which $2,000 was a grant from Gram Swaraj. 
In addition, the Federation used a grant of $1,100 from the Foundation for MSME 
Clusters (an NGO promoting small and medium enterprises) to buy a pressing 
machine. This can be used by four processors at the same time, and can generate 
a profit of $5–10 per day. The Federation facilities are used as a meeting place, 
for demonstrating new processing technology, and for training processors how 
to improve their productivity, reduce their costs, conserve energy and develop 
new products from the sal leaves. 
Bank loans UNIDO organized workshops with bankers to explain how the value 
chain works, the opportunities and strengths of the chain. The Betnoti Federation 
then approached a bank and got a matching loan against the Federation’s sav-
ings ( in Figure 5.12). The loan was used to buy sal leaves from the collectors’ 
Ahari Federation during the high season. The leaves were held in the Betnoti 
Federation’s storage room and then sold during the low season to processors at 
competitive rates.
In an effort to secure investment loans for new technology, the banks were invited 
to look at the strength of the leaf pressing business. The banks also wanted mar-
ket information and asked the traders whether this technology would contribute 
to a better product. Convinced that it was a sound investment, the banks began 
lending money to the processors to upgrade their equipment ( in Figure 5.12). 
One major improvement was a thermostatic cut-out to prevent overheating, re-
duce electricity consumption and improve safety. While the traditional system 
consumed 2.2 units of electricity every 3 hours, the improved machine consumed 
just 1.2 units – a 40% reduction in energy use. Other improvements included a 
better cutting blade and a pressing lever that greatly reduced the physical effort 
of processors.
New product development In an effort to reduce leaf consumption and over-
exploitation of the forest, UNIDO started motivating processors and traders to 
develop new products. A trader came up with the idea of using glossy paper for 
the bottom layer of sal leaf cups, rather than using two layers of sal leaves. For 
processors there were a number of advantages to this - transport costs were lower, 
and paper was easier to procure than leaves. Consumers also liked the hybrid 
cups for their strength and water-resistance, and they now fetch a better price on 
the market than traditional sal cups. In order to increase the scale of production, 
processors were trained in paper plate processing according to the specifications 

5 Improving chain liquidity
provided by the trader. The Betnoti Federation is working towards bringing all 
the processors into this initiative. 
Traders
Loans One of the main reasons that banks refused to lend to traders was their 
lack of financial records such as balance sheets and income statements. Initially 
the traders were sceptical and did not want to disclose their business turnover. 
But UNIDO arranged meetings with bankers, took the traders on an exposure 
visits, and helped the traders prepare basic financial data so the bankers could 
appraise their businesses and lend them money. This gave banks the confidence 
to start giving individual loans to traders, ranging from $1,000 to $3,000 ( in 
Figure 5.12). Two traders decided to follow the recommendations and started 
receiving payments from retailers and wholesalers through the bank, giving the 
banks a record of their transactions. Others saw their success, and now 35 traders 
are using this new business approach.
Social and environmental innovations
Generating income growth in Mayurbhanj district was not just the result of finan-
cial changes such as gaining access to credit. Social and environmental initiatives 
initiated by UNIDO were essential to creating an environment in which loans 
and credit could work.
Insurance Personal accident insurance is now available for collectors, proces-
sors and traders, organized by a government agency with UNIDO’s help ( in 
Figure 5.12). Collectors pay Rs 15 ($0.30) a year, and can receive up to $500 in 
the event of an accident. For processors the premium is $2 and the benefit up to 
$2,000. “Insurance camps” were organized in the villages to inform people about 
the insurance programme and get them to sign up. 
Health training Many people in the area suffer from poor health, and large 
numbers of children never attend school, or drop out early. The self-help groups 
began raising awareness among local people about health, education and insur-
ance services. They began providing help and advice on personal hygiene, arrang-
ing herbal gardens where families could grow medicinal plants; and prompting 
parents to send their children to school. They sometimes also produce lunch at 
schools and support with student tuition.
Forest conservation It is vital to conserve the forest for the future of the sal 
leaf value chain. Arable land in Mayurbhanj district is scarce, and there is a lot 
of pressure on the forest as a source of income: people fell trees for fuel and clear 
land to grow sabai grass. An earlier attempt by the Joint Forest Protection Com-
mittee to raise awareness about forest conservation and control illegal tree cutting 
had failed. But UNIDO’s programme revived and reorganized this committee, 
and 40 women and 96 young people joined. A programme to raise awareness 
about forest protection targeted 95 villages, and trained collectors in sustainable 
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harvesting. To reduce illegal tree felling, a patrol squad was created, paid for by 
a fixed contribution from the 95 member villages.
Engaging banks with the sal leaf chain
In the past, there was a total mismatch between the sal leaf value chain and the 
financial system. Collectors received overly large loans and got into deep debt as 
they were unable to repay, while traders and processors had no access to bank 
loans and were unable to invest in their businesses. Now, after the intervention, 
the actors in the sal leaf chain have become clients for the banks. UNIDO’s pro-
gramme established two triangles of value chain finance:
Loan from Ahari Fed-
eration to individual 
collectors ( in 
Figure 5.12)
Loans from bank to 
Betnoti Federation 
and processors () 
Loan from bank 
to collectors’ and 
processors’ self-help 
groups ( and )
Product and financial flows
Purpose Short-term micro loan Buying raw material and equipment Loan
Amount
Loan given to individu-
als
Total portfolio: $1,200
No cash given alone
Raw materials, equip-
ment and other items
Total portfolio: $1,500
Total portfolio: $94,530
Period 7–30 days 6 months At least 1 year
Interest rate
2% up to 7 days 
3% 8–15 days 
5% 16–30 days
1% for raw material 
7% for equipment
11%
Transaction 
costs 1% <1% 2%
Risk management
Securitiza-
tion Peer pressure
Collateral: pressing 
machine
Legal document 
stating terms and 
conditions
No
Liability Both individual and self-help group Individual Self-help groups
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
Application letter 
forwarded and recom-
mended by self-help 
group
Application
Federation member-
ship
Bank account
Savings
Books and accounts
Minutes of group 
meetings for at least 6 
months
Table 5.4 Financial services in the sal leaf chain in India
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•	 Collectors – Ahari federation – bank The collectors are organized and 
trained in business planning and financial management. They are informed 
of market trends and they have built assets through regular savings. In other 
words, the collectors have become knowledgeable businesswomen and as 
such they are attractive clients for the banks. The banks provide them with 
working capital, in accord with their needs.
•	 Processors – Betnoti federation – bank The processors also organized and 
got trained in business skills. They started saving regularly, on the basis of 
which they obtained bank loans for working capital. They learned to present 
their business case to the banks and get investment loans for new equip-
ment. With these investment loans they can innovate and expand their busi-
nesses.
In addition, the banks also started to finance some traders. Two factors helped to 
set this up. One, traders applied more formal methods of financial accounting and 
could therefore present reliable data to the bank. Two, the banks got to know how 
the sal leaf chain operates and developed more confidence that it could recover 
loans from the sector.
Table 5.5 shows the risks of lending to the sal leaf chain. Various risks have 
been reduced thanks to UNIDO’s intervention. Financial training, introduction 
of regular savings, and organization of the chain actors have been the key risk 
mitigation strategies. 
Benefits 
Collectors At the start of the programme, the collectors earned about $0.30 
per day, or $10 a month. By selling directly to the Federation and not using the 
services of agents, they were able to increase their incomes to $14 a month. 
Using the production loans from the banks, some collectors were able to buy 
a processing machine and increase their average incomes by $200 to $300 per 
month per person. This also gives them employment all year round, instead of 
just in the high season. 
The collectors’ self-help groups now meet regularly; the members are disciplined 
and have adopted a code of conduct. Three hundred groups have started group 
savings, 133 have started lending within the group, and 30 have negotiated with 
the bank to get loans that suit their needs. 
Four hundred self-help group members now use their loans for business activi-
ties instead of consumption, and 240 group members have invested credit from 
internal lending in their business activities. 
Processors The monthly income of processors has increased from $12 per month 
to some $35–$40 per month in the high season. This increase was the result of 
storing raw materials, improved processing technology and the introduction of 
paper as a raw material. 
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The Betnoti Federation supports processors by giving them access to raw materials 
in the low season. It gives them loans to install better technology and energy-sav-
ing devices. It also provides employment to many people. Some 120 processors 
are the direct beneficiaries of this initiative. 
Traders Thirty traders received loans from banks and increased the scale of their 
business. They also benefited indirectly from the improved technology because 
it produces a better product. These benefits to the traders have a trickle-down 
effect through the whole sal production process in the area. 
Banks Banks now experience better loan recovery: the repayment rate increased 
by 55%. The relationship between banks and lenders has improved thanks to 
hand-holding, which decreases their credit risk. More than 80% of the default-
ing self-help groups improved their working relationship with the banks. In 
addition, the banks developed new client relations with the processors and the 
traders. The bank has learned that the sal leaf chain can be an attractive market 
for the bank.
The chain as a whole The chain as a whole has become more integrated through 
better information flows, better financial management and lower costs. New in-
novations in products and technology have added value to the chain. The scale 
of production has also increased, especially at the level of processors and traders. 
The value chain has been made more sustainable through conservation efforts.
Social and environmental impacts
Some 1,560 primary collectors and 120 processors now have personal accident 
insurance.
The introduction of paper into cup-making cut the use of sal leaves by half, sup-
porting conservation efforts. The growth of the Joint Forest Protection Committee 
from 7 village members to 95, and its renewed activities has also had an impact: 
illegal tree felling has stopped in 47 villages because of the patrol squad. 
The social impacts on the chain have also been significant. Most processors are 
women. Once they gained access to working capital, they could upgrade their 
equipment, buy cheaper raw materials, and earn more. Better technology has 
reduced their physical burden. Because they are earning more in less time, they 
now have more time for their families. 
Traditionally, children were often involved in processing, meaning they missed 
school. As adults, they were less able to manage business activities and under-
stand markets, making them overly dependent on others in the value chain. Once 
their mothers started earning more, the children had a better chance of getting 
an education and breaking out of this vicious cycle. 
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Challenges and lessons
Length of intervention The UNIDO programme began in January 2006. In May 
2008 the programme ended and UNIDO staff withdrew. Around 9,000 collectors, 
200 processors and 30 traders benefited from the programme. As of February 2009, 
the Federations were still performing well. This programme demonstrated that it 
is possible for a donor-funded intervention in a value chain to achieve substantial 
and sustainable results, to hand over some minor continuing support activities to 
existing government agencies, and to close down in as little as 3.5 years.
Local agents The position of the local agents in the chain continues to raise a 
question mark. UNIDO did not involve them in the programme because they were 
adding costs and not value to the chain, and exploiting collectors and processors 
with excessive prices. An informal inquiry into the lot of five agents after the 
programme found that two had bought a pressing machine and started work-
ing as processors. The other three were still operating as agents in other villages 
(outside the 25 project villages). They have increased the price that they offer to 
primary collectors for sal leaves.
Credit The problems in the chain show that excessive value chain credit can be 
as damaging and ineffective as too little or no credit. 
Multiple approach Successful value chain interventions must be multi-facetted, 
including inputs such as improving marketing and processing channels, building 
strong community institutions and technological changes. Value chain finance 
on its own can rarely achieve anything.
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Over-collection 
of leaves
Sensitization among collectors
Forest protection regulations
Alternative raw materials
Energy inefficien-
cy and losses Improved pressing equipment
Price
Big changes 
in price of sal 
leaves
Increasing leaf storage capacity
Market
Competition 
from alternative 
products
 Product development and diversification
Default
Misuse
Non-repayment
Financial counselling
Training on financial literacy
Regular savings
Other Illness
Insurance 
Health club for children and women
Herbal garden
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 5.5 Risk analysis for the sal leaf chain in India 

Value Chain Finance 
Importance of grassroots institutions The flow of value chain finance involves 
disaggregating large sums into the small amounts which individual producers, 
traders or intermediaries need. This requires strong and usually community-
owned institutions, which must be built before any sustainable financial flows 
can follow.
Local adaptation Massive top-down government or donor credit delivery pro-
grammes must be radically changed to make them useful for the target group. 
The target group’s needs and savings capacity must be the basis for the loans.
More information
Amit Kumar Singh, Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project, asinghks@gmail.com
Sangeeta Agasty, Foundation for MSME Clusters, sangeeta.agasty@gmail.com 
www.ruralenterprise.blogspot.com
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Micro-factoring: Instant 
payment on delivery of tea in 
Kenya 
kenya is one oF the world’s top exporters of tea, and Kenyan tea has won international acclaim for its consistently high quality and pleasant aroma. 
Tea is also one of the country’s top foreign exchange earners, and the Mombasa 
Tea Auction is the second largest in the world. About 60% of the country’s tea is 
produced by smallholders, who earn an average of around $1,500 a year.
But Kenya’s smallholder tea growers face a problem: they find it difficult to get 
paid on time. Some have to wait for months before they finally receive their money. 
The long delay makes it hard for them to feed their families in the meantime, or 
to invest in improving their farm enterprise.
Similar problems face producers of many other types of agricultural products: 
farmers have to invest up front, wait a whole season before harvesting the produce, 
then wait again for the buyer to pay. That limits their productivity and output, 
and means that they are forced to sell at low prices to intermediaries who can 
give them cash immediately. 
Factoring as a solution
Biashara Factors Limited, the microfinance arm of Kenya Gatsby Trust, is devel-
oping solutions to this problem. It provides an innovative financing arrangement 
known as “invoice factoring” that offers short-term financial services to small-
holders and other actors in the value chain. 
Biashara has adapted this service for various commodities in Kenya: tea (mainly 
in the Kericho area in Rift Valley province), cotton (in the Siaya area in Nyanza 
province), fish (Lake Victoria), and horticulture, coffee and dairying (Central 
Kenya), as well as for information technology in arid and semi-arid parts of the 
country.
This case describes the factoring service that Biashara has developed for the tea 
value chain.
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From bush to cup
On the face of it, one would expect 
tea to provide growers with a regular 
income. During the picking seasons 
(March–May and August–December), 
the young leaves can be plucked from 
the tea bushes once every 2 weeks. The 
farmers take sacks of leaves to collec-
tion centres, from where they are taken 
to a processing plant for drying and 
processing ( in Figure 5.14). The proc-
essed tea is then taken to Mombasa for 
auction. Tea traders there buy the tea, 
pack it and sell it to the local or export 
markets.
Under this system, the Kenya Tea De-
velopment Agency (KTDA), a company 
that serves the country’s smallholder 
tea growers, paid the farmers KSh 30 
($0.38) per kilogram of tea. But the 
farmers would have to wait up to 3 
months before they finally got paid. So 
many farmers instead sold their output to private traders, who paid immediately 
– but much less: only KSh 10 ($0.13) per kilogram ( in Figure 5.14). The farm-
ers were in a poor position to bargain because they needed cash urgently, did 
not know the prevailing market rates, and had no access to alternative sources 
of finance.
Figure 5.14 The tea value chain before Biashara’s intervention
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Figure 5.13 The Kabianga cooperative is 
near Kericho, Kenya
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Building a new chain
The 3,000-plus members of the Kabianga cooperative, one of several co-ops in a 
tea-growing area near the town of Kericho in Rift Valley province, were convinced 
they could do better. Their cooperative collected tea from individual members, 
then sold it to KDTA. They decided to reopen a run-down tea processing plant 
at Kapchebet, which is jointly owned by individual farmers and the cooperative. 
The factory would sell the tea directly through the Mombasa auction, rather than 
going through KTDA’s cumbersome procedures. They managed to obtain a loan 
of KSh 100 million ($1.25 million) from a national development bank to renovate 
the factory. This loan was secured by a charge on the factory’s assets and the 
directors’ guarantee.
The factory had to repay this loan on time. It also needed to guarantee supplies 
of tea from the farmers. That meant paying them quickly so they would not be 
forced to sell to the traders. The factory did not have enough working capital to 
do both, so the management approached Biashara for a factoring facility (Box 5.3). 
Biashara, a pioneer in providing this service to smallholders in East and Central 
Africa, is a self-financing organization that does not depend on donor funding 
for its operations. It gets its funds from its parent organization, Kenya Gatsby 
Trust, in the form of shares, and also borrows from other financial institutions 
in Kenya and foreign organizations such as Shared Interest, a socially oriented 
lender based in the UK. 
Box 5.3 What is invoice factoring?
Factoring is a form of business financing where you sell your invoices to a factoring com-
pany in exchange for immediate payment. It eliminates the 30–90 days that your customers 
take to pay your invoices, and provides you with the working capital you need to run your 
business. Factoring is a common practice for big business, but is revolutionary for micro-
entrepreneurs.
This is how it works:
1 You deliver goods or services to your customer and issue an invoice.
2 You sell your invoice to a factoring company, which immediately advances you the first 
instalment, between 70% and 90% of the gross value of the invoice. You receive the 
first payment in as little as 48 hours.
3 The factoring company sends the invoice to the customer.
4 After 30–90 days, the customer pays the invoice and the factoring company pays you 
the remaining funds as a second instalment, minus the interest and a processing fee. 
The beauty of invoice factoring is that you get predictable cash flow. It eliminates the un-
certainty of when your customers will pay. The amount of money that is advanced depends 
on your sales volume, and your financing line increases as your sales grow. Factoring is 
easy to set up and is suitable for both established and new enterprises. 
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Biashara conducted a comprehensive 
appraisal of the auction house to de-
termine its financial and management 
rating, and studied the value chain to 
become familiar with the movement 
of the produce and payment flows. It 
analysed the various critical points in 
the chain, such as production, quality 
control (on farm and in the factory) 
and transport. It discussed the results 
of this study with the factory manage-
ment and the cooperative, and helped 
them overcome issues that arose. After 
analysing the viability of the venture, 
it decided to start providing the factor-
ing facility in phases to ensure that it 
worked well. 
The resulting chain is summarized in 
Figure 5.15.
The farmers deliver their tea to the 
co-op’s collection centres, as before. 
The co-op then transports the tea to 
Figure 5.15 The tea value chain with Biashara’s factoring services
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Figure 5.16 The factoring system uses 
Safaricom’s M-PESA scheme, which lets 
farmers be paid via their mobile phones
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the Kapchebet tea factory ( in Figure 5.15) which processes it and delivers it to 
the Mombasa auction.
Twice a week, the auction house sends a receipt to Biashara listing deliveries of tea 
it has received from the factory ( in Figure 5.15). The factory provides Biashara 
with a list of farmers and the amount of tea they have delivered. On the strength 
of this, Biashara pays out 70% of the money to farmers (or more, depending on 
the sales to the auction). 
Making payments to over 3,000 farmers is a daunting task, which Biashara han-
dles by paying into farmers’ individual accounts with the co-op (), local banks 
(), or through the M-PESA or PostaPay money transfer services ( in Figure 
5.15 and Box 5.4). These payments are made within 3 days of Biashara receiving 
the auction house’s receipt. The tea delivered to the factory acts as security for 
these loans.
When it has sold the tea (about a month later), the auction house pays the full 
amount to Biashara – up to KSh 10 million ($125,000) a week ( in Figure 5.15). 
Biashara then deducts 10% of the total and pays this into the Kapchebet factory’s 
Box 5.4 Money transfer services
To remit small amounts to farmers, Biashara uses the M-PESA and PostaPay money 
transfer services. 
M-PESA
M-PESA (M stands for mobile, while pesa is the Swahili word for money) is a service offered 
by Safaricom, a Kenyan mobile phone service provider, in partnership with Vodafone. It 
allows subscribers to transfer money using mobile phones, without needing a bank account 
(Figure 5.16).
When Biashara pays a farmer, an SMS is sent to his or her mobile to confirm the transac-
tion. The farmer can then go to any one of Safaricom’s 11,000 agents throughout Kenya 
and show the agent the phone number and an identity card, and say how much he or she 
wants to withdraw. The agent then pays the farmer this amount in cash. This service costs 
KSh 30 ($0.38) to send KSh 100–10,000 ($1.25–$125) to a registered M-PESA user, and 
up to KSh 75 ($0.94) to withdraw over KSh 10,000.
More information: www.safaricom.co.ke 
PostaPay
PostaPay is a joint venture between the Kenya Post Office and Afripayments (the software 
company providing the service). Biashara sends a list of the farmers it wants to pay to 
Afripayments, along with a cheque for the money to be paid (including a service fee). The 
list includes the identity card numbers and nearest post office of each farmer. Afripayments 
distributes this list to the respective post offices. The farmers go to the post office with their 
identity cards and can withdraw their money. This takes a maximum of 3 days. The cost of 
transaction depends on the amount sent.
More information: www.postapay.co.ke 
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Product and financial flows
Purpose Provide prompt payments to tea farmers
Amount
Total limit of KSh 30 million ($375,000)
Average of $25 per farmer per week
Period 30–90 days
Disbursement
Disbursed weekly, directly to farmers’ bank accounts or 
through M-PESA and PostaPay services
Initial payment = 70–90% of expected value of invoice
Final payment = 10–30% of invoice, minus fee
Repayment Repaid by the buyer (the Mombasa Tea Auction)
Interest rate 2.5% per month, deducted from the final payment received from the buyer
Transaction costs One-off 1% payment on the estimated monthly volume
Risk management
Securitization
Binding memorandum of understanding between the buyer, 
seller and the factoring house
Tea processor may offer assets or produce as security
Thorough assessment and investigation before offering 
financial services
Buyer must pay factoring house rather than seller
Liability Auction house and Kapchebet Tea Factory are jointly and severally liable
Information flows
Information required to 
apply
For processing plant:
•	 Application letter
•	 Business registration certificates, value-added tax compli-
ance, personal 
•	 identification number
•	 2–3 years of audited accounts
•	 Current year’s management accounts
•	 Company and directors’ profiles, copies of directors’ iden-
tity cards or passports
•	 Company organizational chart
•	 Sale contracts between factory and auction house, farmers 
and cooperative
For farmers:
•	 Account number, co-op number, ID number and location
Information required 
during season
Monthly reports by field officer of Kenya Gatsby Trust to 
financiers on impact of funds: reports from processing plant 
on deliveries, auction house receipts, number of farmers 
reached
Time lag between appli-
cation and payment
5 days from appraisal to background check 
Disbursement immediately after approval
Table 5.6 Factor payments by Biashara to farmers for tea in Kenya

5 Improving chain liquidity
bank account to cover its processing services (). The bank deducts the loan re-
payment instalment from the factory’s account. Biashara then pays the farmers 
the balance of what is due to them (again following arrows ,  or ), minus 
2.5% interest per month. This interest charge covers Biashara’s costs. Biashara 
currently finances an outstanding balance of about $130,000 between the auction 
house and the farmers. 
To ensure that the farmers fully understood the factoring process, Biashara offers 
quarterly training courses for farmers on basic bookkeeping and the importance 
of sustainable business relationships, and helped the cooperative set up systems 
to support the process. It covers the cost of these services from its fees.
Table 5.6 summarizes Biashara’s factor payments made to farmers.
Risk analysis
Tea is a risky business with a fragmented market structure and strongly fluctuating 
market prices. Nevertheless, Biashara has managed to develop a financing model 
which effectively mitigates the major risks. The key elements are (Table 5.7):
•	 Triangular cooperation Before starting to finance the chain, Biashara con-
ducted extensive research to understand the workings of the chain and to 
check the conditions of the companies in it. This phase of research and due 
diligence results in a contract agreement between the suppliers, the buyer and 
Biashara for the delivery of the factoring service. This agreement details how 
information flows repayment will work, and outlines each party’s roles. The 
agreement forms part of the collateral for the financing.
•	 Lead firm model Though small farmers receive the factoring service, the 
repayment is done by a large lead firm (the auction house). Hence, Biashara’s 
risks are not with the small farmers, but with the lead firm. Therefore, in the 
research phase, the due diligence focuses especially on the financial condition 
of the lead firm.
•	 Partial pre-finance The international market price of tea fluctuates, so Bi-
ashara cannot know in advance how much to pay the farmers. It mitigates this 
risk by estimating the price beforehand and paying farmers a percentage of 
the price as a first instalment. When the actual price is known, Biashara pays 
the amount remaining, minus interest and fees.
•	 Alignment of interests The farmers have an interest in selling through the 
Kapchebet processing plant because they hold shares in it: if it earns a profit, 
they earn a dividend ( in Figure 5.15). They have an interest in the factor-
ing system because it pays them quickly and pays higher prices than they 
would get from the alternative – selling to private traders. The cooperative 
maintains good relations with the farmers by providing them with various 
services, including extension advice and fertilizers on credit.
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Benefits
Farmers
The 3,000 farmer-members are the main beneficiaries of the factoring system. They 
get prompt payment after delivery and higher prices than they could otherwise 
expect: KSh 30 ($0.38) per kilogram of tea, compared to KSh 10 ($0.13) previously 
offered by the traders. This has reduced the number of farmers seeking the serv-
ices of independent traders. A few farmers divert their produce to other buyers, 
but their numbers are not significant. 
A culture of saving and borrowing is growing among the farmers, and farmers 
are able to leverage their savings to access other financial products.
The farmers are able to make informed decisions about their production because 
they can now obtain information directly from the cooperative and the factory. 
The factory publishes accounts that show how much it has earned and how 
profitable it is. The cooperative is able to negotiate better terms for its members 
because they are corporate shareholders in the factory. 
Cooperative and Kapchebet factory
With fewer members selling to other traders, the co-op and factory have increased 
the volume of tea they handle. They have improved their credibility and reputa-
tion, and are able to attract new members. 
The cooperative now is in a position to approach other financial service providers 
to develop specific products for its members.
The tea factory’s sales have grown from 5,000 to 8,000 tons a day. It has a guar-
anteed supply of raw materials and is able to plan its processing schedules with 
minimal risk of its suppliers diverting their produce elsewhere. It has been able 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Seasonality Increase buffer stock during high sea-sons
Disease Train farmers on good production meth-ods
Price
Low demand Market forces and constant marketing
Market price 
fluctuations Encourage farmers to diversify
Default Side selling of produce
Close relationship with farmers
Prompt payment
Farmers own shares in factory
Currency
Currency risks 
on international 
loans
Minimal borrowing from abroad
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 5.7 Risk analysis for tea factoring in Kenya

5 Improving chain liquidity
to repay most of its initial loan, and plans to apply for a second loan to expand 
its operations. 
Value chain
Bottlenecks have been removed from the value chain as a whole. A greater vol-
ume of produce now moves more smoothly than before, and payments are made 
on time.
The strong linkages between the different actors cultivates a culture of respon-
sibility in the chain. 
The chain provides a clear communication channel, keeping everyone informed 
about pricing and the quality required.
Challenges
•	 Sensitization Factoring is a new financial service in Kenya, and many people 
shy away from it. This is not because of its complexity but due to a lack of 
knowledge. Many people view factoring as a kind of loan. Biashara tries to 
educate the public by organizing forums as part of its marketing work. 
•	 Complexity of the groups A lot of effort is needed to mobilize the produc-
ers into business groups before the factoring service can be introduced. This 
is costly and time-consuming. Most financial institutions do not have the 
patience to do this groundwork; they rely on NGOs to establish a relationship 
with the group.
•	 Lack of regulation policy Factoring can be abused. It is not regulated by 
banking laws, and so unscrupulous operators could use it to defraud clients. 
Biashara is pushing for more factoring houses to be set up to have enough 
weight to lobby for regulations on aspects such as capital base, dispute-set-
tlement procedures and licensing.
•	 Lack of investors Because factoring is new to Kenya, potential investors 
lack information, so are unwilling to put money into this form of financial 
service.
lessons
•	 Factoring can be used to alleviate smallholder farmers’ from cash-flow prob-
lems. Such farmers lack hard collateral to secure finance from banks and other 
financial institutions. The factoring invoice provides security that enables the 
farmers to obtain funds.
•	 Factoring complements other innovative services such as M-PESA and Posta-
Pay money transfers. These enable financial services to reach large numbers 
of widely scattered farmers who lack bank accounts.
•	 Factoring is flexible enough to be easily replicated to other commodities.
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•	 Factoring builds capacity of farmers and other actors and strengthens the value 
chain. Policy makers should develop legislation to regulate and promote the 
industry. 
More information
Billy O Mathu, Biashara Factors/Kenya Gatsby Trust, email bmathu@kenyagatsby.org, 
bllymathu@yahoo.co.uk, websites www.kenyagatsby.org, www.biasharafactors.com
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Financing rice farming in 
Rwanda 
rice growing has a short but eventful history in Mukunguli, 75 km south of the Rwandan capital, Kigali. In the 1970s, Chinese entrepreneurs leased 
marshland in the area and turned it into irrigated rice fields. They encouraged 
local farmers to plant rice, and for over 20 years held a near-monopoly over all 
the rice they produced. They bought most of the paddy rice. The farmers made 
little money, but it was still better than nothing.
Struggling to raise their output, the farmers turned to local moneylenders for loans 
so they could buy inputs. They promised to repay the loans in the form of dried 
paddy. The interest rates were high: sometimes the repayments amounted to three 
times the original loan. The moneylenders took around 50% of the farmers’ rice. 
Another 20% went to the Chinese in return for use of the land. The farmers used 
10% for home consumption and sold the remaining 20% to local shopkeepers. 
After the genocide of 1994 the Chinese fled the country, as did the farmers and 
many others. The farmers later returned and started to cultivate rice again, this 
time without the Chinese. A German NGO helped rehabilitate the irrigation 
system, but finding a market was difficult, as was getting fertilizer. Low yields 
forced some farmers to start growing sweet potatoes and beans instead of rice. 
Reviving the rice chain
But most of the farmers did not give 
up on rice: they knew that they could 
benefit by coming together to bulk 
their rice, negotiate better prices and 
seek new markets. Plus, being organ-
ized would grant them better access to 
inputs, extension services and credit. It 
took almost 10 years to set up a farmer 
organization, but in 2003, 280 rice grow-
ers established the Rice Producer Coop-
erative (COPRORIZ). The result was the 
value chain shown in Figure 5.18. 
Farmers The farmers are smallhold-
ers who earn between $200 and $500 a Figure 5.17 Locat ion  o f  Mukungu l i , 
Rwanda
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year. They grow and harvest the rice, dry it and take it to the co-op. Currently 
there are over 5,000 farmers in the area who grow rice, owning a average of 0.4 
ha of rice land each. 
COPRORIZ This co-op provides its members with a number of services. Before 
and during the season it supplies inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides. 
At harvest, it collects and bulks their rice, takes it for milling, and sells it to traders 
or wholesalers ( and  in Figure 5.18). It also provides extension and training. 
The co-op’s general assembly, composed of all members, meets twice a year and 
elects a board of directors. A manager runs the co-op from day to day. Almost 
all the area’s rice growers are members of the COPRORIZ; the few non-members 
are still allowed to sell through the co-op.
Crop traders and wholesalers Two types of traders buy rice: crop traders buy 
unmilled paddy, while wholesalers deal only with milled rice. The co-op prefers 
to sell to the former as it can avoid the costs and delay involved in milling and 
transporting the rice. But if the traders offer a price that gives the co-op less than 
a 25% profit, the co-op will arrange for the rice to be milled and delivered to a 
wholesaler.
Millers The millers mill the paddy to make white rice ready for cooking. A 
number of small mills exist, but they produce a low-quality product and a lot of 
wastage. The co-op prefers to have its rice milled by larger mills in Kigali, which 
have less milling loss and make it easy to deliver direct to wholesalers in the 
city. However, this involves transporting the paddy from Mukunguli to Kigali, 
waiting for the rice to be milled (the mill serves many producers from different 
parts of the country), and paying a service fee of $60 per ton of white rice, pay-
able immediately.
Figure 5.18 The initial COPRORIZ rice value chain
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Retailers Shopkeepers and supermarkets buy the milled white rice from the 
wholesalers and sell it in packages of 1–5 kg. The locally produced rice competes 
with rice from Thailand and Tanzania.
Consumers The consumers include residents of the Mukunguli region and 
Kigali.
Problems in the chain
This chain was not without problems:
Lack of inputs The co-op bought inputs such as seed and fertilizer in bulk, but 
could not distribute them to farmers on credit as it lacked the working capital 
to do so. Strapped for cash themselves, the farmers could not afford to pay for 
them even at the reduced prices the co-op charged. So many farmers would plant 
without fertilizers, and would harvest less than 3 tons per hectare instead of the 5 
tons/ha they could expect with fertilizer. Some would delay planting until they 
had enough money to buy inputs. Staggered planting allowed pests and diseases 
to spread from one field to another, and different harvest times complicated 
marketing and transport. 
Slow payment Once the rice was safely harvested, dried and delivered to the 
co-op, the farmers still had to wait for up to 2 months to be paid because it took 
that long for the buyers (in Kigali) to pay the co-op. In need of cash, many indi-
vidual farmers started to sell their paddy directly to local traders who paid only 
one-third the price ($0.33 per kg, compared to $0.90 from the co-op), but handed 
over the money immediately ( in Figure 5.18). By 2007, only 40% of the total 
rice produced was marketed through the co-op.
Loss-making co-op Although the co-op served many needs of its members, it 
was making a loss. For income, it depended on a membership contribution of 
$2, and on the fees it charged for a range of services: the sale of rice, provision of 
fertilizers and seeds, the provision of sacks and organizing transport of paddy 
to mills, arranging extension services, and the like. The level of these fees was 
fixed by the general assembly; they typically covered the costs incurred plus a 
management fee of 30%. But this income was not enough to cover the full costs 
of the co-op.
caf isonga
A local microfinance institution, Caisse des Affaires Financières (CAF) Isonga, 
had experience in financing rice production in the Gitwe region in northern 
Rwanda. CAF Isonga was looking for new opportunities, and it established a 
branch in Mukunguli. It had heard of the co-op’s problems and offered to help 
overcome them. 
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Starting life as a savings-and-credit cooperative, CAF Isonga was transformed 
into a limited liability company in 2006 so as to meet central bank regulations 
for microfinance providers. With an equity of $375,000, the company has assets 
of $1,327,000 (in December 2008), and a clientele of over 21,000; 84% of these are 
smallholder farmers, its main target group. CAF Isonga is the only formal financial 
institution to serve the rice value chain in Mukunguli. It has become the main 
source of finance for COPRORIZ and its members, and has established a branch 
near the rice farms to cater for the financial needs of the rice producers. 
Smoothing the financial chain
CAF Isonga has developed a variety of financial services for the farmers and the 
co-op. To do this, it received technical support from SNV (the Netherlands Devel-
opment Organisation) to develop its services, and from Terrafina Microfinance, 
which provided training and equity capital. These financial services involve close 
collaboration with the co-op and the farmers. 
Production loans CAF Isonga decided to provide credit to farmers so they could 
buy fertilizer and hiring labour. Only farmers that are members of COPRORIZ can 
apply for these loans; the co-op screens each applicant for integrity and capacity 
to repay – as evidenced by the size of the applicant’s rice plots. It guarantees the 
loan by co-signing the contract between CAF Isonga and the farmer, agreeing to 
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Figure 5.19 The CAF Isonga/COPRORIZ rice value chain
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repay the loan if the farmer defaults. If the application is approved, CAF Isonga 
transfers the money to the borrower’s bank account (CAF maintains accounts for 
all the co-op members, which farmers can use for savings as well as to manage 
their loans) ( in Figure 5.19). The farmer repays the loan by delivering paddy 
to the co-op (see the voucher system below). If the farmer defaults on the loan 
(for example, by not delivering to the co-op), the co-op has to repay the debt. The 
average loan is $100; the loan conditions are summarized in the second column 
of Table 5.8.
Paddy commercialization loan To enable the co-op to pay farmers more quickly, 
CAF Isonga developed a “paddy commercialization loan”. This is a credit line 
that allows the co-op to pay farmers on the same day that they deliver rice to the 
co-op warehouse ( in Figure 5.19). The co-op bulks and stores the rice until it 
is a good time to sell. Once it has found a buyer prepared to pay a good price, 
the co-op takes the rice to a miller and delivers it to the buyer. It then repays the 
loan, plus interest, to CAF Isonga. The ceiling of the credit line depends on the 
estimated rice output for that season. In 2008, it was set at $464,000. The third 
column of Table 5.8 gives the key features of this credit line.
Voucher system A voucher system is used to speed payments to the farmers. 
When a farmer delivers rice to the co-op warehouse, he or she is given a voucher 
showing the amount, co-signed by the warehouse manager and the CAF Isonga 
credit officer (who doubles as warehouse keeper) ( in Figure 5.19). The co-op 
can give out vouchers up to the maximum amount of its credit line. The farmer 
presents the voucher to the CAF Isonga office just down the road from the ware-
house, and CAF Isonga pays the farmer the full value of the paddy delivered, 
after deducting the production loan and interest (). The value depends on the 
price the co-op has negotiated with the trader (it sells to the trader who offers 
Figure 5.20 The combined efforts of the co-op and microfinance institution mean benefits 
for farmers
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Production loan for farmers ( 
in Figure 5.19)
Paddy commercialization credit 
line for co-op ( in Figure 5.19)
Product and financial flows
Purpose
To enable rice farmers to pay for 
inputs such as labour, pesticides 
and fertilizers
Pre-finance of purchase and 
marketing of paddy rice
Amount
Total $286,000
Average loan to farmer: $100
$464,000
Period 7 months 3 months
Disbursement Disbursed to borrower’s bank account just before planting
Ceiling for credit line set through 
agreement 
Payments directly to farmers 
upon submission of signed 
vouchers showing amount of rice 
delivered to co-op warehouse
Repayment
Deducted directly from proceeds 
of sales to co-op just after har-
vest (March and September)
Repaid by co-op after rice sale 
through direct deduction from 
sales proceeds
Interest rate 1.5% per month
Negotiable, depending on ceiling 
and loan term
Varies between 2 and 2.75% per 
month
Transaction 
costs
$1 per application plus 1% com-
mission 1% commission fee
Risk management
Securitization
100% guarantee by co-op
All transactions carried out 
through bank account at CAF 
Isonga, with facility to deduct 
amount due automatically
Warehouse inventory, joint ware-
house management, and joint 
marketing of rice
Liability Individual farmers and co-op are equally liable Co-op is liable
Information flows
Information re-
quired to apply
Updated yield forecast
Approval from co-op, specifying 
amount needed and production 
capacity
Credit history
Production forecasts
Prices
Potential buyers
Needed amount (ceiling) based 
on production forecasts
Information 
required during 
season
Price of agricultural inputs 
Price of rice
Monthly reports on disburse-
ments
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
2 days 1 week from application to agree-ment
Table 5.8 Key features of CAF Isonga’s loans to farmers and COPRORIZ for 
rice in Rwanda
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to pay most). The trader pays the co-op through CAF Isonga (), enabling the 
co-op to repay its credit line.
This system works well because all payments are made through CAF Isonga, 
and both the co-op and CAF Isonga are custodians of the warehouse and jointly 
control the flows of paddy into and out of it. The repayment rate is 100%, and 
the portfolio at risk is close to zero (Box 5.5). 
Lease for transport CAF Isonga’s credit officers helped COPRORIZ carry out 
an internal assessment to find out why the co-op was continuing to lose money. 
They discovered this was mainly due to transport expenses. The co-op used to 
hire lorries to carry paddy to millers in Kigali; the costs were so high that it was 
Box 5.5 Callixte Niyonsaba talks about vouchers
“I am a rice farmer in Mukunguli, Rwanda. I own 2 hectares of land, including 0.7 hectares 
of rice. In the beginning, the rice plots belonged to the Chinese who started experimenting 
with this crop in Rwanda in the early 1970s. The Chinese allowed us to use the land, and 
in return asked us to give part of the production to them. 
“We worked for nothing: we still owed money to moneylenders, who charged very high 
interest rates. Around 50% of our production went directly to moneylenders to repay loans. 
We also ate some of the rice ourselves. We sold the rest to local traders at very low prices 
– but at least the traders paid on the spot. 
“In 1994, people fled genocide and war, and the area was left uncultivated for quite some 
time. People started growing crops there again in 2003. That year I got hold of a plot which 
I was allowed to cultivate, and together with almost 300 other farmers we decided to set up 
a cooperative, called COPRORIZ. 
“Being members of the co-op has changed a lot for us rice farmers. Instead of us having to 
go to moneylenders to buy inputs, now the co-op was supplying fertilizer and seeds. And 
COPRORIZ has an arrangement with a microfinance institution, CAF Isonga. It gives loans 
to co-op members. Now it is easy: when the planting season is on, you go to the co-op, 
which gives you a guarantee for CAF Isonga, and it gives you a loan straight away. Now 
we no longer hesitate to get a loan, so we have been able to increase our production. We 
can also use the loan to cover household expenses. In return for the loan we have to sell 
all our rice to the cooperative. 
“There is another arrangement that has helped us: the voucher system. Now we are paid 
upon delivery! 
“The new situation has changed a lot. We work for ourselves; we have access to inputs, 
which helped increase our production. We are owners of the cooperative. If any profit is 
made, it is for the farmer. For example, I have been able to buy bicycles so other people 
can look after my farm when I am not around, and a motorbike and a mobile phone. I have 
even built a house. Before I started rice farming, I had none of these, and have acquired 
them gradually. I used money from rice to expand to other business as well: I have now 
three cows producing 30 litres of milk every day, and have started cultivating cassava and 
sorghum. 
“The co-op has been crucial for this success. Without it we could not have had access to 
microfinance. COPRORIZ gave CAF Isonga confidence to lend to us.”
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impossible to make a profit. The cooperative was too new to be able to buy its 
own lorry, and it had nothing to use as hard collateral to get a loan (the warehouse 
and other buildings it used actually belonged to the Chinese). So CAF Isonga 
leased a 5-ton truck to the co-op ( in Figure 5.19), and it started to generate a 
net income. 
Why a lease rather than an investment loan? Because CAF Isonga still owns the 
truck until the co-op has paid off the lease. That reduces CAF Isonga’s risk. The 
repayment was supposed to be complete by 2008, but the contract was extended 
until June 2009 because heavy rain destroyed part of the crop and affected the 
co-op’s cash flow. Previously, in 2007, rehabilitation work on the irrigation system 
also reduced production levels.
Profits and dividends. Thanks to lower transport costs, better governance and 
transparency, and fewer production leakages, the co-op started making a profit in 
2008. The co-op retains around 10% of its profits as savings and then distributes 
the remainder to its members as a dividend (). 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Weather  
Establish a branch of CAF Isonga near 
the co-op and monitor forecast and actual 
production closely
Monitor the difference between forecast 
and actual harvest to guide decisions 
about loan products
Warehousing  
Joint management of warehouse be-
tween CAF Isonga and co-op
Daily management of inventory
Price Price fluctuations  Help co-op market rice
Market
Transport Lease lorry to co-op
Demand fluctua-
tions  Help co-op market rice
Competition with 
imported rice Lobby co-op ensure high-quality milling
Default
Over-indebted-
ness of borrow-
ers
 
Base loan decisions on credit history and 
production forecasts
Deliberate 
default  
Co-op screens borrowers and assesses 
applications 
Co-op and farmer jointly liable for repay-
ment
Other 
(gover-
nance)
Cooperative 
management
Joint decision-making between CAF 
Isonga and co-op
Signed contracts
Members’ partici-
pation  Regular meetings with co-op members
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 5.9 Risk analysis for the rice chain in Rwanda
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Mitigating risks 
The value chain includes various financial risks (Table 5.9):
Production risk Rice depends on having the right amount of water, so if the 
weather is dry, or if a storm damages the irrigation system, production can be 
impaired. Rice may also be damaged in storage. 
Market and price risk Prices and demand for rice fluctuate a lot. Wholesalers 
may prefer to buy imported rice if this is cheaper. The voucher system depends 
on the traders’ willingness to buy the rice and the price they offer. These are the 
result of long negotiations, but no formal contract is signed, and the traders may 
drop out of the deal at the last moment. If they do not buy, the co-op will be in 
trouble, since it will not be able to repay its credit line.
Default risk Farmers face many demands for cash: production, regular family 
needs, and emergencies. These competing demands may lead to default through 
side-selling. The farmers’ ability to repay depends on many factors: the market 
price, transport and milling costs, the availability of inputs, and so on. If the 
co-op does not manage to sell all its rice at an acceptable price, the farmers may 
default on their loans.
Governance risk The whole system depends heavily on the cooperative. This 
is well-managed, but in the future, poor accountability, inadequate transpar-
ency, and low levels of participation of farmers in decision-making may threaten 
this.
Benefits
Farmers The production loans allow farmers to buy fertilizer and hire labourers 
to work their fields, so increasing yields. Productivity rose by around 30% between 
2007, when production loans were introduced, and the end of 2008.
The farmers get paid immediately on delivering the rice to the co-op warehouse. 
The farm-gate price of paddy has risen by 67%, from $0.33 to $0.55 per kilogram 
over the same period.
Higher and more reliable incomes enable the farmers to invest in new equipment: 
95% now own a bicycle (compared to only 20% in 2005); 3% have bought a mo-
torbike, and three have their own small-scale rice mills. Some have bought more 
land. The farmers are more organized financially: all now have a bank account, 
compared to only 3% in 2003.
COPRORIZ The co-op has a credit line that enables it to buy grain from farmers 
and hold it until market prices are attractive. Members have stopped selling to 
other traders, and the co-op retains 10% of the profits as savings. It has cut costs 
through leasing a lorry, and has professionalized its management and operations. 
Until 2007 it recorded losses, but in 2008 managed to post a profit of $29,500. 
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CAF Isonga The microfinance institution has expanded its operations and 
developed a reliable, profitable set of clients in a new area. The repayment rate 
is 100%. In only 4 years, its agricultural loan portfolio has increased 18-fold. In 
2007, it replicated the product in other parts of the country. Mukunguli currently 
accounts for 32% of its agricultural loans.
Value chain The system has worked so well that the government is pushing 
for it to be replicated in other areas and on other commodities. The Ministry of 
Agriculture has asked CAF Isonga to support other microfinance institutes to 
develop similar services in various parts of the country.
Challenges
Costs Production costs are still high; it is expensive to transport paddy to Kigali, 
and the few new, small-scale rice mills are inefficient. The co-op is planning to 
acquire its own mill nearby, and expand the area it covers to include other rice-
producing areas. CAF Isonga has agreed to help raise the resources needed for 
this project.
Governance The majority of co-op members are illiterate and cannot adequately 
monitor the organization’s operations and ensure its leadership is accountable.
The co-op is a vital player in the system – which makes it very fragile. In addition, 
permanent deals have yet to be agreed with wholesalers and retailers to ensure 
that the chain is sustainable.
The co-op board often rubber-stamps the decisions of the manager, jeopardizing 
the organization’s governance. There is need to ensure that the co-op is able to 
manage its many roles and at the same time respond to its members’ needs. 
Expanding financial services CAF Isonga considers the rice value chain as its 
flagship. It faces challenges in increasing its portfolio to match the demand for 
its services. 
lessons
•	 To be effective, value chain finance needs to be coupled with chain empower-
ment: the chain actors need to be able to take their own decisions, based on 
good information and knowledge, and be better organized so they can defend 
their interests.
•	 Soft collateral can work as alternative guarantee mechanism for chain actors 
to access finance.
•	 Access to finance is important in chain development. Integrated efforts are 
needed to develop agriculture-based value chains, especially by the private 
sector. Value chain finance works better when it is embedded in a holistic 
process of market, institutional and organizational development for chain 
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actors. This requires a strong partnership between chain supporters (such as 
CAF Isonga) and chain actors.
•	 Value chain development can work with little or no outside financial 
investment. When appropriate financial products are made available, the 
chain actors have the capacity to invest themselves. Even smallholder farm-
ers are bankable. The finance provider may have to walk an extra mile to 
support farmers integrate into the chain. This requires a thorough analysis, 
good preparation and alternative collateral systems to make farmers’ access 
to finance a success.
Further information
Kabundi Joseph, CAF Isonga SA., jkabundi@yahoo.fr; caf-isonga@yahoo.fr
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Unleashing 
investments in the 
chain
in our Final set of cases, we see how financial agents enable chain actors to make medium-term investments through a range of financial services beyond the 
traditional, short-term loans.
• Financing the honey chain in Kitui, eastern Kenya, for example, describes 
how various branches of the K-Rep Group, a microfinance organization, 
stimulated honey production and marketing by micro-leasing equipment and 
by providing loans and factoring services.
• Financing the soybean value chain in Ethiopia describes how FCE (an NGO) 
and Harbu, a microfinance institution it is affiliated with, have promoted the 
processing of soybean into milk. Services have included seed capital, mate-
rial support, technical capacity building, loans for investment and working 
capital, and leases of processing equipment.
• Opening opportunities to small coffee producers in Nicaragua discusses the 
way that the government and FDL, a microfinance institution, offer a series 
of grants, investment loans and working capital loans to individual farmers 
and a farmers’ cooperative.
• Developing the organic quinoa chain in Bolivia illustrates the idea of a 
temporary joint venture, in which the financial agent and a business each 
invest money for a limited period in a joint business activity. The business 
provides the technical expertise, while the financial agent provides not only 
much-needed additional funds, but also its financial expertise.
• Financing artisanal fishing in India, the final case, is a fascinating account of 
how SIFFS, a federation of fishermen’s and -women’s societies, has reorgan-
ized the marketing of fish. This reorganization benefits the fishermen and 
-women, rather than traders, who used to take a disproportionate share of 
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the profits. Through its control of the marketing, SIFFS can access funds from 
banks, finance houses, insurance companies and donor organizations to offer 
its members investment loans, loans to help members repay existing debts 
that charge exorbitant interest rates, insurance, working capital, and a whole 
range of non-financial services.
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Financing the honey chain in 
Kitui, eastern Kenya 
Beekeeping in kitui is almost as old as human settlement in this part of Kenya. Honey from Kitui used to be well-known: for many years the Tana and Athi 
Rivers Development Authority (TARDA), a regional government agency, proc-
essed it and guaranteed a market for beekeepers. But in 2003 this service was 
run down because of political interference, and the processing unit was moved 
to another area. Without a viable market, local beekeepers could no longer make 
a profit, and the quality of their honey deteriorated. Lower quality meant lower 
prices: while TARDA used to pay KSh 100 ($1.25) per kilogram, traders would 
pay only KSh 30 ($0.38). Rather than selling at such prices, many producers 
consumed their honey at home, sold it to local brewers, or gave up producing 
altogether. For many producers, honey was their second most important source 
of income (after goats), but even when prices were good, many survived on less 
than $0.50 a day. Their situation had become desperate.
Figure 6.1 The value chain before the intervention
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The traditional honey chain
Relatively few actors are involved in the traditional honey chain (Figure 6.1). 
Support services like finance, technical assistance and business development are 
poorly organized or absent altogether.
The chain actors include: 
•	 Artisan hive makers These hollow out logs to make hives and give them 
to beekeepers in exchange for livestock, cereals or honey. Only a few people 
make such traditional hives as it is not a profitable business. 
•	 Beekeepers Almost every man in Kitui owns a hive, but only a few have 
bee colonies. Because of the low prices of honey, many have given up their 
hives. They have inadequate production skills and are not aware of market 
requirements.
•	 Local traders They buy small quantities of low-quality honey from beekeep-
ers. 
•	 Home brewers and herbalists Brewers buy bulk crude honey from the trad-
ers and brew it into a kind of beer. Herbalists use the honey to make herbal 
medicine.
Figure 6.2 Traditional hives are made of 
hollowed out logs. Producers 
b o t t l e d  a n d  s o l d  r a w , 
unprocessed honey
Figure 6.3 Improved equipment enables 
producers to use improved 
hives and bulk their honey
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•	 Consumers There are two types 
of consumers: local consumers in 
Kitui, who buy honey from neigh-
bours, and consumers who buy beer 
and herbal medicine in Nairobi. 
There used to be no formal financial 
services. Moneylenders lent money to 
local traders and charged high interest 
rates. Various microfinance institu-
tions offered credit, but these were not 
aligned with the needs of the beekeep-
ers and honey traders. 
Reviving the honey 
business
Two studies in 2005 and 2006 funded 
by Danida (the Danish International 
Development Agency) found that Kitui 
district had over 400,000 traditional log 
hives, along with 3,000 modern hives 
with movable frames (which make it 
easier to harvest the honey). But the 
district produced only 3,000 tons a year, 
way below its immediate potential of 10,000 tons. Producers used poor beekeeping 
techniques, and charcoal-makers indiscriminately felled trees, whose blossoms 
were a food source for the bees. Production was far below demand, and pack-
ers had resorted to importing honey from southern Sudan and Tanzania. In the 
medium term, the researchers found, the honey subsector might produce up to 
50,000 tons a year. The market value would be KSh 3 billion ($37.5 million) if the 
chain were efficiently organized. 
The studies called for three interventions to revive the chain: form strong produc-
ers’ organizations, strengthen market linkages, and provide appropriate financial 
services. Danida’s Agricultural Business Development programme contracted 
K-Rep Development Agency (KDA) to pursue these initiatives. KDA is a research 
and development agency that focuses on developing, testing and refining ap-
propriate financial products for marginalized groups in Kenya. It is part of the 
K-Rep Group, a microfinance organization focusing on poverty alleviation in 
Kenya (Box 6.1). KDA took on a coordinating role in reviving the honey chain, 
and called on other units in the K-Rep Group for support. 
Figure 6.4 Kitui honey is now better 
quality, so supermarkets are 
willing to sell it
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Designing a new chain 
KDA reviewed the demand for services 
by each of the chain actors, then de-
signed a series of financial and techni-
cal services to build a new chain. With 
Danida’s Agricultural Business Devel-
opment programme, farmers were mo-
bilized into groups and were trained on 
the various aspects of group dynamics 
and the basic principles of beekeeping 
as a business. Farmers with previous 
rudimentary skills in hive management 
were identified for further training to 
qualify as providers of this service. The 
existing local traders were selected and 
recruited into the programme. It was 
realized they lacked market informa-
tion and record-keeping skills, among 
other things. 
Baraka Agricultural College, a training 
institute based in Molo, in Kenya’s Rift 
Valley province, trained the hive makers, producers and traders on production 
techniques. The traders in turn train groups of producers on how to maintain 
their hives and improve the quantity and quality of honey.
KDA trained the producers and traders on financial management and business 
development, and built the capacities of staff and board members of the financial 
services associations (see below). 
The new chain began operating in 2007 (Figure 6.7).
Hive makers The KDA project trained the hive makers how to fit the traditional 
log hives with a “queen excluder” – a mesh that stops the queen from laying eggs 
in the honeycombs, so preserving the honey. This is a much cheaper option than 
modern hives, which were being widely promoted, even though they are not 
necessary to produce good-quality honey. The project also trained the hive makers 
how to make modern hives; the beekeepers choose the hives they want.
Beekeepers These producers have between 10 and 200 hives each, with which 
they produce honey and other products such as propolis and pollen (used as 
medicines) and beeswax. By December 2008, around 2,000 farmers, including 
500 women, were producing honey as a business venture. The peak produc-
tion season is between January and April, during the dry season following the 
October rains. 
Figure 6.5 Location of Kitui, Kenya
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Box 6.1 The K-Rep Group
Founded in 1984, K-Rep began as a technical assistance and financing agency for non-
government organizations. It has evolved into an umbrella organization with various units 
dealing with microfinance in Kenya (Figure 6.6).
•	 K-Rep Development Agency (KDA) This is the group’s research and development 
arm. It identifies, develops, tests and refines financial products for marginalized groups 
in Kenya. 
•	 K-Rep Bank This microfinance bank targets mainly small and medium enterprises. 
It is the second biggest microfinance bank in Kenya, and the sixth largest bank overall 
in the country, with 61,300 clients, a loan portfolio of nearly KSh 6 billion ($75 million) 
and a savings portfolio of KSh 7 billion ($88 million).
•	 K-Rep Advisory Services A consultancy company in microfinance and business 
development services.
•	 K-Rep Fedha Services This company manages village financial services associa-
tions. In December 2008, it managed 56 such associations, with a total membership 
of over 100,000 and an outstanding loan portfolio of KSh 300 million ($3.75 million). 
These loans are financed by the members’ share capital and their savings (totalling 
about KSh 275 million ($3.44 million), and loans of about KSh 25 million ($310,000) 
from KDA and other sources.
•	 Juhudi Kilimo The latest entrant to the group, this company was registered in July 
2009. It has evolved from what was KDA’s micro-leasing project. It will primarily target 
the promotion and development of agribusiness value chains in Kenya.
K-Rep is a non-profit organization. Projects that begin making profits sustainably are spun 
off to form independent, for-profit companies. The honey value chain financing project was 
hosted by the micro-leasing project, which is now a separate company under the K-Rep 
umbrella. KDA aims to leave the honey project with its sister companies, K-Rep Fedha 
and K-Rep Bank.
Figure 6.6 The K-Rep Group
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Producer groups The beekeepers were organized in groups of between 20 and 
35. These groups collect the crude honey and sell it to the collection centres. Be-
cause the honey is bulked, it fetches a better price than before.
Collection centres The collection centres are owned by the producers through 
shareholding. These buy honey, remove foreign matter, grade and bulk it, and 
store it before selling it to traders. By December 2008, there were 10 collection 
centres, each serving around 20 producer groups.
Traders The project trained the traders who used to buy low-quality honey 
from the beekeepers. These traders now buy bulk honey from the collection 
centres, and press and centrifuge it to separate the honey from the honeycomb. 
They then deliver the honey to the final processor. A majority of the traders are 
women; many of them are widows. There are 50 traders in the four regions of 
the district served by the project. 
Final processor Under a new national government, TARDA restored its honey 
processing activities. It buys the honey from the traders for final processing and 
packaging. It pays traders KSh 150 ($1.88) per kilogram of honey, compared to 
KSh 120 ($1.50) offered by others. One disadvantage is that TARDA cannot pay 
for the honey immediately upon delivery – making an alternative system of pay-
ments necessary. 
Figure 6.7 The honey value chain since 2007
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Factoring Pa
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Retailers TARDA packs the honey and sells it to local retailers in Kitui and 
nearby towns, as well as to food processors, herbalists and pharmaceutical com-
panies. Some companies also export the honey.
Consumers Consumers include households, hospitals and hotels. 
Serving the chain
Financial services associations K-Rep Fedha set up village-based cooperatives 
known as financial services associations throughout the district to offer simple 
credit, savings and money transfer services to their members. These are user-
owned and user-financed institutions, managed by K-Rep Fedha Services. Each 
association has about 2,000 members each: farmers, beekeepers and other local 
people, who own shares in it. The associations tailor loans to their members’ 
needs; for example, there are loan products for cotton farmers, school fees, and 
so on. To qualify for a loan, borrowers must be a member of a group, and the 
group must give them a recommendation. They do not need hard collateral, but 
the group as a whole takes responsibility for repaying the loan. The financial 
services associations may borrow from K-Rep Bank or other lenders to cover 
fund shortages ( in Figure 6.7).  
K-Rep Group Various units of the K-Rep Group (Box 6.1) provide services to the 
chain: KDA conducted studies and redesigned the chain; K-Rep Fedha Services 
manages the village financial services associations; and the K-Rep Bank provides 
financial services to various actors in the chain.
Memoranda of understanding
The K-Rep Group developed several financial services to help the honey value 
chain function more smoothly. Each type of service is designed for a particular 
stage in the chain, from beekeeper to final processor. They are based on close 
cooperation between the chain actors. In fact, that cooperation is so important 
that various memoranda of understanding have been signed between different 
parties to ensure it works smoothly. These are not contractual but are based on 
trust and goodwill. They ensure continuity in the chain because they are between 
organizations rather than the individuals who work for them. They are the first 
line of collateral for the financial organizations that provide loans and leasing 
services. 
There are eight different memoranda of understanding between various groups 
of actors and the financial service providers. They specify the roles of each signa-
tory and the arrangements for buying, selling and financing honey and inputs, 
as well as services such as training and monitoring.

Value Chain Finance 
Micro-leasing
K-Rep and the financial services associations use “micro-leasing” to encourage 
various actors to invest in the honey chain. Honey production and processing 
require relatively large one-time investments in things like hives, bee colonies 
and processing equipment. Such purchases lend themselves to a leasing arrange-
ment. Loans are more appropriate for situations where the borrower needs many 
different, smaller-value items (such as bags of seed or sacks of fertilizer) on a 
repeated basis (e.g., new seed every season).
The micro-leasing scheme works like this: K-Rep (or the village financial services 
association) buys an item (such as a hive or processing equipment), then allows 
the lessee to use it for a certain period, during which the lessee must pay for 
it in instalments. The item becomes the property of the lessee at the end of the 
period.
Advantages of  micro-leasing
A lease has several advantages over a loan:
•	 The financial institution remains the owner of the item until the lessee has 
paid it off fully. That makes it easier for the bank to repossess the item if the 
lessee fails to keep up the payments. 
•	 The financial institution has more control over how the money is used: it 
buys the item, so it can choose the supplier and make sure the item is good 
quality. With a loan, the financial institution has much less control over how 
the borrower uses the money once it has been handed over.
•	 The financial institution can negotiate with suppliers to provide items in bulk 
at a low price.
•	 The borrowers also benefit, since they are assured that the items are good 
quality and reasonably priced.
Micro-leasing services
K-Rep and the financial services associations offer leases to three types of chain 
actors: beekeepers, hive makers and honey traders.
Beekeepers A typical investment for a hive plus ancillary equipment is worth 
KSh 3,500 ($44). This represents an average of 40 months of income for these 
people, so almost unaffordable. 
To get a lease, the producer must find at least two quotations from suppliers of 
hives and equipment, and submit these to the village financial services associa-
tion. The association appraises the request, and chooses one supplier, to whom 
it pays 60% of the price. The supplier must deliver the items within 21 days, then 
receives the remaining 40%. 
The beekeeper must pay off the lease in monthly instalments, over a 24-month 
period. There is a grace period of 6 months to allow time for bees to colonize 
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the hive and the first honey to be harvested so the beekeeper has a steady cash 
inflow to pay for the instalments. Only after paying the final instalment does the 
beekeeper become the owner of the equipment.
To qualify for the micro-leasing arrangement, beekeepers must have received 
training in hive management. By December 2008, close to 2,000 farmers had done 
so. The beekeeper must also belong to a group, which guarantees the request for 
the lease. So there is a triangular relationship between the beekeeper, the group 
and the financial services association ( in Figure 6.7 and first column in Table 
6.1).
For the duration of the lease, the trader and the group monitor the equipment 
to make sure it is being used properly. The lessees are required to report to the 
groups periodically on the status of their repayments, so enabling the group to 
take collective responsibility for the equipment. The financial services associa-
tions also train the groups on how to manage loans and cash flow, and on how 
to use the credit properly. 
Hive makers The hive makers also need wood and other materials, and tools 
to build the hives. The financial services associations provide leases (or loans) for 
these items, along similar lines as for the beekeepers ( in Figure 6.7). 
Traders The traders also need equipment to process the honey. The financial 
services associations lease this to them using a similar procedure to the micro-
leases for beekeepers, though with much higher amounts because the equipment 
is more expensive ( in Figure 6.7 and Table 6.1) They have so far disbursed KSh 
1 million ($12,500) in this way. 
Other financial services
Collection centres: Short term loans for working capital 
When they deliver their honey to the collection centre, the beekeepers naturally 
enough want to be paid straight away. But the collection centres do not have 
the cash to pay them until they sell the honey – and that may not be for several 
months. So the financial services associations loan them money so they can pay 
the producers immediately ( in Figure 6.7). The producer gets 80% of the price 
immediately, and the remaining 20% once the centre has sold the honey to a 
trader, minus a KSh 1 ($0.01) administration fee per kilogram. Any excess is paid 
out as dividends at the end of the year.
These loans are for a maximum of 6 months and are repaid once a month in equal 
instalments. The interest rate is 18% a year.
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Micro-leasing ( in 
Figure 6.7)
Loans (working 
capital) ( in Figure 
6.7)
Factoring ( in 
Figure 6.7)
Product and financial flows
Purpose
Enable producers and 
traders to buy hives and 
other equipment
Borrowers pay for items 
in instalments; when fully 
paid, they own the item
Give trader working 
capital to buy honey
Enable end-proces-
sor to delay payment 
for honey until it is 
sold
Amount
For producers, first loans 
maximum KSh 17,500 
($220)
For traders, up to KSh 
150,000 ($1,875) first 
loans
Financial services as-
sociations lend 5 times 
value of member’s 
shares (compared with 4 
times for other loans)
Total KSh 1 million 
($12,500) disbursed
First loan of KSh 
150,000 ($1,875)
Total KSh 1 million 
($12,500) disbursed
Total KSh 2 million 
($25,000) disbursed
Period Maximum term = 24 months
Maximum term = 6 
months
Maximum term = 3 
months
Disburse-
ment
60% of price paid to 
supplier on approval of 
lease
Remaining 40% paid on 
delivery
80% first payment
20% later payment, 
less 20% service 
charge
After delivery of 
honey, trader takes 
invoice to bank
Bank pays 80% 
immediately after 
invoice is authenti-
cated
Repayment
Equal monthly instal-
ments
Amount depends on 
negotiations between 
financial services as-
sociation and client, but 
aims at full recovery of 
lease amount
Equal monthly instal-
ments
Buyer pays after 3 
months
Fees are deducted 
then
Interest rate
15% a year flat rate
Interest rate is low to en-
courage producers
18% a year flat rate 20% a year flat rate
Transaction 
costs
1% lease application fee
1% lease insurance fund 
against death of client
1% application fee
1% insurance fund 
against death of 
client
1% loan application 
fee
1% loan insurance 
fund against death 
of client
Continued...
Table 6.1 Financial products in the honey value chain in Kenya
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Traders: Short-term loans for working capital and micro-
leasing of  equipment 
The traders need money so they can buy the honey from the collection centres. 
K-Rep Bank and the financial services associations provide them with short-term 
loans of up to KSh 150,000 ($1,875) during the honey harvesting season – far more 
than the amount they could get as a first loan from other lenders ( in Figure 6.7 
and second column in Table 6.1). 
The loans and leasing arrangements are subject to memoranda of understanding 
between the trader, collection centre, the financial services association and K-Rep 
Bank, in which the trader agrees to buy all the honey that the collection centre has 
Micro-leasing () Loans (working 
capital) ()
Factoring ()
Risk management
Securitization
Peer pressure from 
group
Leased item and 
household items 
pledged to group
Household items 
pledged
Due diligence on 
buyer including 
inspection of audited 
accounts, etc
Liability
Group members are 
individually and sever-
ally responsible
Trader TARDA, trader
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
Producer: Number of 
hives already owned 
(minimum 10)
Number of hives colo-
nized (minimum 5)
For start-ups, proof of 
training in beekeeping
Trader: Must have 
handled over 3 tons in 
previous season
Maximum of 1.5 times 
size of working loan
Memoranda of under-
standing
Number of groups 
and hives supplying 
the trader
Projected honey har-
vests for season 
Previous season’s 
cash flow
Agreement with 
TARDA
Invoice from TARDA
Information 
required dur-
ing season
Number of leased hives 
colonized 
Proof of visits by hive 
specialist to inspect for 
diseases and pests
Projected harvests dur-
ing season
Expected harvests
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
7 days 7 days Immediate payment 
on submission of 
invoice
Table 6.1 (continued) Financial products in the honey value chain in Kenya
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available, trains the producers and maintains their hives. The collection centre 
agrees to sell its honey to the trader, giving it an assured market and the trader 
an assured supply.
Final processor: Factoring to enable purchase of  semi-
processed honey
In value chains, especially towards the end, supermarkets and other buyers often 
pay for products months after receiving them. That leaves the sellers short of the 
cash they need to keep their operations going. The honey traders and TARDA, 
the final processor, suffer from this problem. They need constant cash so TARDA 
can buy the semi-processed honey from the traders, and the latter can continue 
to buy crude honey from the collection centres. 
K-Rep Bank’s solution is known as “factoring” or “invoice discounting” (see 
also the case on tea micro-factoring, page 125). When TARDA’s refinery in Kitui 
town receives a delivery of honey, K-Rep Bank pays the traders 80% of the price 
on TARDA’s behalf. Three months later, after TARDA has processed and sold 
the honey, it pays the bank the full amount, and the bank pays the traders the 
remaining 20%, minus a fee equivalent to 20% a year flat rate. This agreement 
between K-Rep, TARDA and the traders is the second triangle in the chain ( in 
Figure 6.7 and third column in Table 6.1). 
This arrangement ensures there is enough liquidity in the chain for it to work 
smoothly. The traders get their money on time, so can buy more honey in turn 
from the collection centres. This also prevents honey going to waste during the 
harvest season because of actors further down the chain not having the immedi-
ate cash to buy it. 
Risk analysis
Because Kitui is a dry district, it has very limited business opportunities and high 
risks, and is not an attractive location for financers. Extended periods of donor 
programmes have left residents expecting handouts rather than loans they have 
to repay.
Table 6.2 summarizes the risks involved in financing the honey value chain.
Benefits 
These innovations have resulted in benefits for various actors in the chain.
Beekeepers The leasing arrangements have enabled even the most disadvan-
taged producers to acquire new hives and equipment, and to upgrade their ex-
isting hives. They have been trained on beekeeping, and now have savings and 
money transfer services. They have increased both the quantity and quality of the 
honey they produce: in 2006, they harvested 2,500 tons of honey, while in 2007, 
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they produced 4,000 tons. In 2009, they hope to increase their output further. The 
improved quality is reflected in higher prices: in December 2008 a kilogram of 
honey fetched KSh 89 ($1.10), compared to KSh 60 ($0.75) a year earlier. This has 
made honey an important source of income for many people in a drought year.
Farmer groups and collection centres The farmer groups and collection cen-
tres have been able to get loans that let them pay producers immediately for the 
honey they deliver. The collection centres paid producers a total of KSh 720,000 
($9,000) in 2008: KSh 480,000 ($6,000) more than they would have got under the 
old system.
Traders Access to credit and the ability to lease equipment mean that traders 
can buy and process more honey. Improved quality and an assured market give 
them higher prices: their prices rose by 25%. 
TARDA Before, a lack of financing forced TARDA to reduce its honey operations 
drastically. Factoring gives TARDA and the traders enough liquidity to continue 
buying honey throughout the year. From a low of just one ton, in 2008, TARDA 
processed 3,000 tons, and in 2009 it expects to handle 10,000 tons. 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Climate: bees 
leave in pro-
longed drought
Help producers diversify to poultry pro-
duction, drought-resistant crops, etc.
Price
Prices high when 
production is low
Producers side-
sell if they can 
get better prices
 
TARDA survey at start of season to 
determine market prices
TARDA pays higher than going prices
Price fluctuations  
Relation with TARDA helps stabilize 
prices 
TARDA pays higher than going price
Market
Disruption to 
continuity of 
chain
Memoranda of understanding between 
chain actors and financial service provid-
ers
Single buyer: 
whole chain is 
threatened if 
TARDA cannot 
take product
 Seek additional buyers
Default
Funds used for 
other purposes
Select traders who have agreement with 
TARDA
Train clients before disbursement
Low honey 
quality
Borrowers ex-
pect handouts
 
TARDA continuously trains traders on 
controlling quality 
TARDA provides standard containers to 
conserve quality
Traders have to take back inferior honey
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 6.2 Risk analysis for the honey chain in Kenya
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Financial institutions The financial services associations have increased their 
membership and loan portfolio by over 20%. Some 2,000 farmers have joined the 
associations, borrowing a total of KSh 3 million ($37,500) in the first year.
K-Rep Bank lent KSh 5 million ($62,500) in the first year to traders, a figure that is 
expected to rise to KSh 30 million ($375,000) as factoring becomes more common. 
The bank has eagerly embraced this model because though of medium risk, it 
enables the bank to do brisk business in this arid and semi-arid district.
Chain as a whole The package of innovative financial services provided to 
different actors has revived the honey industry in Kitui. The quality and output 
of honey have risen. There is a lot more liquidity in the value chain, with each 
actor now able to handle more honey because the financial constraints have been 
removed. Prices throughout the chain have risen, and the chain is now more 
organized and streamlined. The level of trust among actors has risen, cemented 
by a network of memoranda of understanding.
Factoring is still in a pilot stage, and lessons on how to apply it are still being 
learned. 
One of the objectives of KDA’s intervention was to stimulate interest in the value 
chain among other financial institutions. One of these, Equity Bank, is developing 
a loan product targeting beekeepers. 
Challenges
Producers
•	 With better honey prices, the theft of hives has risen significantly. Farmers 
are urged to move their hives nearer to their homes so they can keep an eye 
on them. 
•	 Beekeeping is traditionally a male affair, and few women are yet involved. 
•	 Prolonged drought (sometimes lasting up to 7 years) leads to dismal honey 
harvests.
•	 Tree felling to make charcoal continues unabated. This depletes the vegetation 
vital for bees to make honey.
Financial service providers
•	 Financial services associations allow producers up to 6 months before they 
have to start repaying their lease. These long grace periods pose cash flow 
challenges, because the associations reply on their members’ share capital for 
loan funds. As a result, they have had to look for other sources of money to 
loan out.
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lessons 
•	 The project has shown that commodity value chains require different types 
of interventions, including business development and financial services.
•	 There is huge growth potential for chain actors and financiers in commodity 
value chains. However, value chains may derail at the pre-production stage, 
so a thorough study of this stage is important. For example, the hive makers 
in Kitui could not make the hives the farmers needed because they had no 
capital. And without transport, the hive specialists could not reach the farmers. 
The project has financed bicycles and motorbikes to enable them to provide 
their services to distant farmers.
•	 Appropriate financial interventions can make a major contribution to reviving 
and strengthening a value chain.
•	 TARDA has not been a reliable partner in the past, and overdependence on 
one government agency has to be avoided. 
•	 As with other programmes that become sustainable, KDA aims to withdraw 
from its involvement in the chain by the end of 2009. K-Rep Bank and K-Rep 
Fedha Services will continue to be involved in the chain through the financial 
services associations.
More information
Paul Maundu Mwilu, K-Rep Development Agency, maundumwilu@yahoo.com 
www.k-rep.org
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Financing the soybean value 
chain in Ethiopia
“it does not matter if we have no grazing land to rear cows”, says Abba Sherab Abba Warri. “After all, soybean is our cow that never stops giving milk.”
Abba Sherab is one of many farmers in Jimma zone, in Oromia state in south-
western Ethiopia, who have recently taken up growing soybeans. He sells the 
soybeans to the marketing organization he belongs to, which takes them to a fac-
tory nearby which produces soy milk, a nutritious substitute for cow’s milk. The 
soy milk is proving popular in the city of Jimma, the capital of the zone. Cow’s 
milk is not readily available in the area, and local Orthodox Christians abstain 
from animal products for about 200 days a year.
The farmers in Jimma zone face many problems. The soil is poor, and many farm-
ers plant maize, the staple food, year after year. They have no money to buy inputs 
such as seed and fertilizer, and they lack both a market for their surplus produce 
and the skills to sell it. Borrowing money costs a lot: moneylenders charge 120% 
interest a year. Farmers who take up such loans are sometimes forced to sell their 
produce at low prices to pay off their debt. 
Some farmers own a few cattle, but this is a densely populated area and grazing 
land is scarce. The cattle are of low quality, and drought and diseases mean that 
most cows produce less than a litre of milk a day.
A plant that gives milk
What alternative crops could farmers 
grow? Facilitator for Change Ethiopia 
(FCE), a national NGO working on 
community development (Box 6.2), 
discussed various options with local 
farmers, research centres and govern-
ment agencies, and came up with soy-
bean. This legume is well-adapted to the 
local soils and climate, and improves 
the soil fertility by fixing nitrogen. The 
beans can be used for food and feed as 
well as processed into various products, 
including milk. Market studies showed Figure 6.8 Location of Jimma, Ethiopia
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it had a promising market in the city of Jimma, as well as among food processing 
plants in Addis Ababa. 
FCE and Jimma Agricultural Research Centre have jointly promoted soybean in 
Jimma zone since 2006. They have put a lot of effort into popularizing the crop 
among farmers: each year a soybean field day is held, farmers visit model farms, 
and exhibitions are staged where local people can learn about foods made from 
soybean. As farmers gradually adopted and began to consume soybean, the need 
to find a bigger market for the beans became clear.
At the same time, women’s groups in Jimma city were looking for ways to earn 
money. Familiar with the shortage of cow’s milk, they decided to make and sell 
soy milk. They approached Harbu Micro Finance Institution, an affiliate of FCE, 
to discuss this idea. FCE decided to link the women with the existing farmers’ 
groups to form a new value chain.
The soybean value chain was established in the city of Jimma and three adjacent 
rural districts, Tiro Afeta, Kersa and Omo Nada. It links smallholder producers, 
farmers’ marketing organizations, the women’s groups (grouped together into 
“cluster-level women’s associations”), retailers and consumers.
Chain actors
Smallholder farmers A typical smallholder farmer owns 1.5–3.5 hectares of 
land and grows soybean on about one-quarter of this area. Most farmers in the 
Box 6.2 Organizations supporting the soybean value chain
Facilitator for Change Ethiopia (FCE) 
Established in 1997, FCE is a national NGO that helps disadvantaged communities over-
come poverty. It focuses on enabling them to improve their livelihoods using their own 
resources, skills and experiences, with minimum external support. FCE currently has seven 
projects in Oromia and Amhara states in Ethiopia, three of which promote farmer marketing 
organizations. 
FCE is heavily involved in value chain promotion, especially on soybeans. It has organized 
about 5,000 farmers into 64 farmer marketing organizations in these two states. For the 
soybean value chain in Jimma, FCE is supported by SOS-Faim, a Belgian-based NGO.
Harbu Micro Finance Institution
This was established in 2005 and is affiliated to FCE. It aims to boost agricultural productivity 
and agricultural marketing by supporting value chain development and access to financial 
services. It has capital of 12.4 million birr ($1.24 million). Harbu is registered with the Na-
tional Bank of Ethiopia to mobilize savings. It receives support from Terrafina Microfinance 
(a Dutch microfinance promoter) and SOS-Faim. 
More information: www.fce-eth.org 
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area earn around 4,500 to 5,000 birr ($450–500) a year. They sow soybean between 
the end of May and mid-June, and harvest them in December. The farm families 
consume about 25% of the harvest themselves, or save it as seed for the next 
season; they sell the rest to farmers’ marketing organizations. The average yield 
is 1.5 tons a hectare.
Farmers’ marketing organizations Many of the farmers in Jimma zone are or-
ganized into neighbourhood groupings known as ollas consisting of 20–25 farmers 
each. Several ollas are grouped into voluntary associations known as farmers’ 
marketing organizations. Throughout Ethiopia, FCE has helped establish 64 of 
these marketing organizations, with a total of over 4,000 farmer members. There 
are 30 marketing organizations in Jimma zone, with over 2,000 members and a 
working capital of birr 750,000 ($75,000). FCE helped them get organized, built 
their capacity, and provided start-up capital so they could begin trading. They 
have gained a lot of experience trading in grain and business activities.
Five of the marketing organizations in Jimma zone, with a total of about 240 
members, are engaged in the soybean milk value chain. Between them, they 
have around birr 150,000 ($15,000) in working capital. They buy soybeans from 
their members, clean them and pack them ready for sale. Each organization has 
a warehouse where it stores the bulked soybeans. The organization’s managers 
negotiate the sale of the beans.  
Figure 6.9 The soybean value chain
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Cluster-level women’s associa-
tions Since 2000, FCE has helped 
establish 131 informal self-help groups 
of poor women in Jimma zone, each 
with 15–20 members. These groups in 
turn make up 14 cluster-level wom-
en’s associations, which are engaged 
in various types of small enterprises, 
services and manufacturing. The as-
sociations aim to give their members 
access to finance, business skills and 
other resources. Involvement in these 
enterprises makes membership of an as-
sociation attractive: the average annual 
income of members had risen from birr 
1,300 ($130) before joining the group, to 
3,600 by December 2008. 
One of these associations, with 164 
women members, is involved in the soybean milk value chain. It buys all the 
soybeans sold by the five farmer marketing organizations, plus soybeans from 
other farmers’ marketing organizations in the area. It soaks the beans to remove 
the hulls, grinds them up in water, and filters the resulting liquid to make soy 
milk. This work is all done in a factory, managed by representatives elected from 
among the association. Some association members work in the factory (they earn a 
wage for their work); the association hires professionals to run the equipment.
One kilogram of raw soybeans produces 7.5 litres of soy milk. Members consume 
5% of the resulting milk at home. They fill the remainder into half- or one-litre 
bottles or 5-litre cans, and sell it to retailers and other customers in Jimma. The 
association also makes and sells tofu and animal feed from soybeans.
Retailers The retailers are individual entrepreneurs around Jimma city who 
have relationships with the associations. They sell the soy milk to consumers. 
Consumers The soy milk is aimed at consumers who readily accept new ideas: 
university students (who account for 10% of the market) and the middle class, in 
the hope that the product will spread to other groups. Many consumers prefer 
soy milk to cow’s milk because it is good quality, more nutritious and costs less 
than cow’s milk (much of which is diluted). Other consumers include children, 
cafeterias, hospitals, and other urban residents. The milk does not yet reach buy-
ers outside the Jimma area. 
FCE and the Jimma Agricultural Research Centre have jointly promoted soybean 
in Jimma zone since 2006. Continuous training on food preparation has been given 
to the wives of the soybean producers, so soy-based food have become included 
in many families’ daily meals. A Dutch organization, SharePeople, supported 
FCE and Harbu in testing the product in universities and cafeterias to check for 
Figure 6.10 Soybean is a new crop in the 
Jimma area
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people’s preferences. The comments 
and feedback from this market research 
were encouraging.  
Establishing the chain
FCE has played a lead role in build-
ing and strengthening the chain and 
its main actors. It organized both the 
farmers’ marketing organizations and 
the women’s association, and built their 
capacity through training and experi-
ence sharing. It guided them on how to 
manage internal loans and funds from 
outside. It had worked with these groups before the soybean value chain was 
created, so had already developed a trusting relationship with them.
With support from Jimma Agricultural Research Centre and rural development 
specialists, FCE raised understanding among the farmers on soybean produc-
tion. To help farmers find a reliable market outlet, FCE provided the marketing 
organizations with seed capital, material and technical support.
•	 Seed capital To encourage the marketing organizations to build their work-
ing capital and develop a saving habit, FCE provides them with matching 
finance on a 50:50 basis: for example, if a marketing organization has raised 
20,000 birr, FCE provides it with another 20,000 birr. This financial support 
may last for only 3 consecutive years after a marketing organization is estab-
lished. The upper limit of financial support is usually 40,000 birr.
•	 Material support When the marketing organizations have mobilized locally 
available resources such as land, wood, and labour (to build a warehouse, for 
example), FCE provides purchased inputs such as nails, metal sheets, cement 
and payment for a contractor. 
•	 Technical and capacity building support FCE provides professional advice, 
trainings, experience sharing etc. Like the other types of support, there is a 
farmer contribution here too. For example, for training courses, the market-
ing organizations cover the transport costs while FCE covers per diems and 
professional fees. 
FCE also linked the women’s association to the farmer organizations, input sup-
pliers and customers, as well as to Harbu. It helped test consumer preferences 
for things like packing materials for soy milk, the size of bottles, flavour, place 
of delivery, etc. 
The Ethiopian government controls many sectors of the economy, so is an impor-
tant influence on the chain. It supports the sale of inputs to smallholder farmers 
and provides extension services and technical support. Through line bureaus 
such as the rural development office and the cooperative promotion commission, 
Figure 6.11 The women’s association 
processes the beans into soy 
milk
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it also provides services such as farm management, licensing of cooperatives, 
auditing and quality control. 
Financing the chain
Harbu provides a variety of financial services to the value chain: agricultural 
loans, working capital and lease-financing loans. 
Agricultural loans for farmers The soybean growers need money to buy inputs 
such as seed, fertilizer and implements. Harbu is the only financial institution in 
the area that gives small loans to farmers, as other financers find agriculture too 
risky and demand hard collateral from the farmers. To qualify for a loan, a farmer 
has to be a member of a farmers’ marketing organization, and the organization 
must have been operational for more than a year. If an individual borrower fails 
to repay a loan, the olla group and the farmers’ marketing organization are re-
sponsible for repaying it. This financial arrangement is shown as the first triangle 
in the chain ( in Figure 6.9).
Working capital loans for farmers’ marketing organizations Many of the 
farmers’ marketing organizations have savings accounts with Harbu. But they 
need capital so they can buy beans from their members. Harbu loans them money 
based on their financial statements, warehouses and inventories. The government 
revenue department does not recognize the warehouses as assets that can be 
used as collateral, so they are considered as “soft” collateral. A contract between 
Harbu and the marketing organization covers details of interest rates, duration, 
repayment, etc. Five percent of the total loan must be deposited with Harbu as 
compulsory savings. All five marketing organizations in the soybean chain have 
received such loans from Harbu. This loan is shown as  in Figure 6.9.
Loans and leases for women’s association Harbu gives similar working capi-
tal loans to the women’s association so it can buy soybeans from the marketing 
organizations and packaging materials from suppliers. In 2008, the association 
approached Harbu for a loan so it could buy a processing machine to make soy 
milk. This machine cost $25,000 – an investment that Harbu found too risky. So 
Harbu proposed an alternative: rather than providing a loan, it would lease the 
machine to the association over a 5 year period, charging 10% interest a year (the 
interest rate declines as the lease is paid, and the machine belongs to the associa-
tion at the end of the period). If the association does not pay on time, Harbu can 
repossess the machine and sell it to somebody else. This arrangement is based on 
the long-term trust relationships between Harbu, the women’s association and 
the marketing organizations. This is shown as the second triangle in the chain 
( in Figure 6.9). 
Table 6.3 gives further details of these financial products.
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Risk analysis
Table 6.4 summarizes the risks in fi-
nancing the soybean value chain. Most 
of the risks are mitigated through the 
triangular cooperation between FCE’s 
development support, Harbu’s finan-
cial services, and the intimate business 
relations between the farmers and the 
women groups. Without this institu-
tional architecture, the risks and costs 
would be too high, and the soybean 
chain would not function properly.
Benefits
Farmers Farmers in Jimma are no 
longer dependent on a single crop, 
maize. In soybeans, they can now grow a crop that they say raises their income 
by more than 7% and improves the fertility of their soil. Soybean is a nutritious 
food that can be consumed in various forms – not only milk, but also bread, cheese 
and other products. Soybean by-products are used for animal feed. In 2008 over 
1,000 farmers started producing and selling soybean. They are now more able to 
grow crops for the market, and they can get loans to increase their productivity 
and incomes. Their ability to organize and promote sustainable local develop-
ment has been increased.
Farmers’ marketing organizations The marketing organizations have a reliable 
buyer for their product, and get higher prices than they would get if the farmers 
were to sell as individuals or on the open market. That has raised their profits by 
over 5% and improved their ability to serve their members. The relation between 
the women’s association and the farmers’ organization has improved the reputa-
tion of these farmer groups.
Women’s association The women who work together in the association have 
also benefited. Their incomes have increased by more than 5%, and they have 
been able to scale up their business. The soybean chain greatly contributes to the 
social and economic empowerment of women in the area. 
Harbu Harbu has increased its portfolio of products and its clientele base by 
20%. It has lowered the risk of default by working with several actors in the chain 
rather than with individual players. By doing business with groups rather than in-
dividual borrowers, it lowers its risks and its transaction costs by at least 50%.
Chain as a whole Before this initiative, the soy milk value chain did not exist. 
Consumers in Jimma now have a substitute for cow’s milk: a reliable supply of 
fresh, nutritious soy milk at an affordable price.
Figure 6.12 Soybeans can be used to 
make a variety of foods as well 
as a good substitute for cow’s 
milk
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The linkages between rural areas and the town of Jimma have been strengthened. 
The chain has helped lower poverty, improve nutrition, and empower women 
and smallholder farmers. It has contributed to development of agro-processing 
enterprises and increased industrial development in the area. 
Agricultural loan ( in 
Figure 6.9)
Working capital 
loans ( in Figure 
6.9)
Lease financing ( in 
Figure 6.9)
Product and financial flows
Purpose Enable soybean produc-ers to buy inputs
Enable farmers’ mar-
keting organizations 
and women’s associa-
tion to buy soybeans 
and supplies
Enable women’s 
association to buy 
equipment
Amount
Average: $275 
Max: $500
Min: $50
Total portfolio: $280,000
Average: $6,500 
Max: $10,000
Min: $3,000
Total portfolio: $32,500
Avergage: 48,450
Max: $93,900
Min: $3,000
Total portfolio $96,900
Period 9 months
5 months (marketing 
organization)
1 year (women’s as-
sociation)
5 years
Disburse-
ment In May to farmer
In December to mar-
keting organization
By Harbu to machin-
ery owner
Repayment Repaid to Harbu, pay-able all at one time
Repaid to Harbu, pay-
able all at one time Throughout the year
Interest 
rate
15% per year, payable 
all at one time
15% per year (market-
ing organization)
15% (women’s as-
sociation)
Initially 10%, declines 
as lease is paid
Transac-
tion costs
Loan processing fee 
= 3% 3% 3%
Risk management
Securitiza-
tion
Peer pressure from 
group
Warehouse and 
inventory 
5% of the total loan 
should be deposited 
as compulsory sav-
ings
Harbu retains owner-
ship of equipment 
until payment is 
complete
Liability
Farmers’ marketing 
organization, neigh-
bourhood groups and 
individual producers
Marketing organiza-
tion (not individual 
members)
Women’s association 
(not individual mem-
bers)
Continued...
Table 6.3 Financial products in the soybean value chain in Ethiopia
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Agricultural loan () Working capital loans () Lease financing ()
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
Group cohesion 
(number of conflicts, 
use of internal funds, 
% attendance at 
meetings, etc.)
Purpose of loan
Credit history of bor-
rower
Marketing organiza-
tion must support 
application
Assessment of assets 
owned 
Balance sheet and 
income statement
Audit reports
Reputation (previous 
business track record, 
clarity and neatness 
of records, profitabil-
ity, etc.)
Assessment of asso-
ciation’s strength and 
experience in manag-
ing internal loans
Purpose of loan
Feasibility of the busi-
ness to be undertaken
Information 
required dur-
ing season
Crop assessment by 
Harbu
Harbu attends fort-
nightly (initial, then 
monthly) meetings to 
monitor use of loan
Stock assessment 
every month by Harbu
Harbu attends month-
ly meetings, or refers 
to meeting minutes 
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
2 weeks 1 month 1–2 months
Table 6.3 (continued) Financial products in the soybean value chain
Lessons and challenges 
•	 There are limited funds for loans to meet the needs of different actors. Harbu 
will work with commercial banks to increase the amount of funds available 
for loans. By offering finance to several chain actors at the same time, it is 
possible to bring about a greater impact with the same level of inputs. 
•	 To benefit from value chain initiatives and play a greater role in the chain, 
farmers and women need to be organized, linked to other groups, and have 
their skills upgraded. But the history of cooperatives in Ethiopia makes local 
people reluctant to get organized. Training, awareness raising and experience 
sharing from model cooperatives are necessary to overcome this barrier. 
•	 Some chain actors have difficulty switching from competing with one another 
to cooperating. It is possible to change their mindsets by showing the benefits 
of the value chain. Creating access to markets and financial services improves 
production – it is estimated that some 7,500 farmers will be willing to grow 
soybean in the next 2–3 years because they see the benefits arising from the 
value chain. 
•	 The lack of strong regulation to enforce contracts and quality standards hinders 
the standardization of services and products in the chain. There is need to 
lobby government to enforce its regulations so as to strengthen trust between 
the actors. 
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The future
The future for the soy milk chain looks bright! A market and feasibility study 
by a private consultant and a group of Dutch entrepreneurs concluded that the 
soybean value chain in Jimma is an excellent example of social entrepreneurship 
on the basis of true economic principles. This study identified new retailers and 
consumers in Jimma city, and found that many institutions (universities, hospi-
tals, supermarkets, cafeterias, hotels etc. ) were interested in obtaining the milk. 
Expanding the chain would create further benefits for the actors involved.
More information
Tesfaye Befekadu, Harbu Microfinance Institution Share Company, harbumfi@ethionet.
et, harbumfi@yahoo.com, tesfayebef@yahoo.com 
Tarekegn Garomsa, Facilitators for Change Ethiopia, fce@ethionet.et, taregarom@yahoo.
com, website www.fce-eth.org
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Crop failure due 
to poor rainfall Buy soybeans from producers elsewhere
Inadequate 
quality
Farmer organizations provide technical 
support to farmers
Women associations pay premium for 
quality
Inputs unavail-
able or late
Strengthen links with government agen-
cies that provide inputs
Failure of soy 
milk processing 
machine
Establish complementary enterprise: a 
flour mill
Lack of manage-
ment skills in 
women’s groups
Train women and share experience
Price Rise in input prices Provide loans to farmers to buy inputs
Default
Beans not deliv-
ered because of 
low production 
or high home 
consumption
Build relations with farmers and raise 
awareness
Women’s associations pay competitive 
price and premiums
Currency Inflation
Gather, manage and use market informa-
tion
Women’s association minimizes adminis-
trative costs and forecasts inflation
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 6.4 Risk analysis for the soybean value chain in Ethiopia
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opening opportunities to 
small coffee producers in 
Nicaragua
coFFee is an important crop in Nicaragua. Around 110,000 medium- and small-scale farmers grow coffee, and it accounts for 16% of the country’s exports 
– about 93,000 tons of high-quality, unroasted coffee beans a year. Nicaraguan 
coffee is well recognized internationally for its quality and taste. Some 20% of the 
output is organic – which fetches a premium price in the market. 
One of the major centres of coffee production is San Juan del Río Coco, in the 
highlands in the north of the country. Some 3,500 small- and medium-scale farm-
ers around this small, highland town produce over 4,000 tons of coffee a year, 
28% of which is organic.
Producing and processing coffee
The coffee production season in San Juan starts in March or April, when the farm-
ers prune the bushes and plant new seedlings to rejuvenate part of their plantings. 
During the wet season, from May to September, the farmers have to control pests 
and diseases, weed the plantations and 
fertilize the bushes. The coffee bushes 
come into bloom (the first indication of 
how good the harvest will be), and then 
each blossom forms into a green berry, 
or “cherry”. Pest and disease control 
continues during October and Novem-
ber. Finally in December to February, it 
is time to harvest the ripe berries, which 
are now bright red. 
The average coffee plantation size is 3.5 
hectares, and produces about 0.5 tons 
per hectare of “green” coffee (beans 
ready for roasting). Farm families which 
have less than a couple of hectares 
can harvest their bushes themselves. 
Larger-scale farmers hire workers, or 
get their relatives to help. The harvest-
Figure 6.13 Location of San Juan del Río 
Coco, Nicaragua
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ers pick the ripe cherries, take them for weighing, then tip them into a concrete 
basin full of water. The good beans sink, while unripe beans, leaves and twigs 
float. The cherries then go into the farmer’s depulping machine, which removes 
the skin and flesh, leaving pale-coloured beans, called “parchment” coffee. (If the 
farmer does not own a depulper, he or she may borrow one from a neighbour.)
The farmer then takes the parchment coffee to UCPCO (Box 6.3), which weighs 
the beans and pays the farmers 50% of the agreed price. It then sun-dries the 
beans, classifies them into quality grades, and puts them into bags. It transports 
the bags to the port in a closed lorry to make sure they are not contaminated. At 
the port, an agent arranges for the coffee to be shipped to its destination. After 
that, the coffee must be roasted, blended, perhaps ground, then packaged before 
it appears on retailers’ shelves.
Sources of finance
Farmers need working capital during the season to pay for inputs and hire work-
ers, as well as investment capital to improve their processing facilities so they 
can produce the quality required by the demanding organic market. They could 
only cover part of these financing needs, using three sources: UCPCO, private 
traders, and the Fondo de Desarrollo Local (FDL, see Box 6.4).
Box 6.3 UCPCO
UCPCO is a union of six village-level cooperatives of organic coffee producers in San Juan 
del Río Coco, with a total of some 400 members. The Union offers a number of services 
to its members: 
•	 Technical assistance and training to improve the quality of production.
•	 Production services Collecting, dry processing, transportation, quality control and 
export.
•	 Organic certification for the farms, together with Bio Latina, an accredited certifier of 
agriculture and livestock production.
•	 Working capital credit The Union used to offer loans to cover members’ working 
capital needs (see “Sources of finance” section below).
•	 Community services The Union runs community centres, programmes on sport, 
gender and women’s health, and training activities. It also offers scholarships and 
school supplies for children, as well as medical support for special cases.
Various NGOs and research institutes (SNV, Pasolac and CATIE) support the Union’s in-
stitutional capacity building and technical assistance activities, as well as providing finance 
to support loans for harvesting and processing. 
In 2007, the Union was named Innovative Exporter by the Nicaraguan Producers’ and Ex-
porters’ Association of Non-Traditional Products. In 2008, it received a national exporters’ 
prize from the Ministry of Promotion, Industry and Commerce.
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UCPCO loans to farmers The Union used to provide loans to its farmer mem-
bers at the beginning of the season, so these had working capital to buy inputs 
and hire labour ( in Figure 6.14). When the farmers delivered the parchment 
coffee, the Union would pay them half of the agreed price immediately. It paid 
the balance, minus the loan amount and interest, after the coffee had been sold 
to international buyers.
At the beginning of each production cycle, the Union negotiated prices and signed 
contracts with buyers. The buyers paid only after receiving the coffee, usually after 
3 months. They did not finance the coffee production or in-country processing. 
Loans from private traders Farmers who needed cash to cover their produc-
tion costs could also borrow from coffee trading houses, or their intermediaries. 
These lenders would charge much higher rates of interest for this finance than 
the Union – effectively 30–100%. The farmers would be obliged to sell their coffee 
to the traders rather than to the Union ( in Figure 6.14).
FDL loans to individual farmers The microfinance institution provided indi-
vidual farmers with short-term loans for 4–12 months (it was not working with 
UCPCO at this stage). The individual borrowers were responsible for repayment 
( in Figure 6.14).
Problems in financing the chain
This system faced several problems.
•	 Lack of liquidity The Union had to use a significant amount of its own 
funds to provide working capital to the farmers. But it sometimes did not 
Box 6.4 Fondo de Desarrollo Local
Fondo de Desarrollo Local (FDL) is a microfinance institution focusing on rural areas. FDL 
offers credit to poor families, and provides technical assistance and training through an 
alliance with Nitlapán, a research institute at the Central American University in Managua. 
It is the largest non-regulated microfinance institute in the country (its non-regulated status 
means it is not allowed to accept deposits from clients) and the third-largest overall. Its 
loan portfolio is $70 million, and it serves 83,000 clients through a network of 36 agencies. 
Over 60% of the loan portfolio is dedicated to agricultural and livestock production, serving 
40,000 producers. 
With its commitment to development, FDL has designed financial products to promote 
investments in rural infrastructure, equipment, improved production, etc. It dedicates 15% 
of its loan portfolio to finance activities with special conditions, such as lower interest rates 
and longer repayment terms. It complements these financial services with technical assist-
ance to improve production in an environmentally friendly way.
FDL is a leader in financing the agricultural sector in Nicaragua and was named the best mi-
crofinance institution in Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2005.
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have enough cash available, so had to reduce or delay its disbursements to 
the farmers and could not buy all the coffee the farmers had to sell. 
•	 Dependency on a few buyers With limited capacity to buy coffee and at-
tract new members, the Union had only a limited amount of coffee to sell, so 
was restricted to only a few buyers. 
•	 Lack of investment Low turnover and lack of capital meant that the Union 
had few funds to invest in the chain. Without access to investment finance, 
the producers could not afford to buy new equipment. Lacking adequate 
processing facilities, the farmers would deliver lower quality beans.
•	 Lack of technical assistance Many of FDL’s farmer clients were not mem-
bers of UCPCO, so had limited access to technical assistance and usually 
received lower prices for their coffee. That increased FDL’s risks in dealing 
with them.
•	 No benefit from organic coffee The private traders were not part of the 
organic value chain, so did not pay the premium price due to organic coffee. 
A potentially high-value product either ended up as regular coffee, or was 
sold as organic without the producer benefiting.
•	 Overconcentration on coffee FDL’s portfolio was highly concentrated on 
coffee in San Juan del Río Coco, so price fluctuations became a major risk. 
The producers specialized in coffee, so had few other sources of income. That 
heightened the risk of farmers defaulting on their loans.
Figure 6.14 The original coffee value chain
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Improving the chain
To revitalize the coffee chain, the chain actors needed capital to invest in tech-
nology, improve the quality of the coffee, and increase their scale of operation. 
UCPCO contacted FDL and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (IDR), a govern-
ment rural development agency to discuss how to do this. The main problem 
the Union wanted to solve was the lack of depulping machines, concrete basins 
and other processing equipment. It also needed funding to improve its support 
for its members.
IDR support
UCPCO negotiated two lines of support from IDR: 
Technical assistance grant to UCPCO This 3-year, $95,000 grant covered the 
cost of a technical assistance programme to improve production techniques 
and product quality, and to reduce water pollution from the farmers’ depulp-
ing machines ( in Figure 6.15). Training of small-scale producers was a major 
component of this activity.
Investment grants for farmers IDR provided capital to farmers so they could 
upgrade their processing equipment. The improved equipment cost $2,500 per 
farmer. IDR was willing to provide 70% of the total. IDR pays this to the Union, 
Figure 6.15 IDR and FDL support the coffee chain
Consumer
 Parchment coffee
Payment
Product
Money
Services, information
Microfinance 
institution  
(FDL)
Cooperative
(UCPCO)
Farmer
Government 
(IDR)
 Cleaned coffee
Lo
an
R
epaym
ent
Roasted coffee
International 
buyer
Inv
es
tm
en
t lo
an
Re
pa
ym
en
t
Advice, supervision
G
rant



G
rant

Loan
R
epaym
ent
Info
rm
ati
on
International 
finance 
institution
Services, support

6 Unleashing investments in the chain
which is in charge of buying equipment and materials and distributing them to 
the farmers ( in Figure 6.15). The farmer has to find the remaining 30% of the 
total.
FDL support
Investment loans for farmers It was difficult for the small-scale producers to 
raise even the remaining 30%. So Union approached FDL to develop a micro-
finance package that would give them the money they needed – an average of 
about $750 per farmer. FDL agreed to finance a 4-year loan at an annual interest 
rate of 14%. This money is disbursed to the farmers via the Union ( in Figure 
6.15). Details are given in Table 6.5.
To qualify for a loan, a farmer has to have a plan for how to use the money to 
improve the wet-processing facility. The farmer has to be approved by the Union, 
agree to deliver his coffee to the Union, allow inspection visits by FDL credit 
officers, and provide information about the previous production cycle. Farmers 
borrowing less than $1,500 (which includes most borrowers) are organized into 
“solidarity groups” of 3–7 farmers: if one member defaults, the other members 
of the group have to pay the balance of the loan. Farmers borrowing more than 
$1,500 have to provide hard collateral in the form of livestock, equipment, vehi-
cles or land. Union technicians visit the farms regularly and report on progress 
and problems to FDL.
After harvesting, the farmers deliver their coffee to the Union. The Union pays 
50% of the price to the farmers immediately, then deducts an instalment of the 
outstanding loan, plus interest, from the balance after it has received payment 
from the buyer. It then pays the remaining amount to the farmer. If the balance 
is insufficient to cover the amount due, the Union advances the difference and 
charges the farmer the next season. 
Such loans are denominated in córdobas, the Nicaraguan currency. The country’s 
central bank maintains a “crawling peg” devaluation system, and loans for the 
whole financial system are indexed to the US dollar. FDL mitigates the currency 
risk by including a clause in its loan contracts to maintain their value against the 
dollar, based on an annual devaluation rate of 5%. 
Working capital loans for farmers FDL has expanded its working capital loans 
to Union members, thereby freeing UCPCO from the need to lock its capital in 
cash payments to the farmers while waiting for the buyers to pay after 3 months 
only. With FDL taking over the financial services to the farmers, UCPCO is able 
to focus on its core business: technical assistance to the farmers and the buying 
and selling of coffee. The FDL loans are for up to 12 months and interest rates 
are higher – from 18 to 21% per year. Borrowers are not required to specify how 
they will use the money, so no investment plan is required. Other conditions are 
similar to FDL’s investment loans, so this is included in arrow  in Figure 6.15. 
Details are also given in Table 6.5.
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Investment loans for UCPCO FDL is prepared to offers loans of up to $50,000 
to the Union to improve infrastructure, buy vehicles, and pay for other major 
capital expenses. The Union has so far borrowed only up to $20,000 at a time. 
The Union has to provide hard collateral in the form of a mortgage of its land 
or buildings. Such loans have a 4- or 5-year term and must be repaid in annual 
instalments. Because the Union now has cash in hand, it has been able to repay 
these loans early. This arrangement is shown as  in Figure 6.15.
Working capital loans for UCPCO FDL is also willing to provide working capi-
tal loans to the Union so it can buy coffee during the harvest season from members 
or from non-members. The Union has not yet needed to take advantage of this 
facility as it now has cheaper alternative sources of finance. Three development 
financial institutions, Root Capital, Rabobank Foundation and Shared Interests, 
have started to give loans to the Union for working capital and investments ( 
in Figure 6.15). This is possible because the value chain has grown and the Union 
has developed a good reputation in financial circles.
Figure 6.16 The value chain’s financing is based on a three-way partnership between 
FDL, farmers and UCPCO
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Investment loan Working capital loan
Product and financial flows
Purpose
Finance investment capital needs 
of UCPCO members for equip-
ment, new coffee plantings, and 
rejuvenating old plantations
Finance working capital needs of 
UCPCO members
Covers food expenditure of produc-
ers who use family labour
Amount
Up to $10,000 
Average less than $1,500
Total portfolio: $92,000
Up to $5,000 
Average less than $1,000
Total portfolio: $346,000
Period
2–4 years, depending on borrow-
er’s ability to pay
4–12 months, depending on loan 
date and nature of borrower
Disburse-
ment
Individual borrower signs credit 
contract. Disbursement via Union 
Max 3 equal instalments
Individual borrower signs credit 
contract. Disbursement via Union 
Lump sump
Repayment Annual payments after harvest (Jan–Apr) At loan maturity (Jan–Apr) 
Interest rate 14% + 1% administrative costs 18–21%
Risk management
Securitization
Up to $1,500: no collateral, but 
solidarity guarantor required
$1,500–10,000: collateral such as 
livestock, equipment, harvest or 
land
Up to $1,500: no collateral, but 
solidarity guarantor required
$1,500–10,000: collateral such as 
livestock, equipment, harvest or 
property
Liability
Shared between UCPCO and FDL
Borrower provides guarantee
Shared between UCPCO and FDL
Borrower provides guarantee
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
UCPCO membership and consent
Farm development plan 
Identity document
Farm visit by FDL
Info on previous year’s production
Coffee to be delivered to UCPCO
Signed contract 
For loans over $1,500:
•	 Membership of solidarity group 
or individual credit 
•	 Solidarity guarantor,  collateral
UCPCO membership and consent
Identity document
Visit to farm by FDL staff
Info on previous year’s production
Coffee to be delivered to UCPCO
Signed contract 
For loans over $1,500:
•	 Membership of solidarity group 
or individual credit 
•	 Solidarity guarantor,  collateral
Information 
required dur-
ing season
UCPCO provides information on 
borrower’s performance before 
FDL makes subsequent disburse-
ments
This information is collected by 
UCPCO technical assistant
Periodic information about the bor-
rower’s performance collected by 
UCPCO technical assistant
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
Maximum 8 days Maximum 8 days
Table 6.5 FDL’s loans to farmers ( in Figure 6.15)
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mitigating risk
It was important for FDL to reduce its risk exposure as it had been allocating 
investment loans to farmers without collateral. FDL had already explored vari-
ous alliances to support coffee value chains, but these had failed, or benefited the 
trading house rather than the producers (FDL’s target group for its development 
activities). So FDL was searching for new models. The new arrangement is based 
on a strong triangular alliance between the farmers, the Union and FDL that is 
central to reducing risk.
The following points help mitigate FDL’s risks:
•	 Technical assistance is available to improve the quality of the output.
•	 Farmers have enough cash to prepare their plantations properly and control 
quality.
•	 The farmers must be members of the Union, which has the ability to monitor 
and coordinate production, and which shares information with FDL.
•	 The Union retains part of the payment for the coffee the farmers deliver, and 
repays this to FDL.
•	 FDL takes a conservative approach in its credit analysis. It uses conven-
tional coffee prices, not organic, to calculate the farmers’ ability to repay the 
loans. 
Table 6.6 summarizes FDL’s risks in financing the value chain.
Benefits
Farmers The farmers now have access to investment funds with longer repay-
ment terms and lower rates of interest. They are confident that they will be able 
to get a loan from FDL when they need it. 
Coffee producers increased their income by an average of 7.7% in 2006–7, and 
again in 2007–8. This was mostly due to better quality and prices, rather than an 
increase in productivity.
UCPCO The Union’s partnership with FDL has increased its liquidity and 
purchasing power: it can buy more coffee during the harvesting season. It now 
has access to investment funds from FDL and international development finance 
organizations. 
Freed from the distraction of having to fund and manage its own microfinance 
programme, the Union can specialize on its core business – providing services to 
its members, assuring quality, and marketing the coffee. Its exports have increased 
from under 100 tons in 2005 to over 500 tons in 2008 (Figure 6.17). 
The Union has grown from 117 members in 2005 to 400 in 2008. It has attracted 
new members, including small-scale producers who were already clients of FDL. 
It has expanded its range of international buyers and has built strong relation-
ships with them. It is now in a position to reject new buyers, so enjoys a stronger 

6 Unleashing investments in the chain
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Climate  
Visits by UCPCO staff to farmer at least 
three times during production cycle and 
reports to FDL
Check forecasts and expected yields
Adjust terms of loans accordingly (e.g., 
extend repayment period if harvest is 
late)
Disease  
UCPCO staff advise farmer how to man-
age disease
Quality  
Almost all producers have wet process 
equipment
Others use neighbour’s equipment
Crop cycles  
Coffee harvests follow a cycle: high one 
year, and low the next
Loans amounts adjusted accordingly
Price Market price fluctuations  
Sign forward contracts for organic coffee 
at start of season to set minimum prices
Market Buying contract default  
If international buyer fails to buy organic 
coffee, sell it as conventional coffee 
through local commercial houses
Default
Farmer sells cof-
fee elsewhere  
Contract obliges farmer to sell coffee to 
UCPCO
UCPCO and FDL supervise harvest to 
assure delivery
UCPCO offers best local market price 
and provides good client service
UCPCO pays reasonable price for low-
quality coffee
No repayment
Check applicant’s credit history and deny 
loans to defaulters
UCPCO discourages defaulting by 
members
Currency
Exchange rates  
Contracts include clause to maintain 
value against US dollar based on annual 
devaluation of córdoba of 5%
UCPCO pays farmers for exported coffee 
in US dollars
Inflation
 
(long-term 
lloans)
  
(short term 
loans)
Value maintenance clause allows for 5% 
inflation
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 6.6 Risk analysis for coffee in Nicaragua
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negotiating position and can demand 
better terms from the buyers. FDL loans 
to UCPCO have risen from $40,000 in 
2005 to $260,000 in 2008.
FDL The microfinance institution has 
used the opportunity to pursue with 
its mission by supporting a significant 
group of small-scale coffee producers. It 
has reduced its portfolio risk in several 
ways. Through the Union, it has better 
information about the farmers’ per-
formance. The Union’s technicians visit 
the farmers regularly and advise them 
on how to solve production problems. 
The yields are more stable and quality 
is higher. Repayments are now handled 
by the Union rather than by individual 
farmers, and the Union will repay loans 
in full on behalf of the farmers. The risk 
is shared with the Union. FDL’s col-
laboration with the Union also reduces 
its transaction costs. It can continue 
growing in the coffee sector and has a 
model it can use to develop alliances 
with other agricultural and livestock 
producers.
lessons
Specialization The value chain has 
benefited because the Union, FDL and 
the farmers each focus on their own 
specialization. 
•	 The Union has relinquished its role 
of providing working capital, so 
is able to focus on providing the 
services that it is good at, and that 
its members demand. 
•	 FDL is able to provide microfinance 
services, and its alliance with the 
Union enables it to do so without 
incurring the costs of organizing 
and training the farmers. 
Figure 6.17 Increase in number of UCPCO 
members (top), coffee exports 
(middle) and FDL loans to 
UCPCO (bottom)
UCPCO exports
UCPCO members
FLD loans to UCPCO
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•	 The farmers are able to focus on improving their yields and quality, without 
having to worry about whether they will get their loans on time.
Alliances Such specialization works because of the strong triangular alliance 
between the Union, the farmers and the microfinance institution. This alliance 
is advantageous to each of the parties. Their roles are complementary, and they 
share information transparently. The managers of the Union and FDL have been 
working together for a long time, so have developed a high degree of mutual 
trust and strong communication links.
Farmer empowerment FDL’s previous attempts to finance coffee production 
failed because they did not take the producers’ needs sufficiently into account. 
They were designed by FDL in collaboration with a trading house or a buyer, 
without involving the farmers. The farmers were at a disadvantage because they 
were obliged to deliver their coffee to the buyer, so were captive suppliers and 
could be easily exploited. The arrangement with the UCPCO is different: the 
Union negotiated on behalf of its farmer members, so their interests are reflected 
in the deal, and as co-owners of the Union, the farmers benefit from any profits 
it makes in the form of improved services, special projects and support such as 
scholarships, school supplies for children, and medical assistance.
Leadership The leadership of the Union and FDL managers has been key to 
success. Without their positive attitude towards change, commitment and ethical 
values, the chain would not have been as successful. It is, however, necessary to 
ensure that the sustainability of the chain does not depend on a few individu-
als.
Need for a kick-start The value chain was initiated through assistance from 
IDR, a government development agency (in other cases, the kick-start may come 
from an NGO, a development project, or the private sector). The initial grant and 
loan provided the capital, infrastructure and skills to develop the chain. Without 
such inputs, the chain would have developed more slowly, if at all.
Need for strong partners One of FDL’s previous attempts to build a value chain 
involved a non-local buyer who did not have sufficient capital to sustain it. This 
chain ended in tears: some farmers are still waiting to be fully paid for the coffee 
they delivered. FDL is strong enough to bear the costs and risks, and has a local 
office in San Juan with other clients, so knows the area well and is not going to 
run away if problems arise.
The future
The Union wishes to get into the gourmet coffee sector. This is the highest value 
coffee. It can be auctioned among potential buyers, and may fetch nearly 90% 
more than conventional coffee (organic coffee, which the Union currently pro-
duces, fetches around 15% more). The price for gourmet coffee also tends to be 
more stable.
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This will pose new challenges to the Union, and to FDL. The Union has identified 
certain farms above 1,200 m altitude that will be able to produce the quality of 
coffee required. Developing these farms will cost money, and the Union is asking 
FDL to provide new types of investment loans, with different disbursement proce-
dures. The Union must also learn how to operate in the new, gourmet market. 
For FDL, a challenge will be to maintain enough liquidity in the current interna-
tional financial crisis. The flow of funds to microfinance institutions that rely on 
development finance organizations has been declining. 
Given the success of the FDL–Union collaboration, FDL wishes to explore similar 
relationships with other cooperatives growing organic coffee. FDL now has a 
model to follow, but will have to invest in developing these new relationships.
More information
Alexandra Schutze, Fondo de Desarrollo Local, alexschutze@gmail.com 
Manuel Bermúdez, Fondo de Desarrollo Local, mbermudez@fdl.org.ni 
www.fdl.org.ni
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Developing the organic quinoa 
chain in Bolivia
“quinoa is one oF my favorite meal staples – it’s got more bite than rice, more protein than pasta. It’s good hot or cold – and it’s very easy to 
prepare.” 
So says an enthusiastic American blogger, one of a growing group of health-
conscious Western consumers who have recently discovered quinoa, an ancient 
grain native to Bolivia and Peru. Health food stores are full of quinoa products, 
from organic whole grains to breakfast cereals, chocolate-coated quinoa bars and 
frozen quinoa dinners. Vegetarians buy it for its protein content; people with 
gluten intolerance love that it’s gluten-free. 
Figure 6.18 Quinoa is a staple food in the Andes
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Quinoa produces edible seeds that are similar to cereal grains. Bolivians eat it on 
a daily basis. It is particularly suited to the growing conditions of the highlands 
in Peru and Bolivia because it can grow at altitudes of up to 4,000 metres. Over 
10,000 farmers produce in total about 22,000 metric tons of quinoa per year on 
32,000 ha of land. According to the National Institute of Statistics, the total value 
of quinoa exports reached $13.1 million in 2007.
Quinoa production is fundamental to the economy of rural communities of Bo-
livia’s highlands, where it makes up 55 to 85% of farmers’ revenues. The recent 
growth and dynamism of the quinoa value chain is largely the result of new 
export niche markets for foods with particular qualities: organic, nutritious, or 
originating from a specific region. These have emerged in response to changes in 
demand, as Western consumers have become more concerned about their health 
and the environment. 
Actors in the value chain
Irupana Andean Organic Food (Irupana) is a private company that has been 
processing and exporting Andean cereals (quinoa and amaranth) to international 
markets since 2003. Irupana is based in the Bolivian capital, La Paz, and sources 
its quinoa from farmers and collectors in five municipalities (Salinas de Garcí 
Mendoza, Pampa Aullagas, Quillacas, Colcha K and Uyuni) in the southern Al-
tiplano (Figure 6.20). This chapter presents the experience of Irupana in working 
with the farmers of these municipalities in developing a business relationship 
in 2003–7.
Figure 6.19 shows how the quinoa value chain was organized in 2003. There were 
three major actors, farmers, traders or “collectors”, and Irupana.
Small farmers In 2003, quinoa was grown by subsistence farmers and their 
families. On average, they had a production area of 0.25 hectare, yielding about 
400 kg annually. They consumed most of this themselves, leaving a small surplus 
to sell. The farmers sold directly to local collectors, or to collectors who worked 
Figure 6.19 The quinoa value chain in the southern Altiplano, 2003
Trader 
(“collector”)
Foreign 
consumer
Local 
consumer
Quinoa
Cash Payment
Processor/
exporter 
(Irupana)
Farmer
Inputs, advice
Cash advance
Quinoa
Payment (cash, in kind)
Product
Money
Services, information
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for farmers’ associations or private 
enterprises that buy large volumes 
of quinoa year-round. The farmers 
received payments in cash or in kind 
(seeds, food). Low soil fertility limits 
productivity. With almost no roads in 
the area, and without a secure market 
outlet, there was little incentive for the 
farmers to try to increase production. 
They also had no technical assistance 
and limited access to market informa-
tion (prices, volumes and other related 
issues). Their total annual income was 
about US $1,684 from various sources 
(selling potatoes, quinoa or working 
occasionally as labourers).
The stages in the quinoa harvest cycle 
include sowing, harvesting, threshing, winnowing and drying. Sowing begins 
in September and can last until the end of October. Abundant rains in January, 
February and March allow the crop to grow fast and yield well. Harvesting starts 
in March/April and is done by the whole family. Winnowing is done by hand 
using a type of sieve and shaking it in the wind.
Traders Traders, also known as “collectors” or acopiadores, go from door to 
door to buy dried quinoa from farmers they have verbal agreements  with. These 
agreements cover the quantity, quality, forms of payment, price and delivery 
terms. The traders operate in areas where farmers do not have their own trans-
port. Farmers with a lot of grain to sell have almost no choice but to sell it at the 
prices fixed by the traders. Some traders also buy from local markets. They are 
well-informed about market conditions and they have good contacts and rela-
tionships with farmers, farmers’ associations and production companies. Their 
working capital ranges from $5,000 to $50,000, and consists of their own savings 
or money borrowed from family members. 
Irupana Irupana was started in 1987 by an entrepreneur with a strong sense that 
organic products were the way of the future. The company began by stimulating 
organic coffee production in the Irupana region (about 70 km east of La Paz), 
and grew to the point that it offered about 80 different products. Eventually, the 
company ran into financial difficulties, partly because its product range was so 
wide. In 2003, the company underwent a major reorganization. It cut back on its 
product range and decided to focus mainly on organic quinoa and amaranth for 
export. 
Why did Irupana decide to focus on organic quinoa? The company carried out 
5 years of research into the demand for organic quinoa in Europe and the USA, 
and hired two international experts to prepare a marketing report. It participated 
in several major international trade fairs in Germany, France and the USA to ex-
Figure 6.20 The quinoa production area 
that supplies Irupana
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plore the market. It found that international demand was almost exclusively for 
certified organic quinoa. The prices for organic quinoa were rising every year in 
response to the growing demand for health products. In 2005, the organic quinoa 
market (Bolivian and export market combined) was worth $5 million. Prices for 
organic and fair trade quinoa were about $1,200–1,300 per ton. It is hard to esti-
mate how stable this market is, because so far demand has continued to increase. 
New markets are opening up, such as in Venezuela. By June 2008, the price was 
$107 per quintal (1 quintal = 46 kg), or above $2,300 per ton.
Irupana now produces organic quinoa products such as cereals and bars for the 
local market, and bulk organic quinoa for the export market. The export of An-
dean cereals has become its core business, and the company’s growth depends 
on it being able to source the raw materials. In 2003, increasing its production of 
organic quinoa products meant finding more farmers, in addition to its regular 
suppliers, who would be willing to become certified for organic production. 
Irupana buys its raw material from traders, but it also has verbal agreements to 
buy from small farmers directly. The agreements with farmers cover the quan-
tity, quality, forms of payment, price determination and delivery methods. They 
sometimes include the provision of some production inputs (such as seeds and 
organic insecticides) to farmers, a cash advance to help finance production, and 
technical advice on organic production.
Figure 6.21 Quinoa is used in a wide variety of health foods
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Going organic 
For a company to be able to meet consumer demand for organic products, it 
needs to be able to rely on regular suppliers. Because organic standards are so 
demanding, there tends to be a limited number of producers who can meet these 
standards. Getting organic certification is a complicated and expensive process. 
Buyers and consumers of organic products demand a lot of information to assure 
that the product is truly organic. This means that the chain needs to be highly 
integrated, with good information flows all the way down the chain. 
Irupana’s decision to start trading in organic quinoa products only meant greater 
demand for organic quinoa, and therefore changes in production processes and 
in the value chain. In order to expand organic production, a number of problems 
needed to be addressed:
Farmers
•	 Costs of certification The certification process, in which specialists check 
that farmers use the right inputs and treat the land according to organic stand-
ards, can take 3–5 years. The costs of this process can be prohibitive for small 
farmers with little working capital. For example, individual certification costs 
about $300 per hectare, which is almost 20% of the farmer’s yearly income.
•	 Costs of organic production The costs of changing to an organic farming 
system are high for small farmers. Organic farming requires special inputs, 
such as biological control agents and bio-insecticides, which require special 
equipment to apply. Farmers also needed to invest in upgrading their post-
harvest facilities, for example by getting new grading and winnowing equip-
ment. 
•	 Knowledge and information The organic market’s strict requirements 
related to quality, certification, and transparency could not be easily met by 
small farmers. The farmers had little knowledge about appropriate technolo-
gies and no access to technical assistance. They wanted a firm contract and 
secure prices.
Traders 
•	 Access to working and investment capital The traders that Irupana works 
with needed capital to invest in making their storage facilities compliant with 
organic standards. They also needed working capital to pay farmers in cash 
for their organic quinoa.
Irupana
•	 Matching supply with market demand Irupana faced a growing demand 
for its organic products from the export market. Small farmers, cultivating an 
average production area of 0.25 ha, had average yields of just 400 kg a year. 
Irupana calculated that it needed about 2,000 kg per farmer to satisfy market 
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demand, and would need to increase the number of farmers supplying certi-
fied grain.
•	 Lack of working capital Irupana’s decision to focus on organic products 
was sound – organic production is a profitable business – but it required 
major investments. Following the company’s reorientation towards organic 
quinoa and amaranth, it spent a lot of money on improving the existing plant 
and buying the equipment it needed. As a result, Irupana no longer had the 
working capital to expand their operations and meet the growing market 
demand. 
Irupana approached several banks looking for a loan, but its financial statements 
at that time were not attractive to commercial banks. Moreover, the new busi-
ness model had not yet proven itself. Irupana needed another type of financial 
institution to come on board: one that does not look at the past (the financial state-
ments), but rather at the future (the business plan). Irupana needed a financial 
institution that believed in the business and that would be willing to become a 
risk-taking partner.
Bringing innovation to the chain
In 2003, Irupana decided to approach Pro-rural, a financial institute that sup-
ports small and medium enterprises in Bolivia (Box 6.5). It explained that it 
had an unmet market demand for organic quinoa and wanted to start sourcing 
organic quinoa from small farmers in the south Altiplano. Pro-rural agreed to 
help strengthen the value chain under its “temporary joint venture” fund. Start-
ing in 2004, Pro-rural began providing support to the three main actors in the 
quinoa chain.
Temporary joint venture with Irupana
Temporary joint ventures (Box 6.6) are suitable for financing start-ups that lack 
working capital, hard collateral and experience in business. As a company that 
had just changed its core business, Irupana was in a similar position. 
The first such joint venture between Pro-rural and Irupana was established in 
2004 for a period of 14 months, with a total investment of $150,000 from Pro-rural 
(60%) and slightly over $100,000 (40%) from Irupana. The funds were to be used to 
buy organic quinoa from suppliers and sell it on the export market. The 14-month 
time period was related with the commercial cycle of the business. The operation 
was successful, and Pro-rural received a return on investment of 8.7%. 
A second, 36-month, temporary joint venture was set up in 2005. This time 
Pro-rural invested $250,000, giving it a 48% share in the company, and Irupana 
contributed $272,000 (52%). As minority shareholder, Pro-rural reduced its risk. 
The return on investment was 8.1%. Both these financing operations allowed the 
company to capitalize and improve its financial performance and statements. 
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These partnerships ( in Figure 6.22 and Table 6.7) enabled Pro-rural to provide 
financial inputs without giving Irupana a loan, so avoided burdening the com-
pany with a large debt in its financial statements, and helping with cash flow. 
The risks were also shared. Pro-rural had a vested interest in making sure the 
business would succeed. As a shareholder in the joint venture, Pro-rural had 
insights into what was going on in the business and a major say on the transac-
tions it was partially financing. 
Temporary joint ventures with traders
Pro-rural used a similar approach by going into temporary joint ventures with 
traders ( in Figure 6.22 and Table 6.7). One example is Don Lino, a small-scale 
producer who decided to become a trader as well (Box 6.7). Pro-rural formed a 
temporary joint venture with him for a period of 10 months: Don Lino contributed 
$20,775, while Pro-rural invested $20,000, taking a 49% share in the enterprise. 
Don Lino used the money to buy organic quinoa, which he then sold to Irupana 
for export. After 10 months, he and Pro-rural shared the profits; the return on 
investment was 9.8%. The initial investment was converted into a loan, which Don 
Lino repaid over a 3-month period at an interest rate of 8%. Pro-rural repeated 
this approach with three other traders as well.
Start-up capital and technical assistance for farmers
The Inter-American Foundation (a US government donor agency) donated 
$300,000 for Pro-rural to invest in infrastructure, equipment, technical assist-
ance and organic certification for farmers ( in Figure 6.22). Of this sum, 41% 
was spent on fixed assets such as winnowing and grading equipment, weighing 
scales and silos. This was a 3-year programme from 2004 to 2007; in the first year, 
a farmer could get a grant covering half the cost of a new machine. In the second 
Box 6.5 Pro-rural
Pro-rural is a financial institution that specializes in working with small start-up businesses 
that are generating revenues but are not yet profitable. It provides them with necessary 
capital and organizes technical assistance, such as support in managing the business or 
setting up an accounting system.
Pro-rural believes that intervening with financial and non-financial services will reinvigorate 
rural economies. It believes that small and medium enterprises and small farmers’ associa-
tions have a critical role to play in the Bolivian economy. It brings the principle of risk capital 
(usually associated with high interest rates and big business) to address rural development 
issues, providing seed money, start-up capital or starting temporary joint ventures. 
Pro-rural’s temporary joint ventures fund (a type of venture-capital fund) was set up 2001 
to provide enterprises with early-stage capital. This fund has an investment portfolio of $1.5 
million, a $4.42 million credit portfolio, and seed and start-up capital of $600,000.
More information: www.prorural.org.bo
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year, the same farmer could qualify for a second grant covering 30% of the cost 
of more equipment. 
Some 36% of the $300,000 was spent on co-financing technical assistance to farmers 
to overcome major bottlenecks in productivity, quality management and certifica-
tion. To get this assistance, the farmers were required to make a 50% contribution 
to the cost. The assistance was provided by Irupana technicians, who were able to 
advise farmers on which equipment to acquire because they were familiar with 
the situation on the ground. 
Irupana also offered the farmers a 20% premium for organic quinoa to ensure they 
met the quality standards of organic production and to retain them as regular 
suppliers in a very competitive market.
Box 6.6 Temporary joint ventures
Venture capital is equity investment made, typically in less mature companies, for the 
launch, early development or expansion of a business. Conventional venture capital focuses 
on businesses that need over $1 million and that target urban areas, services or exports. 
Smaller scale businesses such as Bolivia’s rural and semi-urban entrepreneurs cannot find 
the risk capital they need. Traditional credit is too restrictive: it requires hard collateral and 
entails monthly repayment obligations and high interest rates.
Because most of Pro-rural’s clients are small-scale farmers and their associations, Pro-rural 
started looking for an alternative to traditional loans. In 2001, It started testing temporary 
joint ventures. This approach has been used by three other institutions in Bolivia, but Pro-
rural is the only one to engage in temporary joint ventures with small-scale farmers and 
their organizations.
The term “temporary” refers to the fact that the joint venture is set up for a short, fixed 
period. The period depends on the commercial cycle of the business: typically, it may last 
one business cycle, from when the trader first buys the crop to when he or she has sold it 
to the next actor in the chain. Through a joint venture agreement, Pro- rural and its partner 
combine their expertise and resources to develop a particular business. It may be thought 
of as a partnership that exists only for this specific project. The parties involved maintain 
their separate business and financial identities, and they do not register as an enterprise. 
The parties need clearly defined terms in order to avoid unpleasant surprises in mid-project. 
The agreement must provide a comprehensive road map of the duties and obligations of 
both the parties and also the profit shares. The business plan is the key instrument to fol-
low up the operation.
A joint venture involves sharing money and risks, and sometimes sensitive information. Pro-
rural’s involvement is not just financial. Whenever necessary, Pro-rural adds value to the 
partnership by bringing in technology, accounting software or technical assistance projects. 
All these factors contribute to the strength and sustainability of the business, so decrease 
risk. Pro-rural also supports community development: for example, it helped Irupana import 
300 solar panels from India for highland communities.
One farmer sums up the Pro-rural’s contribution: “Why do I have to share the profit with 
Pro-rural, which just sits there? Then I realized that they were my partners, they were in-
vesting their money, time, technology and know-how…They were just like me, or maybe 
more than me.”

6 Unleashing investments in the chain
Dissolving the partnership
In February 2009, Pro-rural stepped out of its partnership with Irupana. Irupana 
had become bankable; it is now a solid company. It anyway now needs more 
capital than Pro-rural can provide. Irupana had some interest in a permanent joint 
venture, but Pro-rural is not interested at this time because long-term investments 
require a different type of know-how.
Risk analysis
Why did Pro-rural trust Irupana to manage the joint venture well, given that the 
firm was in financial difficulties when it came to Pro-rural? Why did Pro-rural 
not consider it necessary to give Irupana technical assistance, in financial man-
agement for example? 
Irupana was able to provide Pro-rural with soft collateral in the form of export and 
purchase contracts. In the case of the joint venture with the collector Don Lino, 
Pro-rural had a purchase contract from Irupana to Don Lino as soft collateral. In 
addition, Pro-rural knew that selling organic quinoa was a good business to be in. 
Pro-rural first looks to see if a business shows promise. In the case of the farmers, 
technical assistance was necessary to increase their productivity and quality.
Pro-rural’s financial interventions are not secured by hard collateral. Instead, it 
looks at the performance of the value chain as a whole, weighing the strengths 
Box 6.7 Organic quinoa revives the local economy
“Before Irupana came here, the town was dead. Now we have revived.” 
Doña Lidia, an Aymara woman from Sevaruyo, grows organic quinoa with her husband, 
Don Lino, in the southern Altiplano. “Growing quinoa was not secure. We were never sure 
how much we would earn, so we just grew enough for our family. A lot of people left the 
area, but now they are returning here to work and benefit from the good prices for organic 
quinoa.” 
For these small-scale farmers, growing quinoa without chemicals was natural. “It was what 
our parents did”, says Doña Lidia. “With conventional quinoa production, the Pachamama 
(mother Earth) suffers within 3 years. We fumigate with organic products to defend our 
Pachamama.” 
Her husband, Don Lino, decided to go into business as a collector, in addition to growing 
quinoa. He approached Pro-rural with his idea. Pro-rural set up a temporary joint venture 
with Don Lino so that he would have access to working capital to buy quinoa to trade. 
Don Lino and Doña Lidia also benefited from the Pro-rural/Inter-American Foundation start-
up capital fund: they bought a grading machine.
“The grading machine was expensive. We were able to buy it because we contributed half 
of the cost price. Now, we also have a quinoa depot”, explains Doña Lidia. “Production is 
increasing, we have secure markets, and many of us have already bought tractors.”
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of the chain against the risk. The key factors that help Pro-rural control the risk 
in the organic quinoa chain are:
•	 As a partner in the joint ventures, Pro-rural became a chain actor. It shared 
in the risk and had access to all the information necessary to monitor the per-
formance of the chain. Pro-rural had a say in decision-making and an inside 
view of what was really going on.
•	 Pro-rural was involved at all three levels of the chain: at producer, trader 
and processor level. It had information on performance and progress at all 
stages.
•	 Irupana paid an additional price premium of 20% above the spot market price, 
earning the loyalty and commitment of its suppliers.
•	 Irupana’s management demonstrated its capacity to deal with the problems 
and risks of quinoa production and export. Irupana maintained close relation-
ships with the other actors in the chain. 
Table 6.8 summarizes the risks involved in the quinoa value chain.
Benefits
Farmers The average farmer’s annual income has risen dramatically. Produc-
tion and quality have both increased. With an assured market, each family now 
produces an average of 8 ha of quinoa (compared to just 0.25 ha before). Yields 
average 0.78 t/ha (though may vary from 0.4 to 1 t/ha). The average price is Bs 12 
per kilogram, resulting in a gross income of Bs 74,800 a year in 2007, or $10,389, 
compared to just $1,684 from all sources in 2004.
Figure 6.22 The quinoa value chain after Pro-rural’s intervention 
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Pro-rural–Irupana joint ventures 
( in Figure 6.22)
Pro-rural joint venture with trader 
Don Lino ( in Figure 6.22)
Product and financial flows
Purpose
First joint venture (2004): Buy or-
ganic quinoa and sell it for export
Second joint venture (2005–8): 
Store and sell organic quinoa
Store and sell organic quinoa
Amount
First joint venture: $250,000 (60% 
Pro-rural, 40% Irupana)
Second joint venture: $522,000 
(48% Pro-rural, 52% Irupana)
$20,000 (49% Pro-rural, 51% 
trader)
Period
First joint venture: 14 months
Second joint venture: 36 months
10 months
Disburse-
ment Each party maintains own account Each party maintains own account
Repayment Profits shared at end of joint ven-ture period
Profits shared at end of joint ven-
ture period
Interest rate
Return on investment:
First joint venture: 8.7%
Second joint venture: 8.1%
Return on investment = 9.8%
Risk management
Securitiza-
tion Export contracts Contracts with Irupana
Liability Joint Joint
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
Sale contracts (business with 
growth potential)
Previous year’s sales (at least 
$20,000)
Minimum contribution by partner 
of 51%
Net assets similar or bigger 
Business plan, identity documents
Authorization by partner’s Board, 
legal representation of the firm 
specifically for joint venture
Legal bureau report detailing part-
ner’s debts and overdue payments
Sale contracts (business with 
growth potential)
Previous year’s sales (at least 
$20,000)
Minimum contribution by partner 
of 51%
Net assets similar or bigger 
Business plan, identity documents
Authorization by trader, legal rep-
resentation of the firm specifically 
for joint venture
Legal bureau report detailing part-
ner’s debts and overdue payments
Information 
required dur-
ing season
Monitoring reports (business plan)
Investment agreement
Monitoring reports (business plan)
Investment agreement
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
1–2 months 1–2 months
Table 6.7 Pro-rural’s joint ventures with Irupana and a quinoa trader in Bolivia
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Traders In the same period, the trader Don Lino Valez increased his volume 
from 275 tons to 483 tons, and sales from $90,000 to $150,000.
Irupana Irupana increased the amount of quinoa it handled from just under 700 
tons in 2003 to nearly 2,600 tons in 2005. Its sales rose from $210,000 to $810,000 in 
the same period, and its assets rose by 70%, from $890,000 to $1.5 million. Irupana 
became bankable: it can now get loans from commercial banks, and has risen from 
being the fifth largest exporter of organic quinoa in Bolivia to second place.
Pro-rural. Pro-rural had a good client in Irupana and the traders. Irupana has 
graduated from its need to rely on Pro-rural, and the joint ventures have been 
completed. Pro-rural continues to have smooth working relationships with qui-
noa traders.
The chain The number of farmers involved in organic quinoa production in-
creased from 217 in 2004 to 391 in 2007. The total production of organic quinoa 
tripled from 10,500 quintals in 2004–5 to 29,000 quintals in 2006–7.
Challenges
Pro-rural is no longer involved in this value chain. The challenge for the chain 
actors is to continue to function at the same level of efficiency as during the 4 
years of Pro-rural’s intervention.
Pro-rural is planning to replicate the model in other value chains: for wild cocoa, 
amaranth, sesame and wool.
Pro-rural is also replicating the model of value chain financing with farmers’ as-
sociations and indigenous groups so it can compare the experiences and identify 
the key elements to increase the value share of indigenous farmers. A challenge 
will be to maintain innovativeness and efficiency. The idea is that farmers’ associa-
tions would look after product processing, marketing and exports. Four farmers’ 
associations have approached Pro-rural with a request to go into a joint venture 
to set up a rural investment fund. One of these is a quinoa farmers’ association.
lessons
Suitability of temporary joint ventures Temporary joint venture capital is 
suitable for financing a start-up company where there is a lack of working capi-
tal, hard collateral and experience with business. The business has to have clear 
potential for growth, and the partner has to be able to put up at least half of the 
capital required. Subsidies in the form of grants from the Inter-American Founda-
tion also played a role in the development of the organic quinoa chain and may 
be necessary for some start-up initiatives. 
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Financial and technical support mix The combination of financial and non-
financial services such as technical support met the needs of the actors in the 
organic quinoa value chain. 
Becoming a chain actor By taking on the role of co-owner, an investor increases 
the chances that the chain will be successful. A co-owner participates in decision-
making and assumes risks and challenges, in addition to investing resources.
Flexibility Both Pro-rural and Irupana had to adapt to changing conditions and 
learn how to work as part of the joint venture. 
Duration It took Pro-rural about 3 years of partnership with the quinoa chain 
actors to achieve results. This period was necessary to see change and the impact 
of the intervention, and to allow chain relationships to stabilize.
More information
Maria Renée Bejarano, renee.bejarano@gmail.com
PRO-RURAL, prorural@prorural.org.bo 
www.prorural.org.bo
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Crop quality, 
quantity and pro-
ductivity
Project financed by Inter-American 
Foundation
Price Market price fluctuations Price fixed when contracts are signed
Default
Farmers do not 
honour agree-
ment
Close relationship with partners
Sales to third 
parties 20% premium paid to farmers by Irupana
Currency Exchange rates
Other
Farmers demand 
more benefits or 
better conditions
Close relationships with farmers’ leaders
Social investment in communities (such 
as supplying solar panels)
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 6.8 Risk analysis for the quinoa chain in Bolivia
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Financing artisanal 
fishing in India
dragging the Boat onto the beach at Tharangambadi is hard work. It was a good catch last night, and the boat is full of fish: big, silver, seer fish, weigh-
ing perhaps 5 kg each, as well as smaller skipjack tuna, around 2 kg each. There 
is nearly a ton of fish in the bottom of the boat. A crowd of villagers gathers in 
the early morning sun to help the five crew pull the boat up the sand and unload 
the fish into crates. Soon there is a stream of people carrying crates of fish up the 
beach to a building on the shore. They heave the crates onto an electronic scale, 
and a man notes on a form the type of fish, the weight and the owner. 
Tharangambadi is one of many fishing villages that dot the coast in Nagapatti-
nam district, in Tamil Nadu, southern India. The building belongs to the village 
fishermen’s society, one of such 150 societies affiliated to the Trivandrum-based 
South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS, Box 6.8). When the fish 
Figure 6.23 Smaller fish are auctioned on the beach (left). More valuable fish are taken 
for weighing before they are sold (right)
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Box 6.8 South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies 
(SIFFS)
SIFFS is the apex body of a three-tier structure of autonomous organizations of small-scale 
fisherfolk. These organizations are based in coastal districts in Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu, Pondicherry and Andhra Pradesh in southern India. SIFFS is the result of major 
church NGO initiatives that began in 1970. A large number of NGOs worked independently 
and in concert to create new cooperative institutions for the fishermen. SIFFS developed 
in several phases:
1970–80 The first phase saw the creation of a model village society that gave the fisher-
men control over beach-level fish marketing and enhanced their incomes through better 
fish prices and reduced outflows to moneylenders and middlemen. This model gradually 
spread to neighbouring districts. At this time, SIFFS facilitated its members to get small 
loans through microfinance institutions.
1980–90 The district and regional federations were formed, followed by the apex organiza-
tion, covering the whole of southern India, in 1982. These higher-level structures enabled 
greater economies of scale in managing inputs and markets. They also developed and 
promoted new technologies such as improved boats and motors. SIFFS also developed 
revolving funds and added boat financing to its services.
Since 1990 Boatyards, outboard motor services and ice plants have been developed, and 
SIFFS has started to provide credit. In 1996 SIFFS took up “livelihood financing” to free the 
fishing community from their reliance on moneylenders, middlemen and merchants. It then 
started offering other financial services such as investment and working capital.
SIFFS’s services reach nearly 100,000 families, or a total population of about 400,000 (Figure 
6.24). At the base level are over 150 village fishermen’s societies that function like coop-
eratives. They market fish caught by their members, and cater to the financial requirements 
of over 45,000 fisherfolk. SIFFS serves 9,000 fishing boats, each with 4–5 crew. 
SIFFS has 10,000 women members, many of them fish vendors, grouped in over 170 fish-
erwomen’s societies. It offers them credit and post-harvest technical support. 
The fishermen’s societies are affiliated to five independent district or regional federations 
which monitor and support the village activities. They also undertake a number of commer-
cial, technical, educational and welfare activities. The fisherwomen’s societies are affiliated 
to women’s federations which work in partnership with the men’s federations.
At the apex level, SIFFS focuses on technology for small-scale fish workers and assists in the 
coordination and management of the district federations. One example is a marine plywood 
boat produced and disseminated by SIFFS after a decade of research and development. 
This design is stable, even in high waves, can land on the beach, and can be equipped with 
an outboard motor (another major improvement to the fishing techniques). 
The apex body collects market data and publishes information on the small-scale fishing 
sector. It also focuses on the marine fish resource management and safety for small-scale 
fishermen. The government covers the costs of a pilot market information service. Donor 
grants have funded research and development activities and policy research, but SIFFS is 
increasingly paying for these activities out of its own funds.
SIFFS collaborates with government agencies such as the Marine Products Export Develop-
ment Authority, the Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, and the Central Institute of 
Fishing Technology. These provide services such as information on improved technologies 
and fishing trends, export promotion, and subsidized crates and ice boxes.
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have been weighed, society employees grade and sort the fish by species and size. 
They spread a layer of crushed ice on the concrete floor and lay the glistening 
fish down on top. They add another layer of ice, then more fish, and so on until 
there is a big mound of fish in the middle of the room.
Auctioning fish
The merchants have started arriving to inspect the fish. There are ten merchants 
in the village, well known to everyone present, and they all want to buy fish to 
take to Chennai, 400 km along the coast to the north, or even to Bangalore or 
Trivandrum, both 700 km away. They already know how much fish of what type 
is available: the society staff have informed them. 
At 8 o’clock, the society auctioneer takes charge. He starts off with the bigger seer 
fish, above 3 kg. “Who will offer 150 rupees per kilo?” he calls. The merchants start 
Figure 6.24 Services provided by different levels of SIFFS
Apex body
Boatbuilding & repair
Ice making
Motor sales & repair
Research & info
Technol devel
Fish marketing
Credit
5 district 
or regional 
federations
174 fisher-
women’s 
societies
153 village 
fishermen’s 
societies
Fish marketing
Credit and savings
Support to fisher-
women’s groups
Support to 
village societies
Fish marketing
Liaison with banks 
and donors
Insurance & welfareWelfare
Fish 
vendors
Fishermen Families
100,000 families
400,000 people
9,000 fishing boats, 
each with 4–5 crew 
members
10,000 women 
members
Advocacy & lobbying 
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bidding against each other. Someone 
offers Rs 160, then another merchant 
bids Rs 180. The bidding goes on until 
the final price of Rs 270 ($5.40) – a good 
price. Then the auctioneer sells the 
smaller seer fish, then the tuna. 
The merchant’s workers load the fish 
and more ice into a lorry, and by 10 
o’clock, the lorry is ready to leave for 
the city wholesale market.
When all the fish have been weighed, 
the owner takes the completed form 
and his society account passbook into 
an office in the same building. The clerk 
there calculates how much the fish are 
worth, deducts 10–15% to cover loan 
repayments and 5% to cover expenses. 
This 5% consists of 2% to cover the 
village society’s expenses, 1% for the 
district federation, and another 2% for 
compulsory savings that goes into the 
fisherman’s account. 
Figure 6.26 Fish value chain before SIFFS’s intervention
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Figure 6.25 SIFFS serves fisherfolk in 
coastal areas in southern 
India
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The clerk makes a note of the transaction in the passbook and in the society’s ac-
count book. Then she opens the strongbox by her desk and carefully counts out 
a wad of rupee notes and gives them to the owner.
On some days none of the merchants bids the society’s minimum price. Then the 
society itself will market the fish. SIFFS staff collect information on prices in major 
wholesale markets every day, and the village society can call to find out today’s 
price, or check it on the SIFFS website. If the price is right, the society will hire 
a lorry and take the fish to the wholesale market. The merchants know this, and 
they can check the prices on the website themselves, so it is fairly rare – perhaps 
twice a month – that the society has to market the fish.
Seer fish and tuna are table fish that fetch a premium price. For smaller or lower-
quality fish such as mackerel, sardines and anchovies, there is an auction on the 
beach. Women vendors gather round the piles of fish and bid for lots (the fish 
have not been weighed, but everyone is good at judging how heavy they are). The 
society auctioneer manages the sale: he notes the names or each buyer and seller 
and the amount agreed, and collects the money from the buyer. The fisherman 
selling the fish gets a chit with this information, then goes to the office to pick up 
his cash (minus the same deductions as for the premium fish).
Figure 6.27 Value chain after SIFFS’s intervention
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The fish value chain
Fishing is very important in India. The fisheries sector is the source of livelihood for 
900,000 fishermen and 800,000 workers in allied activities in poor fishing villages, 
and provides jobs and income to many others not directly involved in fishing. It 
produces cheap, nutritious food for millions, stimulates related industries, and 
generates foreign exchange. 
Marketing fish in Tharangambadi and other villages was not always like this. In 
the old system, before the society got involved in fish marketing, the value chain 
had seven main stakeholders: fishermen, middlemen, merchants, wholesalers/
exporters, retailers, fish vendors and consumers. The fishermen sold their catch 
individually to middlemen (local people who advanced money to the fishermen 
in return for taking control of the catch when it was landed) or merchants (bulk 
traders who bought fish on the beach). The middlemen and merchants sold on 
the fish to wholesalers or exporters, who in turn sold to retailers, who marketed 
to the consumers. This chain is shown as  in Figure 6.26.
The fishermen also sold their catch to fish vendors ( in Figure 6.26). Most of 
these are women – often the wives and daughters of the fishermen. They sell 
these fish in the local markets, or carry them in baskets to surrounding villages 
to sell them door to door.
This system was underpinned by moneylenders: local people who gave loans to 
the fishermen and the fish vendors at interest rates varying from 36% to 120% a 
year, or in return for 10% of the catch just to pay the interest on the loan. They 
also lent to middlemen and merchants at lower interest rates.
This system severely disadvantaged the fishermen and women vendors. The inter-
est rates and fees charged by moneylenders were high. Without a conventional 
source of investment credit to pay for boats or to maintain equipment, and with 
no working capital, many borrowers found themselves trapped in debt. Their 
income varied with the size of catches and the daily prices. Fishing is a danger-
ous occupation, with accidents and deaths all too common, and the fishermen 
had no form of insurance. SIFFS was established to help fishermen overcome 
these problems.
Revising the value chain
The new value chain built by SIFFS (Figure 6.27) empowers the fishermen and 
the women vendors through a series of financial services. Instead of the money-
lenders, SIFFS provides various forms of finance to village societies of fishermen 
and -women. It is able to do this because it can access loans from development 
finance organizations and commercial banks. The whole system is supported by 
information flows managed by SIFFS. 
SIFFS and its member societies offer seven types of business service: organized 
fish sales, debt redemption, production loans, women’s working capital, seasonal 
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loans, insurance, and an old age security savings scheme (Tables 6.9 and 6.10). 
We will examine these one by one.
Organized fish sales
The auction system described above gives the fishermen better prices than they 
would get by selling individually. The system is transparent (everyone sees how 
much the fish weigh, and anyone can bid to buy), and payment is immediate ( 
in Figure 6.27).
Under the new system, the middlemen may buy on behalf of people who can-
not attend the auction. If they do this, they take 10–15% commission on the sale 
value.
Investment loans
Fishermen’s assets tend to have a short life. Nets tear, boats leak, engines break 
down. The village society loans money to individual fishermen to cover these 
costs – between Rs 10,000 and Rs 100,000 ($200–$2,000). A fisherman is allowed 
to borrow up to 25% of the value of his previous year’s catch and is required to 
repay the principal plus interest (12%) within 42 months ( in Figure 6.27 and 
the first column of Table 6.9).
The borrower must begin repaying the loan immediately: the society deducts 10% 
of the value of the daily catch. If the catch is lower than expected, the repayments 
are correspondingly lower. Each month, the society calculates whether the bor-
rower has repaid enough. If not, he can increase the amount deducted (say, 15% of 
the catch instead of 10%) or can make up the balance at the end of the month. 
Interest is calculated on the balance of the loan remaining. The repayment rate 
is assessed on the basis of the 36-month repayment period on an equal monthly 
instalment basis. 
Figure 6.28 Interest rates paid for loans by different levels in SIFFS
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Fishermen’s investment loan ( 
in Figure 6.27)
Fisherwomen’s working capital 
loan ( in Figure 6.27)
Product and financial flows
Purpose Acquire/replace fishing equipment Working capital for fish vending and petty trades
Amount
Rs 5,000–100,000 ($100–$2,000)
9,715 loans totalling Rs 269.3 mil-
lion ($5.4 million)
Average = Rs 28,000 ($560)
Rs 2,000–30,000 ($40–$600)
8,336 loans totalling Rs 50.4 million 
($1 million)
Average = Rs 6,000 ($120)
Period
42 months 12–24 months
Disburse-
ment
Directly to borrower through village 
society
Directly to borrower through village 
society
Repayment 36 instalments Daily
Interest rate 12% 16%
Transaction 
costs Upfront fee: Rs 20 ($0.40) per loan Upfront fee: Rs 10 ($0.20) per loan
Risk management
Securitiza-
tion
Borrower must be active member 
of society
Formal collateral not required; 
informal social pressure used to 
assure repayment
As last resort, boats or equipment 
may be confiscated
Borrower must be active member 
of society
Formal collateral not required; 
informal social pressure used to 
assure repayment
Liability Society and individual borrower Society and individual borrower
Information flows
Information 
required to 
apply
Application form
Society’s assessment of individual 
needs
Assessment of previous 12 
months’ catch
History of previous loans
Screened at village, district and 
apex levels before funds are trans-
ferred from apex to village funds 
for disbursement to applicant
Application form
Society’s assessment of individual 
needs
History of previous loans
Screened at village, district and 
apex levels before funds are trans-
ferred from apex to village funds 
for disbursement to applicant
Information 
required dur-
ing season
Monthly financial statement con-
tains borrowers’ catch details and 
financial status
Time lag 
between ap-
plication and 
payment
Under 2 weeks Under 2 weeks
Table 6.9 SIFFS loans to members in India
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A borrower is considered to be in default if he is unable to repay the loan within 
the 42 months. If the catches are higher than expected, the borrower can pay off 
the loan earlier without penalty. Over 50% of the fishermen do this, while another 
25% pay on time. The remaining 25% are delayed, in which case the repayment 
will be rescheduled.
The village society pays the amount collected each month to the district federation, 
which pays it to the SIFFS headquarters. This transfer process enables the SIFFS 
apex body to approve fresh loans every month, so recycling the funds.
The apex body borrows money from different sources at an average rate of 7% 
(Figure 6.28, Table 6.11). It charges 10% interest when it lends to the district 
federation. The interest margin of 3% (10% minus 7%) is among the lowest for a 
microfinance institute in India. One percent covers the apex body’s microfinance 
operations, and the remaining 2% covers loan losses.
The district federation lends money to the village society at 12% interest. The 
margin of 2% (12% minus 10%) is used to cover its expenses. The village society 
also lends to its members at the same rate: 12%. It covers its costs through its 3% 
levy on fish sales, so does not need to charge extra for loans.
Debt redemption loans
Many fishermen in India are heavily indebted to middlemen who lend cash in 
return for taking control of the catch. These middlemen charge high rates of 
commission: 10–15% of the daily catch – however big – and the borrower never 
has a chance to pay off the principal. The fishermen need cash, so borrow again, 
Debt redemption 
loan 
Insurance (group 
basis) 
Seasonal loan 
Product and financial flows
Purpose
Repayment of debt 
with middlemen
Death, permanent 
disability
Working capital for 
women with excellent 
performance histories
Amount
Rs 5,000–40,000 
($100–$800)
Rs 75,000 ($1,500): 
death or permanent 
disability
Rs 35,000 ($700): 
partial disability
8,821 beneficiaries
Rs 10,000–25,000 
($200–$500)
1,326 loans of Rs 31.2 
million ($624,000)
Repayment 36 instalments Yearly premium of Rs 100
Single repayment at 
end of season
Interest rate 12% 16%
Transaction 
costs
Upfront fee: Rs 20 
($0.40) per loan Upfront fee: nil
Upfront fee: Rs 20 
($0.40) per loan
Table 6.10 Other selected SIFFS financial services in India
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driving themselves ever deeper into debt. Such debts can reach Rs 100,000 – a 
huge sum.
To counter this, the society has developed a “debt redemption loan”. The fisher-
man tells the society how much he owes the middleman. The society pays off this 
debt. Then each day, it deducts 10% of the value of the catch from the fisherman’s 
account. It uses this money to pay off the amount the fisherman has borrowed, 
and charges a fixed 12% interest. Typically, a fisherman can pay off the whole 
debt within 2–3 years ( in Figure 70).
Life and disability insurance
Fishing is a risky business. Outboard motors break down at sea, boats capsize, 
and landing on a beach through heavy surf is perilous. To cover these risks, SIFFS 
offers insurance to cover instances of death or permanent disability (such as the 
loss of a hand or leg). It charges a premium of Rs 100 ($2) per year. The scheme 
will pay out Rs 75,000 ($1,500) in case of accidental death or full disability, or Rs 
35,000 ($700) for a natural death or partial disability. This scheme is voluntary, 
but most SIFFS members have signed up ( in Figure 70). Children of people who 
have signed up to the scheme are eligible for a high school educational scholar-
ship worth Rs 1,200 ($24) per year.
SIFFS’s insurance plan is linked to the Janashree Bima Yojana Social Security 
Scheme managed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, a government 
body.
Compulsory savings
In order to inculcate savings habit among the members, a compulsory savings 
scheme is in operation. Every member contributes 2% of the value of the daily 
catch as compulsory savings. Members can withdraw their savings for emergen-
cies such as to cover family expenses during the lean season, to repay loans, etc. 
A minimum balance of Rs 500–3,000 ($10–60) is to be maintained. The society 
holds these savings and uses them as working capital and to provide emergency 
Table 6.11 Sources of loans to SIFFS (cumulative to 2008)
Source
Amount of loan
Interest rate (%)
(million rupees) (million $)
Small Industries Development 
Bank of India
50.3 1.0 8%
Cordaid 20.3 0.4 7%
Commercial banks 90.9 1.8 7.5–9.5%
Own resources and donated 30.0 0.6 0%
Total 191.5 3.8 7%
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assistance to its members. The savings and emergency assistance do not attract 
any interest ( in Figure 6.27). There are no banks or alternative savings institu-
tions in the villages.
Savings for old age security 
As SIFFS members became more aware of the need for savings, they started 
asking the society to provide a savings scheme for old age. SIFFS started such 
a scheme in 2001. Members can sign up to save a minimum of Rs 50 a month, 
or multiples of Rs 50 above that. When they retire from the fishing sector, they 
can get a lump sum consisting of their savings plus interest. The interest rate is 
announced each year; it is typically half a percent more than the interest rate of-
fered by commercial banks for recurring deposits. If a member delays payments 
into the scheme, a penalty of Rs 1 for every Rs 50 is levied. The member has the 
option of withdrawing the amount saved, plus the interest, at the end of every 
fifth year. This savings programme has been a success. At the end of December 
2008, 5,044 members had saved Rs 10 million ($200,000) ( in Figure 6.27).
Services for fish vendors
Women’s working capital
The women vendors need cash to buy the fish auctioned on the beach, and to pay 
for transport and other expenses. These women belong to a fisherwomen’s society, 
affiliated with SIFFS, which handles working capital loans for its members. 
SIFFS provides loans to the village fisherwomen’s societies. The fisherwomen can 
borrow up to Rs 20,000 ($400) from their village society ( in Figure 6.27 and the 
second column in Table 6.9). These are shorter-term loans: loans up to Rs 10,000 
must be repaid within 12 months; larger loans must be repaid within 24 months. 
The borrower repays the loan every day so the borrower does not have a chance 
to spend the money on other items. A society collection agent goes round the 
borrowers’ houses in the evenings to pick up the money and takes the money to 
the village society office. The society office remits the money to SIFFS at the end 
of each month. 
The fisherwomen’s society charges 16% interest on these loans. This includes 
the standard SIFFS 12% interest rate, plus 4% to cover the costs of the society 
(Figure 6.28).
Seasonal loans
Fishing in south India has “lean seasons” when few fish are caught in certain 
areas. During these times, the women may travel hundreds of kilometres to buy 
fish in bulk. They bring this home, salt and dry it so it can be stored, then sell it to 
bridge them over the lean period. For this they need a larger amount of money. 
SIFFS grants loans of Rs 30,000 ($600) to cover this expense. The borrower repays 
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the interest each month, and the principal as a lump sum at the end of the lean 
period ( in Figure 6.27).
Other value chain services
SIFFS provides a wide range of other services to fishing communities in southern 
India.
•	 Boat building and equipment repair SIFFS owns 15 boat-building and repair 
yards and 25 outboard motor service centres. These are run on a commercial 
basis; finance for these comes from a combination of banks and SIFFS’s own 
capital. It is not involved in making nets as this activity is already competitive, 
so no intervention by SIFFS is required. 
•	 Research and development SIFFS develops and promotes improved fishing 
technologies and ways to improve safety at sea.
•	 Fuel supply. SIFFS cooperatives bulk-buy fuel and sells it to their members.
•	 Ice and transport services Apart from the market facilities and auction 
system, SIFFS owns three commercial ice plants to supply ice to the villages. 
It also finances vehicles to transport the fish.
•	 Market information SIFFS provides chain actors with information on market 
prices at various locations.
Box 6.9 A retired fisherman reflects
“I joined the society in 1976 and was an active member until last year. But since then, I 
have not been so active due to ill health. 
“For every 5% that the society collects, it retains 3% for expenses, while the remaining 2% 
goes into our savings. Before the society came into existence, we had no idea at all about 
savings. Now, our savings depend on our catches – the more the catch, the more are our 
savings. 
“I have taken loans from the society 7 or 8 times. We have to contribute Rs 5 ($0.10) towards 
a fund to meet expenses related to a member’s death or retirement. It doesn’t matter where 
the member dies – if a member in Neerodi dies, a contribution can be expected from members 
at Manakudi, and vice-versa. There is a lot of unity and cooperation in the community. 
“Before the society’s formation, whatever price the middlemen fixed was the price we got 
– in the morning there would be one price, while in the evening there would be another. 
After the society introduced the auction system, the price has been steadier. 
“After joining the society, I could easily get loans for machines and gear. All these have 
definitely helped me and my family. I have benefited and grown from being a member in the 
society, and I realize the importance of the SIFFS society for fishermen like me.”
Mr Kamalias, Manakudi village, Tamil Nadu
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Accessing finance
SIFFS obtains funds to support its financial services from various sources. It is 
recognized as a microfinance institution by the Small Industries Development 
Bank of India, which provides financial support for on-lending to fishing com-
munities. After seeing the success of this on-lending, other commercial banks 
started providing support. 
So far, SIFFS has obtained over Rs 161 million ($3.2 million) of loans from various 
development finance organizations and commercial sources at varying interest 
rates (Table 6.11). SIFFS also raises its own money and accepts donations.
As of December 2008, SIFFS had disbursed to its members over 23,000 loans worth 
a total of Rs 326 million ($6.5 million). Some Rs 97.5 million ($1.95 million) is still 
outstanding. The average of all types of loan amounted to Rs 18,360 ($367). 
Risk analysis
The financial institutions and bankers lending to SIFFS do not demand hard col-
lateral. Rather they rely on SIFFS’s strong organizational base and its control over 
the financial flows in the fish chain. The risks of lending are reduced, because 
SIFFS has triangular relationships at various levels of the value chain, through 
which it provides a full package of business services. Here are some examples 
how the risks are reduced (see Table 6.12):
•	 The risk of a member not repaying a loan is low because the fish is marketed 
through the society, and the repayment is deducted right at the source. De-
fault is limited because SIFFS checks how much fish a borrower has caught 
in the previous year, and because fishermen are fond of the auction system: 
it guarantees that prices are transparent and the best possible.
•	 Production risks are limited due to SIFFS’s multiple services which include: 
inputs supplies such as boats, engines, ice and transport, storage facilities, 
marketing support, and insurance. 
•	 Market risks are low because SIFFS controls the auctions and has direct links 
with export houses. By pooling their catch and sending them to distant mar-
kets if local prices are low, the societies can reduce the risk of local merchants’ 
Box 6.10 Investment loans then and now
“At first, we were getting loans up to Rs 5,000 ($100) from the society. Now we can get Rs 
75,000 ($1,500). We use these loans to buy nets and logs of wood for our kattumarams 
(traditional boats). Earlier, we had to rely on middlemen who gave us loans of 5–10 years 
duration. But for a loan of, say, Rs 1,000 ($20), even after 10 years we find ourselves still 
paying the same amount of interest while the middleman retains the original capital.”
Mr Irudhayadhason, Manakudi village, Tamil Nadu
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cartels. If necessary, the society has storage facilities to store surplus fish (2-ton 
ice boxes).
•	 If necessary, SIFFS can use the member’s accumulated savings to cover gaps in 
repayments, during the lean season or in emergencies. Members are obliged to 
save regularly, which gives them a buffer to draw on. There is a moratorium 
of up to 6 months to make it easier for the fishermen to repay on time (bor-
rowers must repay 36 monthly instalments within a period of 42 months).
Through these services and relationships, SIFFS has made it possible for banks 
to lend on the basis of the fishing performance rather than on collateral.
Benefits
Fishermen Instead of being exploited by middlemen and traders, the fisher-
men can get a good market price for their catch. They are able to access loans at 
low interest rates (16% as opposed to 36–120%). They can free themselves from 
permanent debt traps. They can get repeated loans, and can afford to invest in 
new equipment. They can bridge lean seasons, can save for their old age, and are 
insured against death or injury. Women can get microcredit to trade in fish or to 
use for other purposes. Storage facilities have improved with the use of ice and 
ice boxes, leading to lower losses and more stable prices.
Prices of fish have risen by as much as 90% since the fishermen were organized 
into societies (Table 6.13). The combination of higher prices and lower interest 
rates means that the income of each crew member has tripled. For example, in 
Tharangambadi, returns per crew member rose from under Rs 5,100 ($102) per 
Source of risk Risk level Mitigation strategy
Produc-
tion
Lean season Repayment holiday
Migration by 
fishermen away 
from area
Managed by village societies
Price
Oversupply when 
many fish caught
Improve storage facilities
Fish drying
Merchant cartels
Village society bulks produce to sell 
separately
Marketing support
Low prices for 
exportable fish
Contact with export houses to eliminate 
middlemen
Default
Low fish catches Reschedule debt
Accident Loan waiver
Loss of boat, mo-
tor or equipment Equipment insurance
Risk levels:  High  Medium  Low
Table 6.12 Risk analysis for the fish value chain in India
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year to nearly Rs 18,000 ($360) (Table 
6.14).
By organizing in groups to market their 
catch, the fishermen have been empow-
ered. They have freed themselves from 
a debt trap and are able to invest in their 
own futures.
SIFFS SIFFS has expanded as fisher-
men and -women have realized the ben-
efits of membership. Membership rose 
from 3,600 in 2001 to 8,800 in 2008. There 
are now 153 fishermen’s societies and 
174 fisherwomen’s societies all around 
the coasts of south India. SIFFS is now 
an internationally known organization, 
able to access finance from both national and international commercial sources. 
Collaboration with the government has improved. Government agencies now 
want to coordinate their research and extension activities with SIFFS.
SIFFS has increased the range of services it provides to its members. Because it 
controls the marketing of the product, it is assured of repayment. Default rates 
are very low: they occur mainly because of accidents. Delayed payments are 
about 25%, but SIFFS is strong enough to reschedule the debts, charges interest 
on such loans, and has a way of ensuring repayment.
SIFFS’s business activities break even and often generate marginal surpluses; its 
development activities are based on donor support.
The value chain The value chain is now more efficient because fish is sold in 
bulk through the societies. Sales are faster, hygiene has improved, and quality has 
gone up. Links to markets have improved through the organized auction system 
and direct ties from SIFFS to city wholesalers and exporters.
Competition has been introduced into the chain, forcing other buyers to raise 
the prices they pay to non-members too. The whole fishing community benefits. 
SIFFS has its own ice factories, boatyards and outboard repair facilities, forcing 
other entrepreneurs to improve their services. 
Challenges and the future
Loan waivers When the government announces loan waivers in government 
banks and cooperatives, society members want SIFFS to do the same. This un-
dermines SIFFS’s efforts to create a culture of credit repayment. The absence of 
such a culture meant that other credit institutions refused to provide credit to 
fishing communities. However, after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the 
commercial banks and cooperatives waived the loans of fishermen fully (both 
Table 6.13 Fish prices before and af-
ter organizing into fishermen’s society, 
Tharangambadi, Tamil Nadu
Rs
Before After
Seer fish (per kg) 90 170
Tuna (per kg) 15 25
Mackerel (per fish) 6 9
Reef cod (kg) 35 50
Sardines (per 100 fish) 15 35
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principal and interest), SIFFS waived only 6 months’ interest and offered 6 months 
of repayment holiday. SIFFS was successful in collecting 95% of the pre-tsunami 
loans. 
Resource depletion Artisanal fisheries extract a relatively small proportion of 
the fish in an area, so are sustainable and create a large amount of employment. 
Large, mechanized boats take a much larger proportion of the catch and create 
few jobs. They deplete the resource and damage the sea bed. The result is fewer 
fish for poor artisanal fishermen to catch.
Natural calamities Floods, cyclones, and tsunamis are unpredictable and can 
be disastrous for fishing communities. They kill people, damage equipment and 
facilities, and prevent fishermen from going to sea for weeks on end. Global 
warming is likely to change fish stocks.
New financial products SIFFS is planning to introduce an insurance scheme 
for boats and motors. Mainstream insurance companies refuse to insure these 
risks because of mistrust between fishermen and insurance firms. For example, 
if a boat sinks, there is no way of proving the loss to the company. Closer to the 
communities, SIFFS is able to control these risks more readily. It is planning to 
handle individual incidents itself, and to pass on mass claims (for example, due 
to a cyclone) to a mainstream insurer. 
Linking with export houses Prawns, cuttlefish and squid are high-value prod-
ucts with a ready export market in Japan and other countries. Exports are nor-
mally arranged by specialized firms that have agents in fishing areas. However, 
these agents take a large percentage of the value, and often cheat on the weight 
of the product. SIFFS is developing direct links with the export houses to avoid 
this problem. This creates a new issue: the export house pays for the produce 
only after 1 month, tying up a large amount of SIFFS funds. SIFFS is approaching 
several banks to provide credits to facilitate such exports.
Table 6.14 Returns to crew members before and after organizing into fisher-
men’s society, Tharangambadi, Tamil Nadu
Rs $
Before After Before After
Average fish catch 79,412 150,000 1,588 3,000
Loan amount 25,000 25,000 500 500
Interest on loan 9,000 3,000 180 60
Operational expenses 40,000 40,000 800 800
Returns 30,412 107,000 608 2,140
Returns per crew member 5,069 17,833 101 357
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lessons
Controlling the market By controlling the market, SIFFS has been able to raise 
the price of fish its members receive. This is possible only because SIFFS is a suf-
ficiently large (or monopoly) player in each village, and has a sufficiently wide 
geographical coverage that other actors in the chain are forced to trade with it. 
This market power creates resentment among the merchants, who earn far less 
if the fishermen in their village organize as a SIFFS-affiliated society. SIFFS staff 
have been threatened by merchants, and the society has been forced to withdraw 
from some villages for a time. Eventually, however, the merchants have to become 
reconciled with their lower incomes.
Local management It is important to design marketing and other services that 
the local community can manage themselves, after adequate capacity building. 
The societies are run by fishermen and -women themselves. SIFFS provides 
them with training in leadership, management and accounting so they are able 
to manage the village society.
The poor are bankable Small-scale fishermen with highly fluctuating incomes 
can be good clients for a credit programme if they are organized into a strong 
and stable organization. The fish marketing programme generates extra income 
that the society members can save and invest. The poor have multiple financial 
needs: they need to get out of debt traps, they need working capital, money to 
invest in assets, insurance, and so on. SIFFS has found a way to provide all these 
forms of “livelihood finance” by integrating them into a multi-service model and 
spreading the costs over different services and a larger base. That reduces the 
risks inherent in providing large sums and reduces the interest rates SIFFS must 
charge borrowers.
Long-term approach Some development approaches strive to scale up rapidly 
to reach as many people as possible. The SIFFS model combines institutional and 
financial development: it is not possible to provide the financial services without 
a strong local institution. That means rapid expansion is not possible.
Relationship between financial and other processes SIFFS attempts to improve 
the lives of its members by working on many aspects of the value chain: financial 
(loans, insurance, etc.), technical (boat-building, motor servicing, ice-making), 
institutional (the village, district and federal structure of SIFFS, the auction sys-
tem) and social (the village societies of fishermen and -women). SIFFS began its 
work with social mobilization to addressing key issues related to fisheries, then 
moved to finance, marketing and disaster preparedness.
Spreading risk and sources of finance Value chain financing needs to incorpo-
rate a variety of institutions, depending on the type of finance, the level of opera-
tions, size, risk, etc. Fishing is inherently risky, so the risk of financing is also high. 
Various savings products for households enable them to cushion borrowers from 
fluctuating income levels and provide the lender with working capital. During 
crises, it is important to have a combination of financial products, make a greater 
provision for risk, and leverage subsidized government schemes. 
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Action research SIFFS uses an action research model, testing new approaches 
before rolling them out on a large scale. Keeping the fisheries value chain as the 
boundary of its operations, it identifies products and services across the value 
chain that can influence the profitability of small-scale fishing.
More information
V. Vivekanandan vivek@siffs.org or Ephrem ephrem@siffs.org, South India Fishermen 
Federation Societies (SIFFS), www.siffs.org 
N Raghunathan raghu@cms-india.org or C S Nagabhushana nagabhushana@cms-
india.org, Vrutti Livelihood Resource Centre, Catalyst Group, www.catalysts.org
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Synthesis
this chapter summarizes the main lessons from the case studies and offers ideas for organizations to work on value chain finance as a way to promote rural 
businesses, both large and small, in ways that are financially successful and that 
benefit the poor.
Situations of value chain finance
Value chain finance is not always needed. A value chain may work well without 
any intervention from a financial agent. If value chain finance is not tailored to 
the capacities and needs of the businesses in the chain, it may even disrupt the 
value chain, creating bubbles, debts and dependencies. Hence it is important to 
ask in which situations value chain finance is relevant. 
In this book, we have identified three situations where value chain finance has 
been used:
• Crafting new chains Financial services are introduced as part of an integral 
approach to building a new value chain with smallholder producers. The total 
intervention package includes organizing farmers, technical assistance, build-
ing management capacity, technological upgrading, securing a market outlet, 
and financing investments or business operations. Our four cases cover milk 
in India, potatoes in Peru, milk in Bolivia, and chilli pepper in Kenya (Part 4 
of this book).
• Expanding chain liquidity Financial agents link up with an existing value 
chain to finance the product flow in the chain, so that the businesses involved 
can grow and scale up their operations. The main service here is the provi-
sion of working capital for the production and trading of the farm product. 
The cases cover cotton in Tanzania, sal leaf in India, tea in Kenya and rice in 
Rwanda (Part 5).
• Unleashing investments in the chain Financial agents link with an existing 
chain to provide financial services that enable chain actors to upgrade their 
businesses through middle-term investments (2–6 years). The cases are honey 
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in Kenya, fish in India, soybean in Ethiopia, coffee in Nicaragua and quinoa 
in Bolivia (Part 6). 
We will now look at each of these situations in more detail to see how value chain 
finance is being used as a way to catalyse rural entrepreneurship.
Crafting new chains
Sometimes a market opportunity exists, but no value chain to supply the products 
that consumers demand. Or the other way around: sometimes producers have 
the potential to deliver good products, but there is no value chain to link them 
to the market. In these situations, it is necessary to build the value chain. Finance 
is then obviously one of the aspects that needs to be arranged.
Take, for example, our case of milk in India (page 68). The middle class in Indian 
cities is booming. They want to buy high-quality milk in modern retail outlets, 
rather than getting their milk from small vendors in the streets. Reliance Group, 
India’s largest industrial holding, sees this as a market opportunity. It sets up a 
modern milk chain with milk collectors and milk processors who operate under 
a franchise model. To reach the farmers and integrate them in the new chain, 
Reliance allies with the BASIX Group, a private company specialized in working 
with the rural poor. BASIX Group supports the milk farmers with an integrated 
package of services that are delivered through two separate channels. On the 
one hand, BASIX’s non-profit agent supports the farmers with organizational 
capacity-building, technical assistance and veterinary services. On the other 
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Figure 7.1 Two triangles: Financial services and capacity building
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hand, BASIX’s private bank provides loans to the farmers for buying new, more 
productive milking animals, as well as other financial services such as insurances 
and saving accounts.
So the new dairy chain in India is built with an integral package of support serv-
ices that are delivered through two separate triangles of cooperation. One trian-
gle provides capacity-building services to the farmers. This triangle is between 
the farmers, Reliance and BASIX’s non-profit agent. Another triangle provides 
financial services to the farmers. This one is between the farmers, Reliance and 
BASIX’s commercial bank. The capacity-building triangle is non-profit, while 
the financial triangle is commercial. For that reason, the two triangles need to be 
clearly separated into two domains.
We see a similar situation in other cases where an entirely new value chain is 
built. There are always two triangles (Figure 7.1):
• Capacity-building triangle Cooperation between the producer, the buyer 
and a non-profit service provider. The purpose is to build managerial, organi-
zational and technical capacities among the producers so they become solid 
chain actors. The cooperation is initially based on non-profit principles.
• Financial triangle Cooperation between the producer, the buyer, and a 
financial agent. The purpose is to provide the producers with access to the 
financial services they need for their business. The cooperation is based on 
commercial principles from the start.
The reason that the triangles are separated is that one is non-profit while the other 
is commercial. Investing in the basic capacities of producers cannot be done on a 
commercial basis, at least not initially. But financial services must be commercial 
from the start, otherwise you create a corrupted culture of non-payment and non-
compliance. The producers need to have a stake in the business: they need to be 
rewarded for good performance, but also feel pain when they do not comply.
The fact that the triangles are separated does not mean that they are not inter-
related. On the contrary, there must be close coordination to ensure that the 
financial services are tailored to the capacities and needs of the producers. Such 
coordination can occur at two levels. One is at a high level between the organiza-
tions involved, for example through memoranda of understanding as used by the 
K-REP group for the honey chain in Kenya (Chapter 6).  The other is through the 
fieldworkers who are involved in the capacity building triangle. They can indicate 
precisely when the farmers need money for buying fertilizer, hiring workers, 
etc. They can also indicate how much money the farmers need for investments 
in equipment, animals, etc. Through their frequent farm visits, the fieldworkers 
can monitor whether the loans are used in a proper way and whether the farmer 
has the capacity to repay the loan. In this way, the capacity-building triangle 
provides soft collateral for the financial triangle. It is the combination of the two 
triangles that makes value chain finance viable in the high-risk start-up phase of 
the new chain.
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But what happens when there are no more funds to pay for the capacity-building 
triangle? The major risk of crafting new chains is the creation of lasting depend-
encies on the service-provider. Too often we see that the entire value chain col-
lapses after the withdrawal of the service-provider (for further information and 
examples see KIT, IIRR and Faida Mali, 2006). Our case of potato in Peru (page 
40) provides some valuable insights to prevent such disaster.
In Peru, Snacks, a Pepsico subsidiary, produces crisps from a special type of 
potato. However, Snacks was short of supply of this potato, and decided to ally 
with the NGO Fovida to get more farmers in the value chain. In the beginning, 
to get the chain going, Fovida assumed a role as an intermediary in the chain. It 
organized the farmers, provided technical assistance, arranged for inputs, bought 
the potatoes and delivered these to Snacks. Fovida also arranged for farmers to 
get financial services through its sister microfinance institution, Credivida. So 
there was a capacity-building triangle and a financial triangle.
Initially the services from Fovida were paid for by a donor, but Fovida was aware 
that this would be unsustainable on the long term. So after 3 years of operation, 
when the chain was working well, Fovida agreed with the farmers on a service 
fee of 1.27% of the value of the potatoes. After another 3 years, when donor funds 
were no longer available, the service fee was doubled to 2.53%. The farmers were 
willing to pay because they saw the value of Fovida’s services and they were well 
informed about the costs of these. Also, Fovida did not oblige the farmers to use 
its services. Farmers were free to buy inputs and technical services elsewhere, 
and they could use the credit history that they had built to get loans from other 
parties than Credivida. 
Now after 8 years, Fovida has phased out completely. The chain is self-sustain-
ing. There is no more need for triangles. The farmers now have a direct contract 
with Snacks, and they can choose the technical and financial service providers 
of their own preference. 
The Peru case provides some important insights for avoiding lasting dependen-
cies:
• Do not start without an exit Plan the exit strategy from the beginning, and 
inform all chain actors about it. In the course of the project, build the capaci-
ties of the chain actors so that they will be prepared for take-over. From the 
start, be transparent on the costs of the services you deliver and enable the 
farmers to choose to use your services, based on knowledge of the costs. 
• A value chain is business, not a project The chain has to be market-driven. 
You start with detecting the market demand and screening, selecting and 
involving the relevant business partners. Only after that can farmers and com-
munity groups become involved. Make sure that all actors that you involve 
are prepared to take risks, because involvement in a chain is business. Make 
sure that the chain creates added value for all actors, so it is sustainable in the 
long term.
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• Take your time The potato chain took 8 years to build. This is more time than 
most donor projects allow. So take your time and once you start, be prepared 
to be in it for a long time.
• Building and destroying triangles In the Peru case the relationships changed 
continuously. Fovida began as a chain actor, evolved into a service-provider, 
and then phased out. First the two triangles of finance and capacity-building 
were put in place, but later they were replaced by direct bilateral business 
relations.
In sum, when a new value chain is crafted, there need to be two triangles of 
cooperation: one non-profit triangle for capacity-building, and one commercial 
triangle for financial services. They need to be separated but well coordinated. 
The capacity-building triangle forms soft collateral for the finance triangle. In the 
course of time, as the producers develop and the chain consolidates, the triangles 
may disappear. When the triangles are fully gone, you have reached a situation 
where the producers are fully empowered to have direct business relations with 
buyer and financers.
Expanding chain liquidity
Many value chains work reasonably well, but they cannot realize their full poten-
tial due to a lack of working capital. For many traders, farmers and small-scale 
processors, working capital is the main limiting factor for further business growth. 
They have no collateral and therefore no access to bank loans. How can financial 
agents start to work with these enterprises? How to finance entrepreneurs who 
do not have sufficient hard collateral? 
The cases in this book show two different basic strategies:
• Lead firm strategy When there is a strong lead firm in the chain, this com-
pany can be used as a vector to reach non-bankable suppliers. The lead firm 
is the collateral for providing finance to the suppliers. So the financial agent 
establishes a triangular cooperation with the lead firm and the suppliers. This 
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we see in the cases of tea in Kenya (page 125) and organic cotton in Tanzania 
(page 94).
• Capacity-building strategy Another strategy is to build the capacities of 
the suppliers to make them bankable. When the suppliers are trained and 
supported in their businesses for a couple of years, they can build a proven 
credit history and then become eligible for financial services from mainstream 
banks. This strategy has been applied in the cases of sal leaf in India (page 
110) and rice in Rwanda (page 135).
We will now take a look at both strategies in some more detail.
Lead firm strategy In the lead firm strategy, a triangle is built between the 
producer, the buyer and the financial agent (Figure 7.2). The loan goes to the 
producer, while the buyer pays back the loan. So the due diligence for the loan 
is performed on the buyer. It is irrelevant whether the producer can provide 
collateral. When the buyer is a solid, respectable lead firm with strong linkages 
to the farmer, this strategy is very powerful in delivering financial services to 
small-scale farmers and suppliers.
For example, in the Kenya tea case (page 125), the farmers receive cash payments 
for the tea that they deliver to the tea factory through the services of a factoring 
house. The farmers deliver tea to the factory, issue an invoice, and the factoring 
house pays the farmers up to 70% of the value of that invoice. After 30–60 days 
the tea factory pays the factoring house the full value of the invoice, and then the 
farmers receive the remaining balance. In this case, the factoring house performs 
its due diligence on the buyer – the tea factory. The buyer is the collateral for the 
factoring service, as the buyer is the one who will pay back the loan. The seller 
– that is, the tea farmer – is not important for repayment. So there is no need for 
Entrepreneurship
Organizational 
strengthening
Value chain 
development
Making small-scale 
suppliers bankable
Figure 7.3 Three basic elements for the capacity-building strategy to make small-scale 
suppliers bankable
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the tea farmer to offer collateral. The key criterion here is that the buyer should 
be a respectable lead firm. 
The same occurs in the case of organic cotton in Tanzania (page 94). Tanzanian 
cotton exporter BioRe receives an international working capital loan from Triodos 
Bank, so it can pay its farmers on the spot for their seed cotton. BioRe’s balance 
sheet is insufficient to secure this multi-million loan. The guarantor for the loan 
is BioRe’s client Remei, a trader based in Switzerland. The loan is collateralized 
by the export contract and the intimate business relationship between BioRe 
and Remei. The fact that they jointly set up the cotton chain, integrating all links 
from farmers to ginner, spinner, textile manufacturer and final retail, is the soft 
collateral that gives Triodos Bank the confidence that the loan will be repaid. The 
trust, transparency and vertical coordination in BioRe’s cotton chain underpins 
the loan without further need for hard collateral.
Capacity-building strategy The capacity-building strategy focuses directly 
on the suppliers. It aims to build the capacities of the suppliers to make them 
bankable. When the suppliers are trained and supported in their businesses for 
a couple of years, they build a proven credit history and then become eligible 
for financial services from mainstream banks. This strategy requires three basic 
elements (Figure 7.3): 
• Entrepreneurship building Each individual supplier must be trained to 
build capacities in financial and business management. The supplier must 
evolve into a skilful entrepreneur, otherwise he or she will never become 
bankable.
• Organization building Small-scale suppliers who are isolated will most 
likely never become viable chain actors. The suppliers need to be grouped in 
a strong organization so they can develop effective business relations in the 
value chain and with financial agents. Through their organization the sup-
pliers are empowered as a value chain actor. The organization also serves 
as a mechanism to deliver finance to the suppliers, and the organization can 
evolve to become guarantor for loans. 
• Value chain building In many situations there are also bottlenecks in other 
segments of the value chain. Bottlenecks may occur in chain functions such 
as inputs, trading, transport or processing. Or bottlenecks may occur in chain 
management such as quality assurance, innovation or information. Such bot-
tlenecks need to be resolved for the chain to reach its full potential.
For example, in the case of sal leaf in India (page 110), large numbers of small col-
lectors, processors and traders make a living from the production of plates from 
sal leaves collected in the forest. Their businesses remain very small due to a lack 
of working capital. A problem is that the small-scale suppliers are not perceived 
as bankable. Generally, loans from banks and microfinance institutions are too 
large, too expensive or too burdensome to get. The international agency UNIDO 
intervened at two levels. One, it organized the collectors and traders and built 
their capacities in accounting. This was necessary as these small-scale suppliers 
lacked business skills. Second, it worked with the banks to create understanding 
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and redesign their financial products to the needs of the sal leaf cluster. In this 
way UNIDO contributed to value chain building through providing banks with 
information on the sal leaf cluster. Now the micro-entrepreneurs in the sal leaf 
cluster have access to financial services that suit their needs. 
Another example of a capacity building strategy involves the rice case in Rwanda 
(page 135). Rice trade in Rwanda was dominated by Chinese entrepreneurs. To 
defend themselves against the middlemen, rice farmers formed a cooperative, 
COPRORIZ. Initially the cooperative faced some severe financial problems. Due 
to a lack of working capital the co-op was not able to distribute inputs to their 
members; furthermore, it lacked cash to pay farmers directly and was making 
a loss. The microfinance institution CAF Isonga intervened and has become the 
main source of finance for COPRORIZ. CAF Isonga built the entrepreneurial 
capacities of the farmers by making it possible for registered farmers to be paid 
cash on delivery through a voucher system. CAF Isonga also contributed to or-
ganizational building of the co-op. CAF Isonga started to provide credit to farm-
ers, enabling the co-op to provide their members with inputs. Membership of the 
co-op is the collateral for getting a loan. To make sure that CAF Isonga can play 
its role CAF Isonga is being informed on the product flows entering and leaving 
the rice warehouse of the coop. 
Capacity-building strategies go hand-in-hand with making available (new) finan-
cial products that meet the needs of the involved suppliers. These products can 
expand the chain liquidity of the involved businesses. Expanding chain liquidity 
is a powerful way to boost the value chain and enable the chain actors to grow 
and scale up their businesses. However, it should be kept in mind that it is feasible 
only in value chains that show a healthy balance between supply and demand: 
• On the one hand, there needs to be a strong market demand for the produce, 
otherwise it is unclear whether there will be revenues to repay the loan. If the 
financer is not convinced that there is a market for the farm produce, it will 
not proceed to issue the loan. 
• On the other hand, market demand should not be too strong, otherwise there 
is the risk that the farm produce will be diverted to competing buyers who 
offer a slightly higher price. The chain needs to comprise mechanisms that 
assure that the produce will be actually delivered to the guarantor of the loan. 
For example, though a solid contractual relation between supplier and lead 
firm, or through organizational discipline with a farmer group. 
In conclusion, the strength of the value chain determines its bankability. When the 
chain actors work closely together, they have better access to financial markets. 
Working together with a strong lead firm can help in accessing finance. Coop-
eration between chain actors is the soft collateral for obtaining financial services. 
Therefore, it is important that all chain actors are visible and have entrepreneurial 
skills, which requires building their capacity.
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Unleashing investments in the chain
Besides the lack of working capital, another key reason value chains may not 
realize their full potential is the lack of investment capital. Entrepreneurs need 
investment capital to upgrade their technologies, introduce new products, develop 
new markets, etc. The third situation where we have found value chain finance 
is when financial agents link up with the value chain to enable the chain actors 
to make medium-term investments (2–6 years). This is probably even more chal-
lenging than providing working capital, due to the risks inherent in medium-term 
financing. How do financial agents manage these risks? How can investments in 
the value chain be financed in a viable way? 
In the cases we have encountered various examples of medium-term financing, 
using different investment finance products. But how do these different products 
promote the business? 
Medium-term loans In two cases (coffee in Nicaragua, fish in India), medium-
term loans were provided to suppliers. Because of their size and conditions, these 
credits make it possible to make investments in the chain. 
In the case of organic coffee in Nicaragua (page 174), FDL (a microfinance in-
stitution) provided a 4-year loan to small-scale coffee growers. The money was 
paid to the farmers via their union, UCPCO. This needs to approve the farmers 
who receive the loans. In return, the farmers agree to deliver their coffee to the 
union. On delivery the farmers get paid half of the coffee price immediately. The 
rest is paid to the farmer after deducting an instalment of the loan, plus interest 
(14%). Union technicians pay regular visits to the farmers and reports relevant 
information to FDL. Farmers who want to borrow a relatively small amount (less 
than $1,500) organize in “solidarity groups”. These groups are responsible for 
ensuring that the individual members pay back the loans. In case of individual 
larger loans, farmers need hard collateral, for example livestock. The credits have 
made it possible to invest in post-harvest processing facilities at the farmers’ and 
the union levels. These enable the producers to comply with the high standards 
in the market for organic coffee. 
In the case of fish in India (page 200), medium-term loans were provided to sup-
pliers of fish who are organized in village societies. Fishing entails high material 
costs, as boats can leak, engines break down, etc. The village society provides 
loans to its fishermen members to cover these costs. Members are allowed to 
borrow up to 25% of the value of their previous year’s catch. The pay back time 
is 42 months, and starts immediately after the money has been borrowed. The 
village society deducts 10% of the daily catch, and calculates the balance each 
month. Interest is calculated on the balance of the loan remaining. The society 
pays the district federation, which in turn pays SIFFS (which acts as a microfi-
nance institution). This transfer process enables SIFFS to recycle the funds and 
offer new loans. The fishermen have gained enormously, as they are no longer 
dependent on unscrupulous traders and moneylenders. In addition, they have 
built their organizational capacities, developed market channels and built up a 
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credit history. Now they are becoming eligible for loans from the mainstream 
banking sector.
Micro-leasing In the honey case in Kenya and soybean in Ethiopia micro-leas-
ing is provided as an innovative finance investment product. In Kenya (page 149) 
micro-leasing provided by the K-Rep Development Agency enables beekeepers 
to lease and maintain expensive hives and increase the quality and quantity of 
honey they produce. To get a lease, a beekeeper has to get two quotations from 
suppliers of hives and equipment, and submit these to the village financial services 
association. The association approves of the request and chooses a supplier, to 
whom it pays 60% of the price. After delivery (within 3 weeks) the supplier gets 
the rest of the money. The beekeeper pays off the lease each month over 2 years. 
Once the beekeeper has paid all the instalments, he or she becomes the owner of 
the hive. To qualify for this arrangement, the beekeeper must belong to a group 
and attend training on hive management. The lessee has to report to the group of 
beekeepers periodically. The group, which has also received training on financial 
management, takes responsibility for the equipment.
In Ethiopia (page 164), micro-leasing was provided as a service to women’s groups 
for leasing a soybean-processing machine. Buying this expensive equipment was 
perceived as too risky, so Harbu, a microfinance institution, proposed to lease it 
to the women over a 5-year period, charging 10% interest a year. This arrange-
ment was based on the long-term trust relationships between Harbu, the women’s 
groups and the farmers’ marketing associations. Harbu remains the owner of the 
machine until the women pay it off fully. Because of the machine the women have 
been able to scale up their business and increase their income. 
Temporary equity Financial investment can also involve the provision of (tem-
porary) equity, which we see in the case of organic quinoa in Bolivia (page 187). 
When Irupana decided to focus on the processing and export of organic quinoa, it 
could not convince local banks to provide it with loans. So it approached Pro-rural, 
a financial institution that specializes in small businesses. The two organizations 
agreed to a temporary joint venture lasting 2 years. The first joint venture saw 
Pro-Rural investing $150,000 and Irupana about $100,000 in the marketing of 
quinoa. This venture was a success: it achieved a return on investment of 8.7%. In 
a second joint venture lasting 3 years, Irupana invested the larger share, $272,000 
(52%), while Pro-rural had a minority of the shares (48%) and so reduced its risk. 
The venture was also successful, yielding a return on investment of 8.1%. This 
kind of arrangement has several benefits: it shares risk, the business is transparent 
to both parties, and both parties have a say in the business. Pro-rural has used a 
similar approach in its temporary joint ventures with traders. 
These various investment finance products manage risks in different ways. We 
can distinguish four methods of risk mitigation:
Group formation and building the organizational capacity of suppliers Mem-
bership of a group is often set as a condition for investment loans or leasing. In the 
Indian case, fishermen had to be member of a village society. Beekeepers in Kenya 
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also had to be part of a group to get a leasing contract. The groups are responsi-
ble for repaying the loan and, in case of leasing, for maintaining the equipment. 
In Kenya the beekeepers received training on hive management and financial 
management. Investment in marketing groups also strengthens the capacity of 
suppliers and contributes to their empowerment. Strong supplier groups benefit 
the chain as a whole and reduce the risks for financial institutions.
Combined investments with other financial and non-financial services In most 
cases medium-term investments were combined with other financial and non-
financial services. For example in India, SIFFS provides various types of financial 
services, such as old-age security savings and insurance, together with a number 
of non-financial services, such as boat building and repair, market information 
and transport. These multiple services show how risk management in value chain 
finance can occur. In the case of honey in Kenya, the combination of different 
financial (insurance and savings) and non-financial services (technical services) 
considerably reduced the risks involved in honey production.
“Ownership” in the hands of financial institutions This way of risk mitigation 
is characteristic of leasing arrangements. In the case of honey in Kenya, micro-
leasing reduces the risks for the financial institution, since it remains the owner 
of the hive until the beekeeper has paid it off fully. Micro-leasing in Ethiopia 
worked in a similar way: the microfinance institution leased the machine to the 
women soybean processors over a 5-year period but remains the owner until the 
women pay it off fully.
Risk sharing Another way of mitigating risk is by sharing risks and becoming 
directly involved in the activity. An example of this is the case of organic quinoa 
in Bolivia, where both Irupana and Pro-rural invested in a joint venture. They 
combined their expertise and resources to develop a particular business. Risks 
can also be shared by working with a variety of financial agents, as in the case 
of coffee in Nicaragua.
All in all, we have found considerable innovation in financial products for invest-
ments in the value chain. These products include medium-term loans, equity and 
leasing. Various strategies are used to reduce the risks, including strengthening 
of groups of borrowers, parallel support services to borrowers, and risk-sharing 
among various actors. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that unleashing investments in the chain is still the 
least developed form of value chain finance. The investment-capital needs are 
beyond the scope of the financial products encountered in our cases. There re-
mains a great challenge to enable chain actors to make medium-term investments 
in their businesses.
New models of risk management
Traditional finance fails to address the needs of small-scale entrepreneurs because 
their needs are considered too risky to finance. The essence of value chain finance 
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is the creation of new models of risk management which enable better services 
to small-scale entrepreneurs. Three issues are fundamental in these new models: 
bringing the business into the picture, the use of the value chain as soft collateral, 
and looking at the future rather than the past.
Bringing the business into the picture
Rather than looking at the balance sheet and profit-and-loss statements, the 
financial agent looks at the business case: at the crop, buyer, market, technical 
assistance, and value chain relations. The financial product is closely linked to 
the production and trading of an agricultural product within a specific business 
relationship. So the risk calculation is no longer confined to the standard financial 
ratios of solvency, liquidity, etc., but rather to the solidity of the business case 
itself. For example, in the case of organic cotton in Tanzania, a risk analysis of the 
value chain, rather than an analysis of the financial sheets of BioRe, convinced 
Triodos Bank to finance this business, looking at market conditions, production 
conditions, competition from other buyers, etc.
Value chain as soft collateral
By bringing the business in the picture, value chain finance resort to other forms 
of collateral. It partially replaces traditional hard collateral with the soft collateral 
that is inherent in the business case. Soft collateral offers proven risk reduction 
strategies: market risks are reduced through sales contracts, production risks 
through technical assistance, management risks through producer group forma-
tion, moral risks through regular information and communication, repayment 
risks through a claim on the product. 
The cases provide various examples of soft collateral. For example micro-leasing 
puts a claim on the product or processing equipment, as in the cases of soybean 
in Ethiopia and honey in Kenya. In a number of cases, group formation helped to 
manage the business, for example for the fish case in India. In all cases, existing 
relationships between different actors in the chain provided a basis for trust for 
the financial institution. 
Future rather than the past
By looking at the business case rather than the financial records, value chain 
finance takes a perspective fundamentally different from traditional finance. Tra-
ditional finance looks at the past, as represented by the financial records. Value 
chain finance looks at the future, at the potential of the business case. 
Value chain finance will only work if financial agents learn to build their risk 
assessment on the basis of the business case. They must develop expertise on 
the volatile nature of agriculture, the specific commodity sector in question, the 
workings of value chains, and the functioning of producer groups. This informa-
tion need is crucial for a financial institution to step in. If the right information is 
available this in itself is a risk-reducing mechanism.
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The chain of value chain finance
Value chain finance is all about collaboration. There is collaboration between the 
financial agent and the chain actors and service providers (the triangle). But often 
there is also collaboration between various financial agents working together to 
serve the value chain: local banks, international banks, microfinance institutions, 
development finance organizations, insurance companies, and credit and saving 
associations. This is what we call the chain of value chain finance (Figure 3.4 on 
page 33).
The chain of value chain finance further reduces the risks and transaction costs 
of financing the value chain. We have seen three specific purposes of cooperation 
among financial agents: covering all needs in the value chain, sharing the risks, 
and reaching out to producers.
Covering all needs in the value chain
Financial agents work together to attend all the financial needs at various levels 
of the value chain. For example in the case of sal leaf in India, the Ahari Federa-
tion provided production loans to organized sal leaf collectors to develop their 
businesses. Through the Betnoti Federation, banks provided loans for working 
capital. In addition, banks started to finance some traders. 
In the case of honey in Kenya, we also see a chain of value chain finance. The K-Rep 
group developed into an umbrella organization involving different units targeting 
different levels of the chain. For example, K-Rep Fedha offers simple financial 
services (credit, savings) to the beekeepers through village-based cooperatives. 
Traders have access to short-term loans for working capital and micro-leasing 
of equipment. The K-Rep Bank provides a new service, factoring, to processors, 
enabling them to buy crude honey from the collection centres, and to sell semi-
processed honey. This combination of arrangements helps smooth the chain.
Sharing the risks
Financial agents work together and share the risks of a specific financial product. 
For example, in the case of coffee in Nicaragua, initially three sources of finance 
were used. The farmers’ union provided loans to its members as working capi-
tal. The microfinance institution, FDL, provided short-term loans to individual 
farmers. Coffee growers in need of immediate cash can also borrow from private 
traders. Later a governmental rural development agency (IDR) stepped in to 
assist farmers in upgrading their processing equipment, by providing them the 
capital that covered 70% of the total costs involved. FDL also expanded its serv-
ices. Besides working capital, it also started to provide farmers with investment 
capital. Furthermore, FDL provided the farmers’ union with investment loans 
and working capital. For FDL it was central to reduce its risks by building on a 
strong alliance with farmers and the farmers’ union.
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Reaching out to producers
Financial agents work together with a community-based financial agent (for ex-
ample a savings co-op, local bank or microfinance institution) to reach out and 
build interpersonal relations with the credit users. This reduces transaction costs 
in money flows and ensures proper due diligence and monitoring. For example 
in the sal leaf India case, two federations of self-help groups were set up. These 
self-help groups each contributed to a common fund, which was used to get a 
matching grant from UNIDO. The groups can access credit based on their own 
business plans. The groups assist their members by supporting their loan requests 
and pressuring them to repay on time. 
In the case of honey in Kenya, the village-based cooperatives (financial services 
associations) were owned by their users. Each association had about 2,000 mem-
bers (including beekeepers, farmers and other local people) who owned shares 
in it. These associations were able to offer tailor-made services to their members. 
The borrowers did not need hard collateral; the groups took the responsibility 
for paying back the loan. 
In this book we have seen chains of value chain finance in six case studies: honey 
in Kenya, rice in Rwanda, soybean in Ethiopia, and fish, milk and sal leaf in India. 
This is no coincidence. Apparently an integrated approach in value chain finance 
works better – it is not possible to strengthen the value chain unless all the links 
work well. The importance of the chain of value chain finance shows that effective 
intra-organizational cooperation is needed to enhance small-scale entrepreneurs’ 
access to finance. This is not an area where individual organizations can resolve 
all challenges. Microfinance institutions can achieve a lot, as can individual banks 
and trade finance funds. But the needs of small-scale entrepreneurs in value 
chains are only tackled effectively if financial agents work together and different 
services are provided. 
Involving local banks
Local banks need to play a key role in enhancing the access to finance for small-
scale entrepreneurs. As stated above, microfinance institutions and international 
banks can achieve a lot, especially in the pioneering phase, but to mainstream 
value chain finance, local banks need to get involved. How is it possible to stimu-
late local banks to provide working capital to value chains? In the cases we have 
seen several elements that are important, as described below.
Making the chain actors visible
It is necessary for the actors to be seen as solid, bankable companies. In this re-
spect it is important to ensure that the actors are registered as legal entities, with 
audited books. Besides available information and transparency, some level of 
organization among the suppliers helps. For example the sal leaf collectors and 
plate makers include some of the poorest people in India. These (mainly) women 

7 Synthesis
from tribal families were encouraged to form groups and to start saving. At a 
later stage UNIDO stepped in to support these groups in accounting, preparing 
business plans, etc. With the training they have received, they are able to write 
their own business plans and access credit. 
In the Peru case, too, organizing the potato farmers resulted in an agreement with 
Snacks, a market leader in the market for crisps, with the NGO Fovida acting as 
intermediary. 
Developing collateral in the chain
The buyer’s guarantee is crucial to convince banks to lend money. In value chain 
finance, despite the lack of hard collateral, the presence of soft collateral can con-
vince financial institutions to provide their services to rural entrepreneurs. Soft 
collateral can take different forms: for example, the working relations between 
different chain actors, or assigning to the group the responsibility for repaying 
loans. Savings are key in this respect, since they demonstrate the group’s financial 
capacity (this is shown in many of the cases). Other examples of soft collateral 
include the leasing of equipment, and organic certification (which reflects im-
proved management practices and solid chain relations).
Co-financing schemes
Collaboration with other financial institutions can convince banks to provide 
additional funding. This was the case in the coffee case in Nicaragua. Due to the 
growth in the value chain and the good reputation of the union of coffee pro-
ducers, three foreign development-finance institutions (Root Capital, Rabobank 
Foundation, and Shared Interest) started to give loans to the union. The union 
uses these loans as working capital and for investments. The loans are relatively 
favourable for the union, which no longer needs working capital loans from FDL, 
the microfinance institution that was involved in building its capacity. There is 
potential, and need, for local banks also to become involved in such chains.
Piloting
Banks do not always understand how things might work. In this case it is im-
portant to start with a pilot to show the opportunity and how to manage risks. 
The sal leaf case from India gives an example of such a pilot. UNIDO trained the 
self-help groups on financial practices and management. It also sensitized the 
banks on the credit needs of the sal leaf collectors who formed the group, and 
explained how the value chain works. For this purpose different workshops were 
organized. After a small, successful pilot, the banks were convinced of the bank-
ability of the collectors. They began lending money to the processors to upgrade 
their equipment, which enabled the process to be scaled up. UNIDO convinced 
bankers to invest in traders in a similar way. Traders had no accounts or balance 
sheets, but when they had been trained to improve their financial records, the 
banks became confident and started to lend money to them. 
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Helping banks build commodity sector knowledge
Information about the chain is crucial to convince bankers to become involved 
in value chain finance. To build this knowledge, banks should develop partner-
ships with specialist organizations (government agencies, companies, NGOs) 
and establish strong links with actors in the value chain. 
Showing the opportunity
Banks may not realize that financing a value chain can be good business. It may 
be necessary to show them the opportunity: when the banks see a profit, they 
normally jump in. The financing of chain liquidity, in particular, is a clear market 
opportunity, because it is possible to charge relatively high interest rates. Produc-
tion and trade are completely different in their speed and return on capital, so 
the interest rates should be different, but in trading, high interest rates are not 
necessarily a problem. 
Price is not the only determinant of the quality of the loan. What matters is that 
they get a loan at the right time. If producers are willing to sell their crop now at 
depressed prices, rather than waiting and get high prices in 3 months’ time, they 
are in effect buying a very expensive loan. The coffee growers in Nicaragua are 
just one of the examples in the cases of producers selling their product to private 
traders in return for immediate payment at low prices. 
Leasing is also a profitable opportunity for bankers, with collateral and high 
interest rates. The two examples of micro-leasing (soybeans in Ethiopia and 
honey in Kenya) show the feasibility of leasing for both the chain actors and the 
financial institutions.
Building a track record
In the end, the most powerful way to get local banks involved in value chain 
finance is through numbers on paper. This means building a track record with 
the value chain actors. In many cases, we see that after a couple of years the chain 
actors have gained good access to mainstream banks. Outside organizations can 
help in building such a track record, as occurred in the case of sal leaf in India 
(where UNIDO helped collectors and traders), and in Peru (where Credivida 
assisted the potato growers). 
Role of subsidies
The role of subsidies should be carefully considered, especially because value 
chain finance involves financial and non-financial services. In the discussion on 
crafting new chains, we said that financial services must be commercial from the 
start. A number of issues should be taken into consideration before subsidies are 
provided. 
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Need for a good diagnosis
There is a tendency to think that poor people need money, but this is not always 
the case. More than money, they may need other assets to help them improve their 
business. For example in the case of sal leaf in India, the Dumapada self-help group 
involved in collecting leaves and making plates needed training and information 
(Box 5.2, page 115). When they had a loan, members did not know what to use it 
for. After financial counselling they developed a business plan, decided that the 
loan was too high, and returned what they did not need to the bank. 
Subsidies only at the start
When crafting a new chain, subsidies to reduce risks may be appropriate, for 
example for training, capacity building, improvements to facilities, or adding 
value at critical points in the chain. At later stages it is important that farmers 
start to pay for the services and realize their value. In the potato case in Peru, for 
example, Fovida gradually increased its service fee. In addition, Fovida does not 
oblige the farmers to use its services: farmers are free to buy inputs and technical 
services elsewhere. It is important to focus subsidies on intangible goods and 
services, such as technical assistance, group formation, training, etc. 
Subsidies can also be helpful in case of new product development and for study-
ing risks, for example in the case of insurance. It is good to keep in mind that 
NGOs and many other chain promoters are almost always subsidized – so cannot 
continue providing their services indefinitely.
Subsidies for infrastructure only as co-funding, and only 
when farmers are ready
Subsidies can be used to co-fund chain infrastructure, but be careful: farmers 
have to be ready. In case of milk in India, the government invested a lot in the 
infrastructure to support the diary industry, for example by establishing diaries. 
But these diaries remained underused. The lesson was that farmers do not take 
the responsibility over a diary if it is not theirs. Reliance Diary Foods Ltd recog-
nized this problem and started to invest in diaries, but this time using a franchise 
model. They trained local people to run the diary as a business. 
There are two other important criteria before subsidizing infrastructure. First, 
subsidies should be handed out only as matching funds, never 100%. Second, 
they should only be given in a start-up situation, when there is a need to experi-
ment with new products and new technologies. 
No subsidies for financial services
Lending money (such as debts, capital funds) should not be subsidized; only the 
initial equity or set-up costs could be co-funded. Subsidizing financial services 
creates unfair competition and impedes private banks from becoming involved. 
In many countries there is a history of governmental development banks and 
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rural development projects that have used subsidized interest rates. This has had 
a tremendous effect on the willingness of private banks to involve themselves in 
agricultural finance. Moreover, it often led to corruption and contributed to poor 
risk assessment. Loan approvals were often related to political ties and friendship 
relations instead of business criteria and risks. Resources for subsidies are usually 
limited, so there is a need for rationing. This can be done with transparent criteria, 
but often it is done in an informal manner that can easily be subject to fraud.
Subsidies should be temporary, transparent, and preferably free of government 
interference. A no-payment culture must be avoided. Such a culture can occur 
if people are pressed to take a loan, as happened in the sal leaf case in India. 
Before the chain was improved, some borrowers did not even realize that they 
had gone into debt. 
Transparency on costs, and having an exit strategy
If non-financial services are subsidized at first, the recipients of these services 
should be made aware of the value (or costs) of these services. This is important 
if after some time the service-provider starts to ask them to pay for its services. 
Phasing out, as we have seen in the potato case in Peru, requires transparency 
on the costs and also, from the beginning, on the plans to phase out. The other 
chain actors have to be prepared for this. 
Enabling environment and governance
A value chain does not operate in isolation. Its operations may be supported or 
hindered by other actors and institutions surrounding it: the national government, 
local authorities, political interests, powerful competing companies, ethnic ten-
sions, local elites, and so on. It is very difficult to start and sustain a value chain 
in the face of determined resistance from powerful parties, or if the environment 
is not enabling. Patronage may favour certain actors and damage the prospects 
of others. One actor in the chain may become dominant and start to exploit the 
others, reducing their value shares, restricting their access to credit, and imposing 
ever more stringent requirements on them.
Nevertheless, value chain finance may also empower weaker actors. Farmers 
improve their skills in management and marketing, and gain a voice in the chain. 
They can apply these capacities to seek other markets or expand their production 
of other types of produce. Value chain finance may give them the step up needed 
to expand beyond a single value chain. 
Various levels of chain governance are important in the cases, including produc-
ers’ organizations and the national and local governments.
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Organizing the suppliers
At the local level, producers’ organizations are very important. Organizing sup-
pliers helps them to negotiate, get information, achieve greater efficiency through 
higher volumes and lower transaction costs, and obtain credit. From another 
perspective, organizing suppliers helps other actors reach the poor and use social 
pressure within groups to ensure compliance with quality requirements, delivery 
criteria and repayment obligations. In the case of rice in Rwanda, we can see how 
use was made of social structures that already existed. A cooperative played the 
role of credit officer: it pressured its members to repay. 
However, not all existing structures necessarily work. For many suppliers, coop-
eratives still have negative political connotations, and may be managed badly. 
This makes good leadership and training of the farmers very important. What is 
key is that farmers start working together despite these problems.
Role of  the government
The role of the government differs from country to country and from one economic 
sector to another. It may have a facilitating role, or it may interfere or obstruct ef-
forts to develop value chains.  Without a good understanding of the role of national 
and local governments in value chain finance, opportunities may be overlooked 
or the effectiveness of services that are provided may be hampered. 
In some countries progress very much depends on who is in power. When vested 
interests become involved, progress can become difficult. This goes for every 
continent, every country and every locality. Progress can also become difficult 
when a government or local administrator changes, as then everything else may 
change. This is a frequent problem in Latin America. In some countries, the 
government plays an overly strong role in certain sectors, or in the economy as a 
whole. The government controls the land and resources, and determines who has 
access to these assets. This situation is prevalent in a number of African countries. 
Banking regulations can have a negative impact on efforts to develop value chain 
finance. Banks may be sanctioned by the central bank if they offer loans that are 
not secured with hard collateral (e.g., by requiring them to keep high amounts of 
unproductive reserves, or to make deposits for them at the central bank.
Involving the government and understanding its role can be a necessity but can 
also be an opportunity, as projects can be very costly. Governments can also play 
a role in mobilizing people by showing them business opportunities.  
Involving all stakeholders
Building a chain involves regular meetings with all actors, and sharing information 
on all interests and possibilities. Each stakeholder must be willing to recognize 
and respect its own role and that of the other chain actors. In the case of sal leaf 
in India, the creation of platforms facilitated regular meetings among different 
actors. Such mechanisms are especially valuable where information flows are 
impeded, as where a market is far off.
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Opportunities and limitations of value chain 
finance
Value chain finance is an empowerment tool for the poor, but at the same time a 
profitable market opportunity for the finance industry. Here we summarize some 
of the main opportunities and limitations of value chain finance.
Including the poor
For many poor people living in rural areas, accessing finance is difficult. A value 
chain finance triangle is necessary to provide them with the funds they need. 
Nevertheless, for the poorest access to value chain finance will remain difficult 
as they are often not structurally involved in a supply chain. For value chains to 
include the poor, initiatives should also ensure that they are empowered by build-
ing their capacity and involving them in decision-making. Value chain finance 
should favour the poor, counterbalancing the monopoly power of strong chain 
actors. In many of the cases, value chain finance brings benefits to the individual 
actors and to the chain as a whole. But it is necessary to guard against allowing 
monopoly power to build up at one key point in the chain. A number of the cases 
are built around a monopoly: for example, TARDA in the honey chain in Kenya, 
or Snacks in the Peru potato case. 
So value chain finance may result in a paradox: a situation where empowering 
the poor is a goal, but the finance arrangements are based on the credibility of a 
single, lead firm. This implies that the poor should be linked to these lead firms. 
Can a monopoly go hand-in-hand with empowerment of the poor? 
One option for farmers and other suppliers is to move away from the lead firm by 
diversifying markets and products. Another option is to move towards the lead 
firm, by engaging in activities further up in the chain (this is known as “forward 
integration”). 
The added value of  value chain finance 
Upgrading in a value chain does not happen automatically. Bottlenecks often oc-
cur, especially for small-scale suppliers. Value chain finance can help overcome 
some of these bottlenecks and smoothen or upscale a chain, so increasing the 
chain’s competitiveness. But its power remains limited if it is not accompanied 
with market links, business skills, information flows, the right policy framework, 
enforcement mechanisms, and so on. Value chain finance is not the ultimate solu-
tion for a problem in a chain and it does not replace existing financial services. It 
makes new sources and finance available for rural entrepreneurs, and through 
this contributes to the empowerment of the poor. 
Value chain finance and microfinance
Value chain finance both complements and goes beyond microfinance. An im-
portant difference is that value chain finance is tied to actors, transactions and 
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relations in a value chain. Therefore it can reach other actors than microfinance, 
and at the same time it leaves out actors that (fortunately) microfinance institutions 
can reach. Many of the cases in this book involve microfinance institutions, which 
often work together with other financial institutions and farmers’ groups. Micro-
finance can be part of value chain finance, but needs to be complemented with 
other types of financial services that can address varied needs in the chain.
Key messages
The cases have contributed to many new insights on what value chain finance 
entails. In the final section of this book, we offer some key messages for different 
actors involved in value chain finance. 
Farmers, traders and other value chain actors
If you work together, you will improve your bankability. The relationship be-
tween different chain actors becomes an alternative for the hard collateral that 
financial institutions normally demand. The combination of more tailor-made 
financial services with non-financial services builds the capacity of the different 
chain actors and the chain as a whole. 
Banks and other financial institutions
Value chain finance is a serious market opportunity even in rural areas. It does, 
however, require another perception of risk management: a shift from credit 
risk to performance risk. It also requires information on the value chain you are 
considering investing in. Knowledge on how a value chain works opens new op-
portunities for finance, sometimes demanding new kinds of financial products 
and new kinds of partnerships. It is a way of increasing your number of clients 
and expanding your portfolio.
Governments
Stop subsidizing credit; focus on enabling conditions. Financial services should 
not be subsidized. This disrupts the market and creates a culture of “free mon-
ey”. Governments have a role to play in ensuring that the right infrastructure 
and policy frameworks are in place to make the value chain operate smoothly. 
Although ideally governments should not be involved as actors in value chain 
finance, in some countries and some sectors they do play a role, which cannot 
be neglected. 
Donors and development agencies
Use mid-chain lead firms to reach producers, but beware of creating dependen-
cies. It is challenging to link producers to lead firms in a way that contributes 
to their empowerment. If this is not an option, you could support the involved 
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producers to move away from the lead firm and look for alternative sources of 
income. Donors and development agencies can also play other roles in value 
chain finance, such as stimulating product development, providing non-financial 
services and building capacity.
Research
Look into models of “chains of value chain finance”, and at statistical credit 
ratings based on certification and other forms of chain integration. Look at best 
practices and try to find ways to replicate successes, while taking into account 
contextual differences. Make research outcomes available for the different actors 
in the chain and for the financial institutions involved. 
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Resources
this chapter contains links to third-party websites and organizations devoted to finance for farmers and other rural micro-entrepreneurs. It also contains 
references cited in the text, suggestions for further reading on value chain finance, 
and the contact details of the participants who contributed to this book.
We have replaced long web addresses with a shorter equivalent – the tinyurl 
addresses in the list below. 
Agri-ProFocus
apf-finance.ning.com
This online platform facilitates exchange 
and joint action between Agri-ProFocus’ 29 
member organizations in the Netherlands 
and their partner organizations working 
on finance for farmer entrepreneurship. 
Agri-ProFocus links value chain develop-
ment with acces to financial services and 
sustainable food production. Activities 
focus on Africa and are coordinated with 
the MicroNed rural finance group.
CERISE 
www.cerise-microfinance.org 
CERISE (Comité d’Echanges, de Réflexion 
et d’Information sur les systèmes d’Epargne 
-crédit) is an initiative of four French or-
ganizations working with microfinance in 
countries in the South. 
CGAP
www.microfinancegateway.org
CGAP is a web-based resource centre for 
microfinance, with news, announcements, 
features, a library and key areas.
FAO
tinyurl.com/yhspeep
The value chain finance section of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations.
FAST International
www.fastinternational.org
The Finance Alliance for Sustainable Trade 
(FAST) is a global, member-driven, non-
profit association of lenders and producers 
who bring sustainable products to mar-
ket. FAST aims to increase the number of 
producers in developing nations who can 
Organizations and websites
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successfully access quality trade finance, 
tailored to their business needs, as they 
enter sustainable markets.
IFC
www.ifc.org/microfinance
The International Finance Corporation, 
part of the World Bank Group, provides 
advisory services and direct and indirect 
investment services to the microfinance sec-
tor. Its focus is on creating and supporting 
commercially viable microfinance institu-
tions that can attract the private capital 
needed to scale up and respond to unmet 
demand. It demonstrates the business case 
for commercial microfinance and promotes 
it as an asset class to private institutional 
investors.
Microlinks
www.microlinks.org
Supported by the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development, Microlinks produces 
a large number of research reports on 
finance (value chain finance, rural finance, 
microfinance). 
MicroNed
www.micro-ned.nl
MicroNed was created in 2006, as a net-
work of the Dutch Development Finance 
Organisations Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and 
Oxfam Novib, to cooperate on a structural 
basis with respect to the establishment of 
a specialised sector approach for micro-
finance. In 2008 Rabobank Foundation 
joined MicroNed. The MicroNed rural 
finance group coordinates activities with 
Agri-ProFocus. 
Rural Finance Learning 
Centre
www.ruralfinance.org
The Rural Finance Learning Centre aims to 
assist organizations in developing countries 
to build their capacity to deliver improved 
financial services which meet the needs of 
rural households and businesses. 
Shared Interest
www.shared-interest.com
Shared Interest is a co-operative lending 
society that provides fair and just financial 
services. Part of the fair trade movement, it 
works extensively with community-based 
businesses in Africa and other continents. 
It provides finance up front to producers, 
often via their buyers, to enable them to buy 
raw materials, tools and the other things 
they need, when they need them. It also 
offers longer-term loans and other credit 
facilities to support the development of fair 
trade businesses.
SEEP
www.seepnetwork.org
The Small Enterprise Education and Promo-
tion (SEEP) Network connects microenter-
prise practitioners from around the world 
to develop practical guidance and tools, 
build capacity, and help set standards to 
advance their common vision: a sustainable 
income in every household. SEEP produces 
materials on a wide range of topics, includ-
ing value chain finance. 
Synergies
www.itcilo.org/synergies
A platform on current applied research 
and practical implementation of linking 
financial services to business services that 
contribute to pro-poor enterprise develop-
ment, income and job creation. Managed 
by the International Training Centre of the 
International Labour Organisation.

8 Resources
References and further reading
Allen, H. and M. Staehle. 2007. Village 
savings and loan associations (VSLAs). 
Programme guide. Field operations 
manual. www.vsla.net
Athmer, G. 2008. Rural finance study. An 
inventory of policies, practices and 
challenges regarding support to rural 
(micro)finance among Netherlands’ 
MicroNed members. MicroNed, ICCO 
and Terrafina Microfinance, Nether-
lands. tinyurl.com/yd4dkre 
Bernhardt, J., S. Azar, and J. Klaehn. 2009. 
Integrated financing for value chains. 
World Council of Credit Unions, 
Madison, WI. tinyurl.com/ylgn6yo 
Charitonenko, S., L. Heron, G. Chalmers, 
B. Lennon and M. Miller. 2005. Value 
chain finance. RAFI notes 2. Rural and 
Agricultural Finance Initiative, United 
States Agency for International Devel-
opment. tinyurl.com/yaoe8fk 
Christen, R.P. and D. Pearce. 2005. Man-
aging risks and designing products for 
agricultural microfinance: Features of 
an emerging model. CGAP Occasional 
Paper 11. tinyurl.com/yedvrdp 
de Klerk, T. 2008. The rural financial land-
scape: A practitioner’s guide. Agrodok 
49. Agromisa Foundation and CTA, 
Wageningen. tinyurl.com/yfbwzxf 
Dichter, T. 2007. A second look at micro-
finance. The sequence of growth and 
credit in economic history. Develop-
ment Briefing Paper 1. Cato Institute, 
Washington, DC. tinyurl.com/dgq75j 
Dichter, T., and M. Harper (eds). 2007. 
What’s wrong with microfinance? PA 
Publications, Rugby, and Rawat Press, 
Jaipur.
Dutta, s. 2001. The livelihood resource 
manual. New Economic Foundation, 
India.
Enterprise Development and Microfi-
nance 19(4), October 2008. Special 
issue on value chain finance. tinyurl.
com/yjm6xzq 
FAO and GTZ. 2004. Agricultural pro-
duction lending. A toolkit for loan 
officers and loan portfolio managers. 
FAO and GTZ, Eschborn 2004. tinyurl.
com/yfoafk7 
Fries, B, and B. Akin. 2004. Value chains 
and their significance for addressing 
the rural finance challenge. MicroRE-
PORT 20. Accelerated Microenterprise 
Advancement Project, United States 
Agency for International Develop-
ment. tinyurl.com/ybey9ox 
Fries, B. 2005. The value chain framework 
and rural finance. PowerPoint presen-
tation. tinyurl.com/yl2sp4b 
Galvez, E. 2006. Financiación de la comer-
cialización agrícola en América Latina. 
FAO. Servicios de Gestión, Comercial-
ización y Finanzas Agrícolas (AGSF). 
FAO. Rome. tinyurl.com/yj8dfnd 
González, A. and R. Rosenberg. 2006. The 
state of microfinance: Outreach, profit-
ability, and poverty. Findings from a 
database of 2,600 microfinance institu-
tions Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, Washington, DC.
Habyalimana, S. 2007. Access to finance 
through value chains: Lessons from 
Rwanda. tinyurl.com/yb37jtm 
Harper, m. 2009. Inclusive value chains in 
India: Linking the smallest producers 
to modern markets. Global Scientific 
Publishers, Singapore. (Available from 
ivc-india@hotmail.com)
Harper, M., D.S.K. Rao and A.K. Sahu. 
2008. Development, divinity and 
dharma: The role of religion in devel-
opment institutions and microfinance. 
Practical Action Publications, Rugby. 
tinyurl.com/yfoa4as 
International Year of Microcredit, 2005. 
tinyurl.com/ydkcomx 

Value Chain Finance 
Kauffmann, C. 2005. Financing SMEs in 
Africa. OECD Policy Insights 7. OECD 
Development Centre, Paris. tinyurl.
com/y95p2c6 
KIT and IIRR. 2008. Trading up: Building 
cooperation between farmers and trad-
ers in Africa. Royal Tropical Institute, 
Amsterdam; and International Insti-
tute of Rural Reconstruction, Nairobi. 
tinyurl.com/4jqyes 
KIT, Faida MaLi and IIRR. 2006. Chain 
empowerment: Supporting African 
farmers to develop markets. Royal 
Tropical Institute, Amsterdam; Faida 
MaLi, Arusha; and International Insti-
tute of Rural Reconstruction, Nairobi. 
tinyurl.com/yjjuqwt 
KIVA. 2009. About microfinance. tinyurl.
com/2cx6fy 
Miller, C. no date. Rural finance course. 
Calvin Miller, FAO, IDEAS and the 
Giordano dell’ Amore Foundation in 
collaboration with the University of 
Bergamo, Italy.
Nagarjan, G. and R.L. Meyer. 2005. Rural 
finance: Recent advances and emerg-
ing lessons, debates and opportuni-
ties. Reformatted version of Working 
Paper AEDE-WP-0041-05, Dept of 
Agricultural, Environmental, and 
Development Economics, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio. tinyurl.
com/yg9jk6l 
Nair, A., R. Kloeppinger-Todd, and A. 
Mulder. 2004. Leasing: An underuti-
lized tool in rural finance. World Bank 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
Discussion Paper 7. tinyurl.com/yzptx6d 
Neven, D. 2009. Finance in value chain 
analysis: A synthesis paper. microRE-
PORT 132, United States Agency for 
International Development. tinyurl.
com/y8pcrkv 
OECD. 2006. The SME finance gap. Vol. 1: 
Theory and evidence. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, Paris. tinyurl.com/ybfj3ay 
Pagura, M. 2004. Mapping rural finance 
products, delivery models and link-
ages. PowerPoint presentation. tinyurl.
com/yl2sp4b 
Quirós, R. (ed.) 2007. Agricultural value 
chain finance. Summary of the con-
ference “Agricultural value chain 
finance”, Costa Rica, 16–18 May 2006. 
Academia de Centroamérica, San 
José; FAO; RUTA; Serfirural. tinyurl.
com/yc3zgtd 
Seibel, H. 2005. Rural finance innovations. 
Topics and case studies. World Bank 
Publications. Agricultural and Rural 
Development Department, Washing-
ton.
Seibel, H.D. 2005. Finance for small-scale 
commodity processing: From micro 
to meso-finance. Proceedings of an 
international workshop in Khartoum, 
Sudan, 9–11 November 2003. Com-
mon Fund for Commodities, Technical 
Paper 32. tinyurl.com/ygukbwe 
Shepherd, A. 2004. Financing agricultural 
marketing: The Asian experience.  
Agricultural Management, Marketing 
and Finance Occasional Paper 2. Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome. tinyurl.com/ye-
vahor
The Economist. 18 July 2009. The effects of 
microcredit. tinyurl.com/l4858r 
UNCTAD. 2004. Financing commodity-
based trade and development: Innova-
tive agriculture financing mechanisms. 
Report prepared by the UNCTAD 
secretariat for the Expert Meeting on 
Financing Commodity-Based Trade 
and Development: Innovative Financ-
ing Mechanisms. Geneva, 16–17 Nov 
2004. TD/B/COM.1/EM.24/2, 3 Sep 
2004. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Geneva.  
tinyurl.com/y8azepg 
USAID. 2005. Value chain finance. RAFI 
Notes 2, United States Agency for In-
ternational Development, Washington, 
DC. tinyurl.com/3pbba4 

8 Resources
WOCCU. 2003. A technical guide to rural 
finance: Exploring products. WOCCU 
Technical Guide 3. World Council of 
Credit Unions, Madison, WI. tinyurl.
com/yg5b2j6 
World Bank. 2005. Rural finance innova-
tions: Topics and case studies. Report 
32726-GLB World Bank, Agriculture 
and Rural Development Department. 
tinyurl.com/yaey7yq 
Yago, G., D. Ropveda, and J.M. White. 
2007. Transatlantic innovations in af-
fordable capital for small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises. Prospects for 
market-based development finance. 
German Marshall Fund of the United 
States and Milken Institute. www.
tinyurl.com/3zworo  
Yollin, P. 2007. Microcredit movement 
tackling poverty one tiny loan at a 
time. San Francisco Chronicle, 30 Sep 
2007. tinyurl.com/yfhzrvf 
Yunus, M. 2007. Creating a world without 
poverty. Social business and the future 
of capitalism. Public Affairs, New 
York.

Value Chain Finance 
Participants’ profiles
This section gives the names, contact details and brief biographies of participants 
at the Nairobi writeshop, where the draft of this book was prepared.
Sangeeta Agasty
Manager, Foundation for MSME 
Clusters 
USO House, USO Road, Off Shaheed Jeet 
Singh Marg, 6, Special Institutional Area, 
New Delhi 110 067, India
Tel. +91 9903168836, fax +91 11 41688589, 
41688590, email sangeeta.agasty@gmail.com 
Sangeeta holds a master’s degree in rural 
management and an MS in economics. 
Her experience includes implementing and 
managing livelihood projects, the develop-
ment of clusters of micro-, small and me-
dium enterprises (MSME), action research, 
training and capacity building, monitoring 
and evaluation of development projects and 
participatory development approaches. She 
worked with the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) as na-
tional expert under its cluster development 
programme, and currently works with the 
Foundation for MSME Clusters. She has 
developed training modules on financial 
literacy and network management for mi-
cro-enterprises, and has studied livelihood, 
finance and social research methods. 
Navil Agramont Akiyama 
Commercialization and market spe-
cialist, Save the Children Bolivia
PO Box 15120, La Paz, Bolivia
Tel. +591 2 2481606, +591 2 2481615, mobile 
+591 701 12136, fax +591 2 2115856, email 
nagramont@savechildren.org.bo, nagramont@
hotmail.com
Navil has a degree in economics, and a 
master’s in business administration, post-
graduate training in project preparation and 
evaluation, and a diploma in marketing and 
financial engineering. He has worked as a 
marketing specialist, university teacher and 
consultant for various organizations and 
rural enterprises. At Save the Children, he 
focuses on developing and funding value 
chains.
Tesfaye Befekadu
General manager, Harbu Microfi-
nance Institution Share Company
PO Box 13640, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, fax 
+251 11 618 0654, email harbumfi@ethionet.
et, harbumfi@yahoo.com, tesfayebef@yahoo.
com 
Tesfaye is a graduate in accounting with 
experience mainly in development-oriented 
organizations. For the last 12 years he has 
worked in various microfinance institutions 
as a specialist and manager. He provides 
training and consulting services to organi-
zations and individuals in establishing mi-
crofinance institutions. 
maría renée Bejarano Vega
General coordinator, SEED Pro-
gramme, Vice Ministry of Equal Op-
portunities, Bolivia
Tel. +591 2 2119371, +591 2 2110492, fax 
+591 2 2119758, email renee.bejarano@gmail.
com, mr.bejarano@semilla.pnud.bo
María Renée holds a master in business ad-
ministration and has extensive experience 
in rural development management, work-
ing with farmer organizations, micro- and 
small enterprises, non-government organi-
zations and local governments. Until 2009 
she was executive director of Pro-Rural, a 
rural development NGO in Bolivia (www.
prorural.org.bo). She now coordinates a 
$9 million fund to increase the economic 
and social opportunities of rural women 
through financial services, implemented 
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by the United Nations Development 
Programme and funded by the Spanish 
Agency for International Cooperation for 
Development.
Isaac Bekalo Bateno
President and Regional Director for 
Africa, International Institute of Ru-
ral Reconstruction (IIRR)
PO Box 66873, Nairobi 00800, Kenya 
Tel. +254 20 4442610, 4440991, fax +254 20 
4448814, email isaac.bekalo@iirr.org, website 
www.iirr.org
Isaac holds a PhD in organizational devel-
opment and planning. His over 30 years 
experience includes teaching, community 
development, NGO training, curriculum 
design and organizational development. 
He provides technical services on strategic 
planning, business plan development, or-
ganizational diagnoses, participatory moni-
toring and evaluation, project design and 
proposal writing, and facilitation of global 
forums. He specializes in participatory de-
velopment approaches and organizational 
development.
Manuel Antonio Bermúdez 
Vado
Business manager, Fondo de Desar-
rollo Local (Fund for Local Develop-
ment, FDL)
A-339, Managua, Nicaragua
Tel. +505 2774245, 2707371, 2707338, fax 
+505 2774245, email mbermudez@fdl.org.ni, 
website www.fdl.org.ni 
Manuel holds a master’s in business ad-
ministration with a focus on finance. He 
has been working in rural microfinance 
for 15 years, the last 10 years as a business 
manager. As part of his work with FDL, he 
advises other microfinance institutions in 
Central America.
Nyotumba Bonaventure
Artist/graphic designer
Email nyotsz@yahoo.com, website www.
developmentart.com/artists.htm 
Bonaventure is a freelance designer-cum-
artist based in Nairobi. He has a diploma in 
fine art. He has worked as a designer/paint-
er for Bellerive Foundation, CARE-Kenya, 
Rainbow magazine, Jacaranda Designs, 
Don Bosco, Jericho Church and the Interna-
tional Institute of Rural Reconstruction. He 
specializes in fine and graphic art, product 
design and desktop publishing.
Harry Clemens
Programme officer, financial services 
and enterprise development, HIVOS
Raamweg 16, PO Box 85565, 2508 CG, The 
Hague, Netherlands
Tel. +31 70 376 5500, fax +31 70 362 4600, 
email h.clemens@hivos.nl 
Harry is a development economist who 
graduated from the Free University, Am-
sterdam. He has more than 20 years of 
experience in development projects and 
consultancy services, with emphasis on 
rural development and financial services. 
He has also worked on social development, 
agricultural economics, food security and 
markets. 
Tarekegn Garomsa
Programme officer for planning, 
monitoring and evaluation, Facilita-
tors for Change Ethiopia (FCE)
PO Box 24199, code 1000 or 14180, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel. +251 116621438, 6517535, mobile +251 
913 289151, fax +251 11 618 0654, email 
fce@ethionet.et, taregarom@yahoo.com, 
website www.fce-eth.org 
Tarekegn holds a postgraduate diploma 
in rural development management (spe-
cialized in small and medium enterprises 
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and entrepreneurship development) from 
the International Centre for Entrepreneur-
ship and Career Development, India. He 
obtained his BA in sociology and social 
administration from Addis Ababa Univer-
sity, Ethiopia. He has practical grassroots 
experience in rural development (working 
with farmers’ marketing organizations 
and women’s self-help groups), value 
chain development, project coordination, 
participatory planning, monitoring and 
evaluation, and rural project design and 
implementation.
Straton Habyalimana
Economic development adviser, SNV 
Netherlands Development Organisa-
tion
PO Box 1049, Kigali, Boulevard d 
l’Umwganda 1, Rwanda
Tel. +250 78883 5771, +250 575619, fax 
+250 574671, email shabyarimana@snvworld.
org 
Straton holds an MBA in project manage-
ment and qualifications in economics, 
microfinance and community economic 
development as well as public finance. His 
20 years of experience include teaching, 
management of public finance departments, 
technical support to local organizations (in-
stitutional and organizational development, 
strategic and business planning, training 
and networking), and microfinance. He 
specializes in market research and product 
development for microfinance institutions, 
and business development services for 
small and medium enterprises.
Malcolm Harper
The Old Farm House, 37 Filgrave, 
Buckinghamshire, MK16 9ET, United 
Kingdom
Tel. +44 1234 711764, email malcolm.
harper@btinternet.com 
Malcolm was educated at Oxford, Harvard 
and Nairobi. He worked in marketing in 
England, and then taught at the University 
of Nairobi. He was professor of enterprise 
development at Cranfield, and since 1995 he 
has worked independently, mainly in India. 
He has also worked on poverty issues in 
many other parts of the developing world. 
He has published on self-employment, 
enterprise development, microfinance and 
livelihoods. He was chairman of BASIX 
Finance for 10 years, and is chairman of 
Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd (M-
CRIL). He was the founding editor of Small 
Enterprise Development, and is a director and 
trustee of Homeless International, EDA 
(UK) Ltd, APT Enterprise Development and 
Practical Action Publications in the United 
Kingdom. 
Joseph Kabundi
General director, Caisse des Affaires 
Financières Isonga (CAF Isonga) 
PO Box 140, Gitarama, Rwanda
Tel. +250 788302039, 788524537, fax +250 
252 562230, email jkabundi@yahoo.fr, 
caf_isonga@yahoo.fr 
Joseph has a qualification in development 
studies. His experience includes school 
management, social services to street chil-
dren, and financial and microfinance man-
agement. He is the founder of CAF Isonga, 
a microfinance institution, of which he was 
managing director from 2004 to 2006 and 
chief executive officer from then on.
Paul Karaimu
Knowledge and documentation co-
ordinator, International Institute of 
Rural Reconstruction 
PO Box 66873, Nairobi 00800, Kenya
Tel. +254 20 4442610, 4440991, fax +254 20 
4448814, email paul.karaimu@iirr.org 
Paul holds a BA in communications and a 
certificate in electronic publishing. He has 
experience in writing, editing and compu-
ter-aided design. He previously worked 
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as an editor for a book publisher and as a 
writer/editor for a magazine publisher in 
Kenya. 
Maurits de Koning
International Sales Manager, Wal-
laboo
Email hjmdekoning@hotmail.com 
Maurits is a business economist and cultural 
anthropologist specializing in sustainable 
economic development. His expertise lies 
in business development services, financial 
services (microfinance, savings and credit 
unions) and chain development. Until 2009 
he was an adviser in sustainable economic 
development at the Royal Tropical Institute 
(KIT).
Anna Laven
Adviser in sustainable economic de-
velopment, Royal Tropical Institute 
(KIT)
PO Box 95001, 1090 HA Amsterdam, 
Netherlands
Tel. +31 205688207, fax +31 205688444, 
email a.laven@kit.nl 
Anna holds an MA in political science and 
environmental management, and is finaliz-
ing her PhD on governance and upgrading 
in value chains. Her experience includes 
research, teaching, multi-stakeholder work-
shops, proposal writing and policy making. 
She specializes in sustainable development 
issues and value chain development.
Billy O Mathu
Project officer, Kenya Gatsby Trust
PO Box 16052, Nairobi 00610, Kenya
Tel. +254 20 2720711, 2720703, fax +254 
20 2721707, email bmathu@kenyagatsby.
org, bllymathu@yahoo.co.uk, website www.
kenyagatsby.org 
Billy is a certified public accountant with 
experience in financial modelling and 
analysis, project monitoring, business train-
ing and advisory services. He is involved in 
financial product development and promo-
tion of factoring products. He is currently 
studying for an MBA with a speciality in 
strategic management. 
Oliver Mundy
Student, Philipps University of Mar-
burg
Müllenberg 5a, 51515 Kürten, Germany
Tel. +49 2268 801691, fax +49 2268 801692, 
email oliver@mamud.com 
Oliver is studying for his bachelor’s degree 
in geography, and expects to graduate in 
2010 after a year’s study at the Sorbonne in 
Paris. He recently completed 11 months of 
community service with Growing Nations, 
an NGO in Lesotho, where he grew maize 
and beans for AIDS orphans using conser-
vation agriculture techniques, and taught 
computer skills to the NGO staff and local 
young people.
Paul Mundy
Independent consultant in develop-
ment communication
Müllenberg 5a, 51515 Kürten, Germany
Tel. +49 2268 801691, fax +49 2268 801692, 
email paul@mamud.com, website www.
mamud.com 
Paul is a British consultant in develop-
ment communication. He holds a PhD in 
journalism and mass communications from 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He 
specializes in easy-to-understand extension 
materials, developed through intensive 
writeshops like the one used to produce 
this book. He also provides consultancy 
services in various aspects of development 
communication. He has worked exten-
sively in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
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Paul Maundu Mwilu
Microfinance officer, K-Rep Devel-
opment Agency
PO Box 10528, Nairobi 00100, Kenya
Tel. +254 721 902 731, email 
maundumwilu@yahoo.com 
Paul holds a degree in sociology and eco-
nomics from Egerton University, Kenya, 
and has received a postgraduate advanced 
certificate in marketing management. He 
has worked in microfinance, specializing in 
new product development for K-Rep Devel-
opment Agency for financing values chains 
in poultry, dairy, cotton and honey.
Joseph Muriithi Ndegwa
Coordinator/senior training and de-
velopment consultant, Future Focus 
Development
PO Box 328, Naivasha 20117, Kenya
Tel. +254 733858953, 726275442, email 
jmundegwa@yahoo.com, fdevelopment7@
gmail.com 
Joseph holds a BA in human and social 
studies (specializing in development stud-
ies) from the University of South Africa, 
Pretoria, diplomas in agriculture and com-
munity-based development, and a cer-
tificate in agricultural extension. He has 26 
years of experience in public and private or-
ganizations, managing integrated projects 
involving capacity building and training. 
He has provided consultancy services in 
project design, implementation, capacity 
building, monitoring and evaluation. Until 
2009, he was agricultural coordinator with 
the economic programme of Nakuru Region 
Inter-Diocesan Christian Community Serv-
ices (NRIDCCS). He is accredited as a busi-
ness development service provider by the 
Kenya Dairy Board/Ministry of Livestock 
Development. He also lectures part-time to 
diploma students at the Kenya Institute of 
Management.
Joseph Njoroge Ndirangu
Farmer and secretary, Kwieria Tangi 
Women Group
PO Box 42, Rumuruti, Kenya
Tel. +254 725692764
Joseph graduated from Kisumu Technical 
High School and has gathered a wide range 
of experience in general construction. He is 
specialized in carpentry, joinery, metalwork 
and masonry, as well as being experienced 
in farm management. He has earned a cer-
tificate in facilitation from a farmer field 
school. He is involved in several farmer 
groups as a mobilizer and group member, 
and helps manage a community-based 
organization, the Kwieria Tangi Women 
Group, that constructs water tanks for its 
members and has gone into chilli produc-
tion to earn money. 
Callixte Niyonsaba
Farmer and member, COPRORIZ 
c/o PO Box 140, Gitarama, Rwanda
Tel. +250 788681267
Callixte is a farmer who started growing 
rice in 2003 as an add-on to his usual crops, 
maize and sorghum. He is a member of the 
Mukunguli rice producers’ cooperative, 
COPRORIZ.
Janet Nyaoro
Regional training manager, Interna-
tional Institute of Rural Reconstruc-
tion, Africa Regional Center
PO Box 66873, Nairobi 00800, Kenya
Tel. +254 722 230168, 20 444 2610, fax +254 
20 444 8814, email janet.nyaoro@iirr.org, 
website www.iirr.org 
Janet is a trainer/facilitator with 9 years 
of experience in training in the for-profit 
and humanitarian sectors. At IIRR, she 
facilitates training on participatory monitor-
ing and evaluation, community-managed 
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disaster risk reduction and value chain de-
velopment, and also facilitates workshops 
and writeshops. She is also involved in 
organizational development, baseline sur-
veys and capacity assessment for national 
and regional programmes. She holds a 
BEd in economics and geography and a 
postgraduate diploma in human resource 
management.
Marcio Oblitas Fernández 
General manager, Sartawi Founda-
tion
PO Box 8050, La Paz, Bolivia
Tel. +591 2 2481000 or 591 2 2482000, 
mobile +591 70195195, fax +591 2 2487000, 
email marcio.oblitas@sartawi.org, marcio_
oblitas@hotmail.com, website www.sartawi.
org 
A civil engineer by training, Marcio has a 
postgraduate degree in microfinance and 
specializations in social management and 
the management of projects. He has expe-
rience in rural development and financial 
analysis with several programmes funded 
by the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the World Bank, USAID, GTZ and others. 
In addition, he serves as vice-president of 
FINRURAL (Bolivian Network of Financial 
Institutions for Rural Development), as an 
assembly member of the Sartawi Founda-
tion, and assembly president of FOCADES 
(an NGO that provides technical assistance 
to micro-entrepreneurs).
aileen ogolla
Regional communications manager, 
International Institute of Rural Re-
construction
PO Box 66873, Nairobi 00800, Kenya
Tel. +254 722 230168, 20 444 2610, fax +254 
20 444 8814, email aileen.ogolla@iirr.org, 
website www.iirr.org 
Aileen holds an MA in communication. 
She has experience in various activities in 
communication, training facilitation and 
programme coordination.
Alfred Ombati
Artist/graphic designer
PO Box 64427, Nairobi 00600, Kenya
Tel. +254 723 350628, 721 420806, email 
aholiabsart@yahoo.com 
Alfred is a freelance artist who has been in-
volved in publication projects with various 
NGOs, including the International Institute 
of Rural Reconstruction, Médecins Sans 
Frontières, and the African Technology 
Policy Studies Network; publishing com-
panies including Cover Concept, Oxford 
University Press, Sahel Book Publishing 
Co., and the Ministry of Education; and 
advertising agencies such as Lowe Scanad, 
McCann Erickson, and Quite Bright Films. 
He also does fine arts (painting), murals 
and printing.
Beeranna Palyam
Zonal manager, Reliance Dairy 
Foods Limited
Plot 405, Ashtalaxmi Apartments, Station 
Road, Mahabubnagar 509001, Andhra 
Pradesh, India
Tel. +91 99 897 73799, email beeranna_
palyam@rediffmail.com 
Beeranna earned his bachelor’s degree in 
veterinary science in 1977. He has 31 years 
of experience in dairy development, project 
preparation and institution building, in-
cluding buffalo breeding (for the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research), animal 
management, the formation of cooperative 
societies, and milk procurement. He was 
also involved in implementing a training 
and employment programme in Karnataka. 
As zonal manager with Reliance Dairy 
Foods, he manages cooperatives and helps 
integrate them with Reliance’s corporate 
business activities. 
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niranjan pattni
Managing director, BioRe Tanzania 
Limited
PO Box 49, Meatu District, Mwamishali-
Shinyanga, Tanzania
Tel. +255 28 2795090, mobile +255 
784860854, fax +255 28 2795027, email 
niranjan.pattni@biore-tanzania.com 
Niranjan is the managing director of a com-
pany that grows organic cotton, and has 
worked there since the company’s found-
ing. After graduating from high school, 
he worked for two years as a teacher in a 
primary school, before beginning work in a 
textile mill. He retired as general manager 
from the mill in 1996. Niranjan has a lot of 
experience in the textile industry and in 
cotton-growing with smallholder farmers 
in Tanzania.
Lucian Peppelenbos
Learning manager, Dutch Sustain-
able Trade Initiative
Waterstraat 47, Postbus 48, 3500 AA  
Utrecht, Netherlands
Tel. +31 30 2363 488 / 485, fax +31 
30 2312 804, email peppelenbos@
dutchsustainabletrade.com 
Lucian holds a PhD in agricultural sciences 
from Wageningen University, where he 
specialized in value chain management. 
Until 2009 he was a senior adviser at the 
Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), where he 
worked on pro-poor business development 
in Africa, Latin America, and India. Before 
this, he worked in Chile as a management 
consultant for export agribusiness firms, 
farmer cooperatives and international 
agencies. Lucian has recently joined the 
Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative, where 
he works on the mainstreaming of sustain-
ability in international commodity chains.
Nagabhushana Clospet 
Satyanarayana Rao 
Senior consultant, Catalyst Group 
19, 1st Main, 1st Cross, Ashwathnagar, RMV 
2nd Stage, Bangalore 560 094, India
Tel. +91 9343829737, +91 80 23419616. 80 
23417714, email nagabhushana@cms-india.
org, website www.catalysts.org, www.swasti.
org
Nagabhushana holds postgraduate degrees 
in statistics and economics and has some 
30 years of experience in the development 
sector. His experience includes conducting 
evaluation studies, value chain analyses, 
baseline surveys, training, database man-
agement, and preparing proposals and 
reports. He has extensive experience in 
working on assignments funded by the 
World Bank, Danida, DfID, and GTZ, as 
well as government and non-government 
organizations in India. He has been a mis-
sion member for Danida and GTZ to review 
institutional aspects of watershed projects 
in India.
Luisa Santur Alberca
Microenterprise services manager, 
Fomento de la Vida (Fovida)
Av. Javier Prado Oeste 109, Magdalena del 
Mar, Lima 17, Peru
Tel. +51 1 2617548, fax +51 1 4610106, email 
luisa@fovida.org.pe 
Luisa has experience in the design, monitor-
ing and supervising of micro-enterprise de-
velopment and income-generation projects. 
She previously worked at the Employment 
Department in the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Promotion. She has worked for the 
NGO Fovida since 1990, where she headed 
the Department of Economic Development 
and the Program for Enterprise Affairs, be-
fore becoming manager of Micro-enterprise 
Services. In addition, she has completed her 
studies for her master’s degree in sociology 
from the Catholic University of Peru. 
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Alexandra Schütze
Board member, Fondo de Desarrollo 
Local (FDL)
Edificio FDL, Campus Universitario, 
Universidad Centro Americana (UCA), 
Managua, Nicaragua
Tel. +505 2774245, email alexschutze@gmail.
com 
Alexandra holds an MSc in finance, an 
MBA, and a BS in sociology. She has been 
working mainly with financial service 
providers in capital markets, banking and 
microfinance. Her experience includes mar-
keting, services and product development, 
strategic analysis, finance and operations. 
She has been a member of FDL’s Board since 
2003. She is now a consultant in financial 
institution management and small and 
medium enterprise development.
Sarah Simpson
Communications officer, Royal 
Tropical Institute (KIT)
PO Box 95001, 1090 HA, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands
Tel. +31 20 568 8301, +31 20 568 8444, email 
s.simpson@kit.nl 
A Canadian citizen, Sarah is a communica-
tions officer for KIT Development Policy 
and Practice, a department of the Royal 
Tropical Institute. Previously she worked 
as an editor and technical writer. She has 
a background in English literature and a 
degree in biochemistry.
Amit Kumar Singh 
Programme Manager, ACDI/VOCA
ASI, 2/34, Vipul Khand, Gomati Nagar, 
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh 226010, India
Tel. +91 9956999684, email asinghks@gmail.
com 
Amit has experience in conceptualizing, 
executing and managing socio-economic 
development projects. He is a specialist 
in development research, livelihood pro-
motion, cluster development and micro-
enterprise promotion. He has published 
many articles on these subjects in national 
and international journals. He has worked 
with the United Nations Industrial Devel-
opment Organization as a national expert 
on the sal leaf industry. At the time this 
book was written he was state coordinator 
of the Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods 
Project, www.mprlp.in, www.ruralenterprise.
blogspot.com.
Ephrem Soosai
Chief executive, South Indian Feder-
ation of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS)
Karamana, Trivandrum, Kerala 695 002, 
India 
Tel. +91 471 2343711, 2343178, mobile +91 
9443143711, fax +91 471 2342053, email 
ephrem.siffs@gmail.com, website www.siffs.
org 
After graduating, Ephrem joined a village-
level fish marketing society, one of the 
base-level organizations in the three-tier 
structure of the South Indian Federation 
of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS). Now he is 
the head of the organization, having spent 
his whole career with the organization and 
holding many positions within it, starting 
from the grassroots level. He has attended 
many training courses in India and interna-
tionally on microfinance.
Mendu Srinivasulu 
Head, livelihood initiatives, Krishna 
Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank 
Ltd, BASIX Group
7-4-58/1, P C Towers, Ground floor, 
Venkateshwara Colony, Mahabubnagar 
509002, Andhra Pradesh, India
Tel. +91 93 900 36621, +91 8542 273383/84, 
email sreenivasulu.m@basixindia.com, 
mendusreenivas@gmail.com, website www.
basixindia.com 
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Julia Wagemann
Student, Philipps University of Mar-
burg
Zischendorf 9, 91555 Feuchtwangen, 
Germany
Tel. +49 7950 9269512, fax +49 7950 1431, 
email wagemann.julia@gmx.de 
Julia is currently studying for her bach-
elor’s degree in geography at the Philipps 
University of Marburg. She specializes in 
physical geography and her main interest 
is in geographical information systems 
and climatology. In 2010 she will complete 
her degree with a year’s study in Quebec, 
Canada, after which she is considering 
studying for a master’s degree.
Mendu holds a postgraduate diploma in 
business administration with marketing 
specialization and also a diploma in agricul-
ture from Acharya NG Ranga Agricultural 
University. He has 14 years of field experi-
ence in agriculture and related development 
activities, including providing agricultural, 
business and institutional development 
services to small and marginal producers 
of cotton, rice, red gram and milk. He has 
worked for 8 years in microfinance to link 
producer groups with formal business 
development services. Before joining the 
BASIX group in 2001, he worked with Ster-
ling Tree Magnum (I) Ltd, Rallis India and 
Ikisan.com in various capacities.
